The AP article compliments earlier TRC analyses (December 1 WAR Report; and March 1 WAR Report) describing the ascendance of the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia within the political and security landscape of Iraq . Once possibly regarded as a thuggish street-warlord, Sadr is emerging as a major force in Iraq?s renaissance and political arena.

Sadr seems to be demonstrating deft political acumen in ratcheting the martial power of his militia against vigorous political maneuvering that seeks apparently to fashion himself as a prime leader of Iraq?s Shia community, buttressed by the Mahdi Army, and as a political leader of the anti-US national liberation movement. With this anti-US platform, Sadr seems to be cultivating broader-based support and alliances among not only Shias, but also hard-line Sunni clerics believed to have links to Sunni insurgent groups. Sadr?s political efforts would seem to be bearing fruit, as his political followers won 30 of the 275 parliament seats in the December elections.

TRC?s coverage of the recent sectarian violence in Iraq highlighted the activities of sectarian militias in seemingly serving as the central actors in the violence. And, as the above article points out, Sadr leveraged his ability to turn on and off his militia?s violence as a stunning demonstration of his power over the security environment in Iraq: ?The message was clear: al-Sadr controls the streets in much of the country, and no agreement to restore order has a chance of success unless he signs off on it. No major Shiite figure, including the country’s top cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani himself, would at this point challenge al-Sadr openly.?

That Sadr has maneuvered himself into such a position of both martial and political power should be concerning for Iraqi and US officials. As his militia serves as a major source of influence and power, overt moves to disarm and demobilize it by the Iraqi government or US forces will likely be met with forceful ripostes. The activities of the Mahdi Army underscore the profound threat that private sectarian militias pose to the long-term security and stability of Iraq. They continue to operate as powerful martial elements within Iraq and particularly in relation to Iraqi society and the weak Iraqi security forces. With each day, the militias seem to gain strength, and it is difficult to envision a major Iraqi government assault on them in the near-term. Attempts by the government to entice Sadr and his fighters to demobilize in return for political concessions or voice are more likely. However, should Sadr continue to build political power and support on his own, these enticements may lack purchase. In more stark security terms, until Iraqi forces are trained and equipped to a sufficient level to take on the militias and Iraqi political leaders acquire the interest and resolve to attempt to take the militias down forcefully, they?Sadr and his Mahdi Army in particular?will continue to hold significant and destabilizing sway in Iraq.