While the US House of Representative?s latest legislative commitment to maritime security is an important step in the right direction, a sustained commitment to bolstering the many layers of port security will be required to plug the remaining vulnerability gaps. The basic threat from our vulnerable ports can be encapsulated in two scenarios.
The first scenario involves using a cargo container as an unsophisticated guided missile. In this scenario, a terrorist loads a nuclear weapon into a container bound for a major US port and detonates the weapon upon arrival. According to estimates cited by Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN), ?a 10 to 20 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill between 50,000 to one million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 billion to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion.?
The second scenario involves using a cargo container as a means to deliver a weapon or weapons components to a target deep within the US homeland. For example, terrorist overseas may choose to ship surface to air missiles to a cell within the US homeland for attacks against US aviation targets .
Unfortunately, since 9/11 port security has only received lip service while Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have focused on aviation security. It is widely accepted that Customs and Border Portal (CBP) only conducts intrusive hand inspections on 5% of the estimated 9 to 11 million-cargo containers that enter US seaports on a yearly basis.
The proposed remedies to this problematic reality have been a series of maritime security initiatives enacted by DHS. These remedies include but are not limited to the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CSI is designed to increase cargo container security by targeting high-risk containers for inspection at foreign ports. As of March 29, 2006 there were 44 foreign ports participating in CSI. As part of this participation the host governments agreed to inspect suspect containers at the request of CBP in return for package of economic incentives. However, it is important to note that the host government retains the right to refuse to inspect containers and this right has been exercised by a number of CSI participants. CSI relies on the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to determine which containers are high-risk. ATS analyzes the shipping manifest and other intelligence about the cargo to determine which containers need further inspection.
According to CBP?s web site C-TPAT is a voluntary government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security.? Shipping companies apply for membership into this program by outlining their security posture and the steps they currently employ to protect their link in the supply chain. The benefit of membership for shipping companies is a reduced number of CBP inspections and improved efficiency in the customs process.
In theory, CSI and C-TPAT should work to provide enhanced security against the threat of a ?bomb in the box?, however in practice it leaves much to be desired. There are three principle shortcomings with CSI and C-TPAT. First, there is no guarantee the CBP can gather the intelligence needed to determine which containers should to be inspected. Shipping manifests are notoriously vague as second-hand parties typically produce them, not the importers or exporters who have the most contact with the cargo. Moreover, manifest can be amended up to sixty days after the container has arrived at a US seaport. As a result, it is unlikely that CBP will be able to properly identify high-risk containers.
Second, the radiation detection equipment employed by CBP is unable to effectively distinguish dangerous weapons from harmless radiation. Even when CBP is able to target the right container for inspection there is still a chance that they may not find dangerous contraband. Such was the case when the DHS Inspector General?s office conducted two separate tests in September 2003 and September 2004. In each test, even though CBP officials flagged the correct containers containing the contraband for detailed inspection they failed to detect depleted uranium hidden by DHS IG officials. Depleted uranium has the same radiation signature of weapons grade uranium. These consecutive failures were due in part to the unreliable detection equipment employed by CBP officials.
Third, the fundamental problem with C-TPAT, as its implemented, is that shipping companies are accepted into the program and granted the benefits of a ?trusted shipper? not when their applications are verified by CBP but when they are first received. Therefore, there will always be a critical time gap when a company will operate as a ?trusted shipper? without any proper verification of the companies? security credentials.
Quite simply, the major flaw in CSI, ATS, and C-TPAT in particular is that these initiatives fail to distinguish between illicit smuggling of contraband for profit and smuggling of dangerous weapons for an attack. In the case of smuggling contraband for profit, the smugglers seek to an establish a reliable supply chain that avoids detection and will therefore shy away from legitimate shipping operations as there is a higher likelihood that over time the smuggling operation will be exposed due to the security posture of these legitimate shippers. In contrast, smuggling a weapon only needs to succeed once ? not repeatedly over time. Therefore, it may make more sense for a terrorist to ship a weapon from a CSI port through an unverified ?trusted shipper? in the C-TPAT program because the odds dictate that it one shipment will make it to its destination because the system trusts these ports and shippers by definition. In contrast, a terrorist utilizing a non-CSI port or a non-trusted shipper faces a greater chance of interdiction because there is more scrutiny on cargo containers in-bound from these ports.
In addition to increasing the chances of success, the use of a trusted CSI port and vetted shipper to smuggle a weapon into the US homeland will serve to disrupt the entire global supply chain. It is a near certainty that the US government will shutdown all or a portion of US seaports in the aftermath of an attack carried out with the aid of a cargo container. The shuttering of port operations will have disastrous economic consequences. For example, the Brookings Institution estimates that the closing of all major US ports will cost approximately one trillion dollars. The fragility of the just-in-time global shipping supply chain unfortunately does not handle disruption very well. Therefore, a closure in one node of the system will have spillover effects and will have global economic implications.