The Government Accountability Office?s (GAO) red team assessment of US port security highlights a number of important lessons for both US homeland security in general and US port security in particular.
The first lesson learned by the assessment was the GAO team’s ability to acquire commercially available radioisotopes?in this case Cesium-137?easily. Not only did the investigators have no problem acquiring these hazardous materials, but also they were also able to have the materials shipped directly to Washington, DC. Therefore, it is possible that a malicious actor already inside the US could acquire the necessary radioisotopes to construct a similar ?dirty bomb.? As a result, the ease of acquisition of such a potentially dangerous substance should be just as much of a concern to lawmakers as the ability to transport hazardous materials (HAZMAT) across US borders.
Another lesson learned by the GAO?s red team assessment was that high technology is not a silver bullet solution for homeland security. For example, the portal monitors used by the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents at the selected US land borders identified the presence of radioactive materials. Unfortunately, GAO investigators were able to dupe CBP agents with easily forged Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documents. According to the GAO report prepared for Senator Norm Coleman, GAO investigators ?were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a counterfeit bill of lading [sic] and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations.?
While the GAO report found that the CBP agents generally followed documented policy, it should raise alarms that investigators were able to smuggle radioactive material into the country. The inability to prevent the smuggling of radioisotopes into the country appears to be a result of three factors.
First, the ease of acquiring these commercially available radioisotopes greatly increases the chances that these necessary ingredients for a ?dirty bomb? will slip into the country and be diverted for malicious purposes. Therefore, it seems that a more thorough background check should be conducted on companies attempting to purchase these dangerous materials in order to verify the legitimacy of the company and the validity of the need for these radioactive materials.
Second, the CBP?s inability to verify independently the legitimacy of the NRC approval documents greatly increases the chances that radioactive materials will be smuggled into the country. It seems apparent that the NRC should make available a database that stores information on all companies with a legitimate and approved need for radioisotopes. Moreover, CBP agents should be granted access to such a database, as it would allow them to make more informed decisions on whether to allow suspicious persons and materials into the country.
Finally, the ease with which GAO investigators were able to forge the NRC approval documents needs to be addressed. This weakness can be remedied in a number of ways. For example, digital watermarks can be applied to NRC documents. Watermarks increase the difficulty of forgery. Moreover, remote access to a secure database described above would create a secondary source of information that will enable CBP agents to determine forgeries with greater efficiency.
