It’s been no secret that Russia has been trying to steadily isolate itself from the Internet, a move designed to reducereliance on Western technology, and by extension, the threat of regime subversion and sustain the regime.  In 2014, Putin underscored this sentiment, declaring that Russia “must lessen our critical dependence on foreign technology,” and focus on developing indigenous technologies as alternatives to Western offerings.  Indeed, Russia has pushed forward in this area, with its Ministry of Digital Development Ministry proclaiming plans to “relaunch” its marketplace of software solutions.  However these efforts have been stymied with the 2022 invasion of Ukraine having severely disrupted an already stagnant tech sector with as many as 100,000 tech professionals leaving Russia as a result of the war.  With U.S. and Western allied nations executing harsh sanctions on Russia impacting its ability to obtain tech that it has relied upon for so long, if not already committed, Moscow is forced to become technologically independent, 

Nonetheless, establishing a sustainable domestic IT production ecosystem is great in theory and much more difficult in practice.  Though Moscow has made strides in developing its own operating system and national malware scanning platform to create a library of malware signatures that fuel security detection and threat intelligence, its Digital Ministryfound that the “cost, quality, and performance” of domestic production did not meet the performance of foreign alternatives.  This is not a positive endorsement, nor is the “import substitution campaign” of obtaining tech to insert into servers to make them function.  Western sanctions had directly impacted Russia’s supply of tech equipment, forcing it to obtain the technology (e.g., chips) from other countries, or else harvesting them from other devices.  This repurposing of technology keeps Russia afloat but is not a solution for any continuing success.  Once a prominent driver of the Russian economy responsible for more than a third of the country’s gross domestic product, it has since been reduced to a shadow of its former self.  

Still, while punitive, sanctions have forced Russia to become more creative and adaptive to its tech needs.  They have further incentivized Russia’s increased government control over tech companies, as well as its push toward developing alternatives.  Moscow is committed to creating its own Internet, as well as replacing international sites with its own versions such as RuStore, the Russian equivalent to the AppStore.  It is also trying to retain its IT personnel and entice them back with enhanced benefits like military service deferment and income tax exemption.  Russia may be down, but it’s far from out.

China may have a lot more to do with Russia’s ability to sustain its tech needs than just its own survivability.  In 2023, Beijing has supplied approximately 90% of Russia’s microelectronics that it uses in its military equipment.  Semiconductor imports from China reached USD$500 million, a marked increase from the previous year, according to the Free Russia Foundation.  The same group found that China was collaborating with Russia to improve satellite and space technology

Additionally, Chinese smartphone makers gained market share in Russia, leaping to the top two spots supplanting Samsung and Apple.  Russia has found more than just a military ally to counterbalance the United States and Western counterparts.  Despite Western pushback for these activities for potentially supporting Ukrainian war efforts, Beijing has stressed the importance of its economic relations with Russia as its trade partner.  Indeed, though China is stemming the pain felt by Russia’s tech needs, it is likely not a viable long-term solution though it certainly puts Beijing in a good position both as a partner and a government with which the United States must reckon.

Beijing – like Moscow – has long espoused technological independence.  However, it is in a better position to do so as it has set forth a goal of replacing foreign software in China systems by 2027 via its secretive Document 79 plan, an initiative to drive Western tech companies out of the country.  This lofty goal has shown some signs of progress with Chinese vendors laying claim to over half of China’s tech market for the first time in 2022, and making domestic products the dominant offering.  However, while a formidable competitor to U.S. technology, China still isn’t the big boy on the block.  Its companies are subject to the Foreign Direct Product Rule that would empower the United States to cut off Chinese companies from U.S. equipment and software they require to manufacture their products.  The FDPR has already been levied against Huawei with substantial economic consequence to the company’s revenue.  So, Beijing will likely want to avoid further attention at this juncture, limiting its help – at least, for now.

At one point it could be argued that Putin did not want increased tech cooperation with China, a move that would grant its neighbor more power and legitimacy as the next heir apparent to combat the United States.  However, the reality is that the Ukraine war has depleted Russian resources and even its global influence putting it in a unique situation.  Keeping Beijing at arm’s length puts Moscow at a disadvantage, risking a reduction of its oil sales and material assistance from its neighbor, two things that potentially jeopardize its efforts in Ukraine.  And that may be the greater evil for Moscow, to ultimately lose or be in a weakened position post-conflict when so many have believed that a stalemate is the likely result.

The more logical course of action is for Russia to acknowledge that its neighbor is in a better position politically and economically than it is, and that its dependency on China invariably makes Moscow increasingly a junior partner to Beijing.  Such partnership is conveyed in several ways to include ever-increasing strategic partnership initiatives of shared interests like military cooperation and trade.  This also includes tech cooperation, an area both governments see as vital to their economic and security well-being.  Artificial intelligence (especially for military purposes), space technology, and quantum computing are just a few areas in which Moscow and Beijing want to compete against the West.

Kaspersky, having recently been banned by the United States, has agreed to set up a data center in China, a move that strengthens the technical relationship between the two countries.  Per reporting, in addition to the data center, Kaspersky intends on helping Chinese enterprises with their overseas operations “by providing tailored cybersecurity solutions that comply with varying data protection regulations.”  Though the U.S. might deem the company a cyber threat, the rest of the world has a favorable view of the company, which is ranked among the most popular cybersecurity providers.  If U.S. suspicions are correct, it certainly begs the question if this relationship could help further facilitate Chinese cyber espionage.

There is little doubt that China and Russia’s relationship will continue to deepen, particularly as long as the United States openly antagonizes both governments.  And while neither country may be as technically capable as the United States, dedicated partnership in emerging technologies may quickly reduce the gap that currently exists.  Washington needs to be careful about how much it wants to push China and Russia together, because while there is still a healthy mistrust between the governments (Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage was just detected spying on Russian state agencies), trying to contain both may only drive their strategic alignment.  And at a time when political polarization has reached new highs in the United States, uniting our enemies when we are at our most divided seems just like bad policy.