Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Jawad Maliki?s policy position on the disbandment of sectarian militias?absorbing them into the national government?s security forces?may, if done thoroughly, may be advisable. As this analyst has assessed, sectarian militias have emerged as arguably the most dangerous, destabilizing, and entrenched rogue sub-state militant groupings in Iraq . Sectarian militias not only challenge the national government?s monopoly of violence in Iraq, but also serve as the primary catalysts convulsing Iraq toward sectarian killings and civil war. US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad , as quoted in the Los Angeles Times article, eloquently summed up the desire on the part of the US that the militias be disbanded: ?There is a need for a decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration plan for these unauthorized military formations so that the monopoly for the use of force will be in the hands of authorized people in the Iraqi government.?
While some might argue that the ideal policy solution for disbanding the militias would likely involve marshalling the political resolve among Iraqi officials and developing the military and intelligence faculties to confront and destroy the most operationally capable and rogue militia elements, this option is unlikely to be realized in the near-term. The militias seem to enjoy significant support from both their attendant political patrons and from their particular sectarian-political constituency. Some Iraqi leaders who have rode to or reinforced power and ?street creds? via their militia?s muscle will understandably be reluctant to disband them. As this analyst has suggested, the particular ethnic-religious-political sectarian groupings have emerged as the true, organic power groupings in Iraq. Further, Iraqi security forces, many rife with militia members or personnel harboring sectarian loyalties seem to remain operationally incapable of bringing the militias to heel. Thus, even if it were possible, a wide-ranging and robust crackdown against the militias may be strategically ill-advised, as it is likely to result in both vigorous and bloody fighting and the potential rallying of greater societal support for the militias.
Rather, as the militias are de facto sectarian insurgent groups, a more feasible and advantageous counter-militia strategy in the near-term would utilize some elements of classic counterinsurgency strategies. These strategies employ synergized political-military-societal initiatives aimed at:
? combating the most violent and destabilizing elements,
? sapping the group of its militant energies, and
? eroding the base of societal support for the particular insurgent group.
Maliki?s policy of absorbing the sectarian militias into the national security forces may be a pragmatic option if the militias are fully demobilized, integrated, and dispersed into the security forces such that the sectarian groupings do not carry on as potential fifth columns within the security forces. This will prove difficult to achieve. Rather, a more advantageous near-term outcome could be the operational containment, pacification, and organizational erosion of militias as groundwork for their eventual disbandment. To achieve this, an integrated and synergized campaign must be designed that applies instrumental military, political, and societal initiatives against the militias and their supporters.
The critical first step in this counter-militia campaign is to dampen the ability of militias to conduct sectarian targeted killings, thus eroding the most galvanizing motivation for forming and supporting sectarian militias?communal defense?and the primary catalyst of sectarian civil war. This first step would be to clamp down militarily, to separate, and to contain militias within their communal geographic areas both to prevent incursions between provinces and to protect minority enclaves. This could be achieved by inserting military forces between rival sectarian provinces, townships, and enclaves, and establishing geographic and behavioral ?red lines,? dictating that the militias will face uncompromising military ripostes should they attempt anti-government violence, incursions into rival provinces, harassment or killings of rival groupings, or any collaboration with jihadist terrorist elements. Iraqi and US forces should be used to conduct surgical military operations to degrade elements violating these conditions, the most operationally provocative elements, and those receiving support and/or guidance from potentially hostile foreign powers such as Iran (see this WAR Report). A parallel step, similar to Maliki?s policy of absorbing militias into the security forces, would be to redirect and co-opt the militant energies of sectarian militias for the national good by ?civilianizing? them with a degree of autonomy via agreements that the militias will serve with local police forces as provincial security forces. Political and economic incentives can be offered to militia members in return for demobilization.
A critical element of this overall strategy is aimed at sapping the militias? energies by eroding their constituency and factors, conditions, and grievances that energize societal support. In addition to dampening the operational capabilities of militias to conduct targeted killings of rival groups and to erode societal support for the militias as communal defense groups, Iraqi national security forces that can impose security and gradually supplant militias must be developed and deployed. In tandem with this is a weaning of Iraqi leaders and political parties from their dependence upon private militias, while the national government and political power structures take root. Finally, as part of this campaign the Iraqi government must offer and underscore the advantages of communal defense and political empowerment through participation in national security forces and national political processes.
This general strategy is aimed at proving more pragmatic and advantageous in containing, sapping, and eroding sectarian militias. The success of this strategy remains dependent upon the formation and development of a strong national government with the political will and national security forces with the operational faculties to implement it and to cultivate a collective societal mindset and commitment to nationalism and national interests that might overarch parochial sectarian interests.