This post provides observations and compelling views on the threat of intrusive surveillance technologies.
The global surveillance technology industry continues to promulgate across the globe as more governments and their law enforcement and intelligence agencies acquire the tools necessary to expand their visibility and reach. According to one U.S. think tank, between 2011 and 2023, at least 74 governments had contracts with commercial companies to acquire spyware technology. What’s more, the countries in which these industries and companies are most prominent are not exclusive to authoritarian regimes like China and Russia. Per Privacy International, European countries and the United States are also significant providers of such surveillance worldwide, including to government customers that do not have legal restrictions for their use, which is indicative that there is substantial appetite for these technologies. Perhaps no country better exemplifies the push to develop these technologies and market them globally than Israel.
In a 2016 report on the Global Surveillance Industry, there were 27 Israeli companies identified as purveyors of these tools, which at the time was the highest number per capita of any country in the world. Since that time, several Israeli companies have gained global notoriety for how their products have been used to aid governments surveil, spy, and monitor targets of interest. Notably, the questionable activities associated with the NSO Group product Pegasus demonstrated the pervasive use of such tools against dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, and political oppositionists worldwide. But NSO Group is not alone. Other Israeli companies such as Cellebrite, Cytrox, and Candiruare also prominent in the space, and have been linked to cyber attacks against journalists. Though recent news reporting has highlighted how such tools have been abused, the fact that this industry continues to grow shows that there is sufficient financial reward for other companies to fill the void of companies that have been outed, and in some cases like with NSO Group, penalized.
A 2023 Israel Innovation Authority annual report revealed that the country’s hi-tech industry is an integral component driving Israel’s economy, contributing more than 18% to the GDP, and doubling within a decade in 2022. Equally compelling is how Israel’s cyber-related companies has increased the country’s comparative advantage with more than 40% of new start ups having a cyber focus and over half of investments made dedicated to the cyber sector. Another factor may be the fact that Israeli government and military cyber experts are taking their skills to the private surveillance industry, using their knowledge to develop advanced and sophisticated offerings that command high price points on the open market. Therefore, it is little surprise that Israel is a major exporter of such technologies. Per the U.S. think tank’s findings, 56 out of 74 governments have procured spyware and digital forensics from firms based in or affiliated with Israel.
But perhaps more interesting are the customers purchasing these technologies. While many would suspect, and correctly so, that authoritarian regimes are good patrons based on their need to use intrusive means to sustain their interests, other foreign governments are also known to be buyers as well. Notably, the recent establishment of the Abraham Accords has provided a way for Israel to sell such equipment to Middle East governments like Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates who have traditionally been adversarial to Israeli interests. Because Israel’s government has significant influence over its cybersecurity industry, under its laws, its Defense Ministry considers geopolitics prior to issuing export licenses to Israeli manufacturers in order sell their offensive cyber weapons and tools. The Abraham Accords have facilitated such sales and may have been a contributing factor to Israel’s cyber industry raising USD 8.8. billion in 2021, one year after the first Accords were signed. While a direct correlation cannot be made as to the raise in revenue, certainly the normalization of relations has lowered the barriers for Israel to sell its products to these governments.
More interesting customers of these tools are Western governments, especially those with the in-house capability to develop such tools and/or an in-country industry able to supply them. While the reasons for their acquisition may be as simple as cost or tool utility, their purchase suggests that the products themselves are not questionable as to how they are used. For example, one U.S. law enforcement entity purchased NSO Group spyware even after the United States blacklisted the group in 2021. This demonstrates that democracies are not against using the tools even if assertions are made that they are used in a responsible and law-abiding manner. After all, both authoritarian and democratic governments have been associated with unlawful surveillance practices calling into question if less than transparent procurement of such tools are to be knowingly used in dubious practices. As the think tank pointed out, governments can circumvent export restrictions if they so desire, making such measures only as effective as the government wants them to be. This certainly projects inconsistencies with respect to their views on intrusion technology.
Despite growing concern of privacy and human rights abuses inflicted by these technologies, it appears that punitive action remains limited. This sends the message that they will continue to be leveraged by governments who likely will point to “national security” and geopolitical benefit as justification, though these perceptions are left up to interpretation and viewed through prisms of bias. After all, it is difficult to condemn an authoritarian regime for unlawful spying when democratic governments have done the same. Though the NSO Group is still in business, there is some indication that being blacklisted by the United States hurt its bottom line substantially, raising the possibility that global bans on these products might not reign in their use. But that would require governments to back what they say with action, not rhetoric.
As a government tool, the advantages of intrusion technology to monitor and surveil threats are obvious and can potentially yield substantial intelligence gains, as well as evidence to support criminal prosecution. However, oversight and accountability for their use appears substantially lacking, and the risk of their over reach in other matters is considerable, even for a leading democracy like the United States that has been embroiled in allegations of spying on political opponents, and other law enforcement infractions. Thus, the question remains – does the appetite to use such powerful technologies outweigh the need for their strict and consistent regulation?
There is an argument to be made that there is enough interest in intrusive surveillance that will sustain this industry for the foreseeable future, as the bad guys will continue to use them regardless. But this is an opportunity for democracies to lead by example, especially at a time when there appears to be no real interest in reigning in government activities in cyberspace. Global democracies need to come together to implement guidelines on how these technologies should be responsibly used, and a way that they can be held accountable if they are not. There is a big difference between leveraging these technologies to break up impending true national security threats and spying on political parties, political oppositionists, or even friendly nations. Democratic nations know better, and more importantly, should demonstrate that they do. Because what makes democracy popular is that it’s not an easy path forward but a better one, and as such, it requires effort on behalf of democratic governments to adhere to the principles that they promote. And this includes protecting the people in its charge, not targeting them.
