In a move billed as a test for other cities, the US Department of Homeland Security announced plans to install a ring of radiation detection devices in and around New York City. Though exact locations will not be made available for security reasons, these devices will be positioned alongside various highways, at or near truck stops and weigh stations, at outlying perimeter locations, and at several sites near NYC?s downtown areas. The $46 million land-based monitoring project should bolster the city?s current sea-based detection capabilities and further safeguard it against the threat of nuclear and/or radiological bombs being smuggled into the city.
A Move in the Right Direction?
If the Cold War era?s standard definition for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) applies, then the utility of such a system is questionable. A detection ring established within or even near a city?s outer limits would provide only minimal levels of protection against the effects of this type of nuclear device, i.e. one with a destructive output measured in tens or hundreds of kilotons, for two reasons.
First, nuclear devices under this classification utilize either highly-enriched uranium (HEU) (either U235 or U233) or plutonium (Pu239), two elements characterized by lengthy half-lives and low levels of radiation emissions that may allow these elements to pass through NYC?s ring undetected. Should they be packaged in a device or shrouded in lead, the probability of detection devices registering their presence decreases further.
Second, the close proximity of the sensors to the city plus the staggering destructive capacity of the weapon suggests that even if authorities were allotted any window within which to take reactionary measures, be they disposal efforts or evacuation proceedings, the window would be miniscule at best. Should the attack be carried out by a suicidal-assailant, the already minute-window would shrink almost entirely. In other words, by the time such a device was detected, it would be too late.
However, if these weapons are, instead, defined by the materials incorporated within them rather than by their resultant outputs, i.e. chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (source), then the purported ring of nuclear detection devices will afford the US?s most populous city with an invaluable additional layer of defense.
The key to the differing definitions is the assailant?s perceived threshold for success. Whereas Cold Warriors found very little utility for devices that caused anything less than near-total destruction, terrorists operate under a substantially lower threshold of success. For them, mass panic and economic loss that would accompany such an attack serve their cause. Accordingly then, terrorists may see very little difference in the value between a Cold War era device or a crude nuclear bomb constructed out of less highly-enriched uranium. Therein rests the impetus for protective measures. Such a device should emit high levels of radiation, increasing the likelihood that detection devices will pick up on the smuggling attempt. Furthermore, as the destructive capabilities of a radiological or nuclear device decrease, the window for emergency response teams? reaction increases. In this situation, when a device or substance is detected, the probability that lives can be saved is significantly higher.
Future Protective Measures
In time, similar measures should, and likely will, be extended to other major US metropolitan areas. In the mean time, however, a much overlooked measure may prove even more beneficial than the ring of detection devices in negating the effects of a CBRN terrorist attack, regardless of the payload size: public awareness campaigns.
The US government appears resigned to the belief that any measure(s) developed to follow a CBRN attack would prove futile since the resultant destruction is expected to be so complete. Such lines of thought are still conditioned by the Cold War?s definition for WMD. In today?s context, an attack with CBRN component devices will likely cause substantially fewer deaths in the short-term. However, in the intermediate- to long-term, the lack of public knowledge and the resultant growing levels of distrust in the government?s ability to provide for its citizens? safety will lead to mass hysteria and staggering body counts. Therefore, an awareness campaign that sheds light on this new weapon?s classification and its true capabilities and also provides instructions on how best to counter such an attack will not only reduce the level of disruption, shorten the recovery time, and save lives, but it should also decrease the attractiveness of such an attack by terrorist organizations. Thus, by decreasing the expected impact of such an attack, authorities can decrease the attractiveness of these weapons to terrorist regimes. And by decreasing the attractiveness, authorities can decrease the likelihood of such an attack occurring upon US soil. This happens to mirror the exact aims of NYC?s nuclear detection ring.
