The article represents an excellent overview and historical context examination of the complexion of the current insurgency in Iraq : its divergent insurgent groups and their apparent strategic mindsets and motivations, or lack thereof. The article echoes similar TRC analyses over the past year on the Iraq insurgency, most recently the February 16, 2005 WAR Report.

As the author James Bennet eloquently notes, the motivations and revolutionary agendas of the various insurgent groups in Iraq remain rather opaque, fluid, and at times baffling in their apparent nihilism. The kaleidoscope of insurgent groups does not seem to rally around a common revolutionary agenda or end-state aside from combating, destabilizing, and ultimately ousting the embryonic Iraqi government and occupying foreign personnel. Thus, it remains critical in counter-insurgency efforts to identify and understand the particular motivations of each group in order to develop the most advantageous and effective defensive and offensive counter-insurgency strategies (see the February 16 WAR Report). In particular, a group?s strategic mindset and motivations will generally influence and compel corollary target preferences and attack modus operandi that serve the group?s overall strategy and goals. Thus, by deriving these operational particularities, counter-terrorism forces would be better able to predict and counter targeting preferences and attack MO.