Back in March 2023, we provided an analysis of  “Undersea Telecommunications Cables and the Seabed as Geopolitical Contested Arenas” which, at the time, we framed relative to a great power competition with China:  “Along with Africa and the Arctic, add the growing tensions between the U.S. and China about undersea cable deployment and seabed warfare to your geopolitical tracking, risk awareness, and strategic impacts for your business or organization.” Enter the Houthis – who allegedly have opened an undersea-based front in the conflict in the Middle East.  Details here. 

Red Sea underwater data cables cut as Houthi attacks continue

As reported by C4ISR.com:  Three Red Sea underwater cables providing internet and telecommunications around the world have been cut as the waterway remains a target of Yemen’s Houthi rebels, officials said Monday [March 4th]. Meanwhile, a suspected Houthi attack set a ship ablaze in the Gulf of Aden.  What cut the lines remains unclear. There has been concern about the cables being targeted in the Houthi campaign, which the rebels describe as an effort to pressure Israel to end its war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have denied attacking the lines, however.

The cut lines include Asia-Africa-Europe 1, the Europe India Gateway, Seacom, and TGN-Gulf, Hong Kong-based HGC Global Communications said. It described the cuts as affecting 25% of the traffic flowing through the Red Sea. It described the Red Sea route as crucial for data moving from Asia to Europe and said it had begun rerouting traffic.  HGC Global Communications described the Seacom-TGN-Gulf line as being two separate cables when it is one at the area of the cut, according to Tim Stronge, a subsea cable expert with TeleGeography, a Washington-based telecommunications market research company.  Responding to questions from The Associated Press, Seacom said that “initial testing indicates the affected segment lies within Yemeni maritime jurisdictions in the Southern Red Sea.” It said it was rerouting the traffic it was able to change, though some services were down.

In early February, Yemen’s internationally recognized government in exile alleged that the Houthis planned to attack the cables. The lines appeared to have been cut on Feb. 24, with the organization NetBlocks noticing internet access in the East African nation of Djibouti suffering from interruptions two days later. Seacom serves Djibouti. There have been disruptions in Bahrain as well, a Persian Gulf island kingdom also served by the lines.

But for their part, the Houthis have denied targeting the cables. The rebels blamed the disruptions on British and U.S. military operations but did not offer evidence to support the allegation and have made false claims in the past.  It remains unclear how the Houthis could attack subsea cables themselves. The rebels are not known to have the diving or salvage capability to target the lines, which sit hundreds of meters (feet) below the surface of the waterway. However, subsea cables can be cut by anchors, including those dropped from some of the ships that have been disabled in attacks. A drifting ship with its anchor scraping the sea could be the culprit.  “Our team thinks it is plausible that it could have been affected by anchor dragging, due to the amount of marine traffic the region deals with and the low seabed in many parts of the Red Sea,” Seacom said. “This can only be confirmed once the repair ship is on site.”

There are 14 cables now running through the Red Sea, with another six planned, Stronge, the subsea cable expert, said.  “We estimate that over 90% of communications between Europe and Asia traverse submarine cables in the Red Sea,” he said. “Fortunately, telecom operators have built a high degree of redundancy into the system — there are many cables traversing the Red Sea.”

Houthi rebels present little threat to undersea cables, US admiral says

“The Russian Navy remains the greatest threat to the U.S. in the undersea domain”

Only weeks before the undersea sabotage described above, U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Michael Brookes provided a contrasting view on the capabilities of the Houthis to pull off such an attack:

“Threats by Houthi rebels based in Yemen to slice a lattice of undersea cables in the Red Sea region, jeopardizing communications and financial data, are unrealistic, according to the commander of the Office of U.S. Naval Intelligence.  Veiled threats were published on social media channels associated with the Iran-backed militant group in December and were later amplified by Hezbollah, according to the Middle East Media Research Institute. The posts featured maps of the area, including the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, where fiber-optic cables run, and chatter about international connectivity.

Asked at the West conference in San Diego if he thought such threats were realistic — if extremists could execute such sabotage — U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Michael Brookes said: “I’m not so sure it is.”  “The Russian Navy remains the greatest threat to the U.S. in the undersea domain,” said Brookes, whose organization collects, analyzes and distributes intelligence about foreign forces.  The Houthis need not turn to undersea cables to “continue to pose a significant maritime threat or to be able to continue escalating in the maritime domain,” Behnam Ben Taleblu, an Iran specialist at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington, D.C., said in an interview. “I would expect more anti-ship missile and drone attacks.”

What Next?

Pentagon tech hub hires Anduril to get large underwater drone to Navy

The Defense Innovation Unit awarded Anduril Industries a contract that will get its Dive family of large-diameter autonomous underwater vehicles into the hands of sailors for operations this year.  The award comes after DIU selected the Dive-LD platform to perform in a “swim-off” last year that put commercially available large unmanned underwater vehicles through an obstacle course to assess their maturity and applicability to conduct “distributed, long-range, persistent underwater sensing and payload delivery in a contested environment,” according to a Feb. 8 Anduril news release.

Anduril’s chief strategy officer, Chris Brose, told Defense News the company had worked on maturing and demonstrating the Dive-LD vehicle for the last two years, but the contract now provides a mechanism to get the drone into the hands of sailors across varied geographies and unit types so they can “start solving a lot of different problems across the seabed and undersea domain.” The vehicle is made using advanced manufacturing processes, and the outer shell is 3D printed. Brose said this means the company can scale up production to meet demand under this DIU contract and others that may follow.  He referred to this DIU effort as a “breakthrough opportunity” that’s led to Anduril “really beginning to invest and facilitate for larger-scale production, which is something we’re doing in other parts of the business.”

EU countries are also wading into fighting seabed threats with drones and sensors as their respective navies try to keep up in the cat-and-mouse game of seabed warfare

 The Strategic Implications of Undersea Telecommunications Cables and the Seabed

The complex interplay between technology, security, and geopolitics should reinforce the need for a nuanced understanding of infrastructure  – not just physical assets, but as pivotal elements in the broader strategic calculus of nations and corporations alike.

Undersea Telecommunications Cables

• The undersea domain as a growing threat vector poses a threat to global connectivity, national security, and economic vitality. 
• Undersea telecommunications cables are the backbone of international internet traffic, carrying approximately 97% of it between continents, and are not just physical infrastructures but are pivotal assets in the geopolitics of information.
• Their significance cannot be overstated; they are the silent workhorses of the global economy, enabling everything from financial transactions to personal communications to flow with seemingly effortless speed across the globe.
• Besides the recent sabotage of the cables in the Red Sea, this critical infrastructure also has a host of constant vulnerabilities:  the physical integrity of these cables is at constant risk from natural hazards, such as earthquakes and shark bites, and human activities, including fishing and anchor drags.
• As the recent cut cables in the Middle East illustrate, the strategic importance of these cables makes them a potential target for state and non-state actors seeking to disrupt global communications as a form of asymmetric warfare:  The act of severing a cable, a seemingly low-tech strategy, could have cascading effects on both national security and the global economy, illustrating the paradox of our advanced technological reliance on such physically vulnerable assets.
• The ownership and control of these cables further complicate their strategic implications: the fact that major tech companies and, in some cases, state-affiliated entities own significant portions of this infrastructure raises questions about data sovereignty, surveillance, and geopolitical leverage. For instance, the U.S. government’s intervention to prevent a cable connection to Hong Kong due to concerns over Chinese ownership underscores the national security dimensions intertwined with these undersea networks.

The Seabed

• The seabed, as the physical domain through which these cables are laid, is becoming a contested space:  The increasing strategic competition in underwater domains, highlighted by incidents such as the mysterious fires on Russian deep-diving subs, points to a future where the seabed is not just a route for cables but a domain of military and intelligence contestation.
• The future of undersea telecommunications cables and the seabed as strategic assets will likely be characterized by increased efforts to protect and secure these vital infrastructures:  This could include the development of more resilient cable designs, enhanced surveillance and patrolling of critical undersea routes, and international agreements on the protection of undersea infrastructure.
• The strategic importance of these assets may also drive innovation in alternative communication technologies, such as satellite networks, to diversify and secure global connectivity channels.

NOTE:  This OODA Loop Original Analysis was partially generated with the cognitive augmentation of and in collaboration with ALTzero Project – MattGPT.

Additional OODA Loop Resources

Undersea Telecommunications Cables and the Seabed as Geopolitical Contested Arenas: Along with Africa and the Arctic, add the growing tensions between the U.S. and China about undersea cable deployment and seabed warfare to your geopolitical tracking, risk awareness, and strategic impacts for your business or organization. Find an overview of the core issues, tensions, and What’s Next? here.

Russian Attack On Undersea Energy Infrastructure Means Businesses Should Prepare For More Infrastructure Attacks (including Space and Undersea comms): Russia’s sabotage of the Nordstream pipelines in the Baltic was probably done for many reasons. Just before Russia invaded Ukraine they conducted tests of space-based attack systems. Now they have shown they can attack undersea systems and will do so when they want.  For planning purposes, we can assess the attacks that were done to signal that Russia does not care about the EU as a market so no sanctions can be levied that will matter.

Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompts global repercussions on supply chains and cybersecurity. This act highlights potential threats from nations like China and could shift defense postures, especially in countries like Japan. See: Russia Threat Brief

Israel and Gaza: The horrors of war in the region are also giving rise to uncertainty in markets, but for now it seems the war will not spread throughout the Middle East. There were many initiatives between Israel and Arab/Persian nations that have been stalled due to the war.

Economic Weakness in China: China’s economy faces dim prospects exacerbated by disasters, COVID-19, and geopolitical tensions. Amid limited financial transparency, some indicators suggest China’s economic growth is severely stunted, impacting global economic stability. See: China Threat Brief

Networked Extremism: The digital era enables extremists worldwide to collaborate, share strategies, and self-radicalize. Meanwhile, advanced technologies empower criminals, making corruption and crime interwoven challenges for global societies. See: Converging Insurgency, Crime and Corruption

Food Security and Inflation: Food security is emerging as a major geopolitical concern, with droughts and geopolitical tensions exacerbating the issue. Inflation, directly linked to food security, is spurring political unrest in several countries. See: Food Security

Demographic Time Bomb: Industrialized nations face demographic challenges, with a growing elderly population outnumbering the working-age demographic. Countries like Japan and China are at the forefront, feeling the economic and social ramifications of an aging society. See: Global Risks and Geopolitical Sensemaking

Geopolitical-Cyber Risk Nexus: The interconnectivity brought by the Internet has made regional issues affect global cyberspace. Now, every significant event has cyber implications, making it imperative for leaders to recognize and act upon the symbiosis between geopolitical and cyber risks. See The Cyber Threat

Embracing Corporate Intelligence and Scenario Planning in an Uncertain Age: Apart from traditional competitive challenges, businesses also confront external threats, many of which are unpredictable. This environment amplifies the significance of Scenario Planning. It enables leaders to envision varied futures, thereby identifying potential risks and opportunities. All organizations, regardless of their size, should allocate time to refine their understanding of the current risk landscape and adapt their strategies. See: Scenario Planning