In addition to terrorist threats from Kashmiri-Islamist groups (Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and al-Qaeda ), violent homegrown Muslim activists (the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) ), and rural Maoist guerrillas (Naxalites ), India is facing an upsurge of attacks from separatist insurgents in its northeastern region. Since the breakdown of peace talks in September 2006, separatist insurgents from Assam have reinvigorated regional attacks against Indian infrastructure and society with no sign of abatement in the near-term.
The preeminent separatist group among the more than 30 rebel armies operating in India?s northeast is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) , which since 1979 has fought for independence, claiming the government has plundered the region of its natural resources of tea, oil, and coal while neglecting to provide the region with basic infrastructure and services. The conflict has claimed 10,000 lives, threatened Assam?s world famous tea industry, and scarred off investors and tourists. Following the breakdown of peace talks between the government and ULFA, separatists have stepped up attacks, and Indian forces have responded with robust counterinsurgency operations in the region. Earlier in November, a ULFA-associated bombing targeted a crowded market in Guwahati (Terrorist Incident forthcoming), the main commercial center of the northeast region, as well as an oil installation (Terrorist Incident forthcoming), killing 12 and wounded about a dozen. In October, twin blasts targeted a Hindu festival in Guwahati, killing one and wounding 10 (Terrorist Incident forthcoming). The ULFA, along with the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), which has close ties to the ULFA, are suspected in the 20 November bombing of a commuter train in West Bengal (Terrorist Incident forthcoming and Intelligence Report) that killed at least eight people and wounded 60. The ULFA has extorted local business, especially tea farmers, to pay protection money.
Security Forecast
The ULFA is believed to maintain bases in neighboring Bangladesh (Country Report); this sanctuary may be threatened should the Awami League political bloc, seen as friendly to India, gain power in upcoming elections there. The political crisis and civil unrest convulsing Bangladesh may serve as an additional catalytic force for ULFA attacks, as the group seeks to exploit its Bangladesh bases in operations before they are potentially jeopardized by an Awami League government. In this vein, observers believe that should the BNP-Jemait coalition be re-elected, the ULFA would invigorate operations.
Until India employs a more holistic counterinsurgency strategy that seeks, in addition to militant direct action, to temper and ameliorate the central motivating grievance of the separatists, the insurgency will likely retain its powerbase and energy. Initiatives that might succeed in tempering this grievance include: 1) increased government services and 2) development projects. With no peace talks on the horizon, the operational tempo of the Assam separatist insurgency will likely continue apace in the near-term.
As the November 20 TRC Intelligence Report notes, the core separatist motivations and strategic goals will likely focus group targeting on functional and symbolic targets of Indian government power, such as military and security forces. Further, that a central motivating grievance of the ULFA is the perceived exploitation of the region?s natural resources by the Indian government, ULFA operations will also likely target Indian industrial and natural resource harvesting infrastructure, as well as Indian, and potentially foreign, companies perceived as complicit in the natural resource exploitation. Past ULFA attacks suggest a modus operandi of hit-and-run guerrilla tactics and bombings targeting Indian security patrols, oil and gas pipelines, transport and telecommunication facilities, and vulnerable population-dense societal targets such as markets, festivals, and public transportation.