Indonesia is girding for the threat of terrorist attacks over the holiday season following a warning from the US Embassy in Jakarta that terrorist attacks ?could occur at any time and could be directed against any location including those frequented by foreigners and identifiably American and other Western facilities or businesses.? The Embassy went on to say: ?In recent years terrorist attacks have occurred in Jakarta and elsewhere during the Christmas and New Year?s holiday season.? In response, Indonesian security forces are stepping up security, deploying 18,000 police and army personnel to protect churches, mosques, public and commercial venues in Jakarta, Christmas celebrations, and tourist areas. National police and regional security analysts remain concerned of renewed attacks because a key terrorist mastermind, Noordin Top, from the regional al-Qaeda -affiliated terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah (JI; Group Profile), remains at large.
The primary significant terrorist threats to Indonesia are from the JI and al-Qaeda terrorist groups. Both groups have robust and sophisticated terrorist capabilities and are driven by the ideological-strategic mindset of militant Islamist extremism, which compels and sanctifies large scale, indiscriminant, and mass casualty attacks particularly against Western targets. Further, these terrorist groups also intend to damage local or Western economies through attacks. Thus, likely targeting priorities for these groups will include venues where westerners congregate, local infrastructure, and areas or assets integral to local economies. This targeting rationale was exemplified in the 2002 bombings of nightclubs frequented by tourists in Bali and the 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel , both blamed on JI. In addition, JI was blamed for a string of bomb attacks against 38 churches or priests on Christmas Eve in 2000 that killed 19 people , indicating an intent to strike at Christian religious venues.
Meanwhile, in Aceh?
The nearly three-decade separatist insurgency of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM; Group Profile) in Aceh province seems to be coming to an end as GAM transitions from rebel guerrilla group to legitimate political party. As part of the peace deal, GAM guerrillas were to lay down their weapons in return for amnesty and financial packages, and the Aceh province was awarded autonomy, including the right to form political parties and a promise of two-thirds of the revenues from abundant local oil and natural gas reserves.
As a landmark element of a 2005 peace deal between the government and GAM, Aceh held its first direct elections for governor and other top political posts last week, with a number of former GAM guerrillas on the slate. Credible poll sampling indicates that Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM commander, is on his way to a landslide victory for governor. Irwandi is forecast to win 39% of the vote, and when taken together with the second place pairing of candidates, also including a GAM representative, the movement is forecast to win essentially 55.5% of the popular vote. Aceh?s election commission will announce the official results of the elections in early January.
Forecast: Peace Will Get its Chance
The strong voter turnout, the relatively generous terms of the peace deal, and Irwandi?s apparent agenda of seeking to consolidate the peace process once he takes power indicate that the peace deal and GAM?s disarmament and transition to political bloc will likely hold. However, the metamorphosis has the potential to be convulsive and violent.
First, integrating thousands of amnestied guerrillas and political prisoners into a local society and the bleak economic environment devastated by the 2004 tsunami will prove challenging. Some former fighters have already turned to banditry and crime.
Also, a degree of political dissonance within the former GAM between old guard leadership who have lived in exile and the new guard of younger guerrillas also reportedly exists. Further, the more action-oriented, hardcore members of the movement may reject disfavored political courses and splinter to renew a violent insurgent campaign. Thus, while political debate and power wrangling is to be expected in any political party, indicators of strident rejection of the peace process may portent preparations for renewed separatist war.
Conclusion
On the whole, the peace deal and elections are a heartening landmark event in the conflict and serve as an exemplar of counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to wage political warfare and work toward a political resolution to a political conflict. The strategy offers political enticements, concessions, and voice in return for disarmament as a means of sapping the insurgency by drawing guerrillas into the political process.
Both sides had seemed weary of the conflict and sobered by the devastation wrought by the tsunami. Soon will come the expectations of competency of GAM commander Irwandi Yusuf to shoulder the burden of leading and administering a province savaged by war and natural disaster.
Thus, Yusuf?s primary focus will undoubtedly be to speed the slow recovery from the tsunami, which killed 170,000 people, including many of the province?s skilled workers and civil servants, and left 500,000 homeless. In a bittersweet turn, this challenge and process of recovery and rebirth may serve as a reformative catalyst for Aceh, its governor, the peace process, and GAM?s transition from insurgency to governance. The tsunami and the peace process have provided a ready new fight toward which the former guerrillas can focus their energies in the service of their nation: rebuilding it.
