The Darfur crisis in Sudan is long from over. Most black African Muslim rebels took up arms in January 2003 due to the perceived central government’s neglect of its people, infrastructure, and basic needs. To quash the rebels, the government armed mostly Arab Muslim paramilitaries, specifically the Janjaweed , that now face crimes against humanity, including genocide. The violence in the last three years created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, killing 300,000 villagers and displacing 2.5 million, and a peaceful resolution is remote at best. Reduced access and scaled back programs, to include food aid, will translate to increased displacement, violence, and death. Until all of the rebel groups agree to sign a peace accord, violence will continue unabated.
BUSH MET MINNAWI
On July 25, 2006, US President George Bush met with Sudan Liberation Army (SLA; Group Profile) rebel leader Minni Minnawi to finalize the May 5, 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Minnawi has long contended that: “The objective of the SLA is to create a united democratic Sudan?based on the right to self-determination and the free will of the various peoples of Sudan…on an economy and a political system that address the uneven development and marginalisation that have plagued the country since independence” (source). Bush insisted that Minnawi’s faction not only “refrain from instigating violence” but also pressure the remaining two rebel groups?the splinter Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM; Group Profile)?to join the peace deal (source). Their signatures would not only broaden support for peace and rebuilding, but also “expand support for the DPA.” While Minnawi confessed that he would not object to a UN mission in Darfur, Bush pushed to bring AU forces under the UN rubric in Minnawi’s territory. Minnawi stands to win huge concessions should the DPA progress: to become the senior assistant to the Sudanese president and thus head the Darfur Authority, which will operate Darfur after the peace accord is implemented.
UN IN?
The US, EU, and UN stand united in pressuring Sudan to allow a UN mission to replace the African Union (AU) forces in Darfur. Until July 26, 2006, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir consistently refused UN involvement for what he believed would be international interventionism and “colonial ambitions of the United States” (source) that would attract Islamic extremists. However, as of July 26, 2006, Sudan left open a “tiny window” for negotiations to allow UN troops into the war-ravaged Darfur region.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed on July 31 deploying 24,000 troops and police officers, the largest deployment ever by the UN, to protect much of the IDP population, refugee camps, supply routes, and migration routes. The Sudanese government has not approved such a deployment. First, the 15 member Security Council has to approve deployment. Second, under Chapter 6, Sudan must allow UN peacekeepers in. The UN can circumvent the latter with a vote, but countries are unlikely to contribute troops without Sudan consenting.
?AFRICAN UNION OUT
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) initially promised 21,000 troops to Darfur; as of June 1, however, AMIS reported 7,105 personnel who are supported by UN military and police teams. Under the DPA, the AU will promote reconciliation and widespread ownership of the peace process. But, the May UN report contended that, according to S/RES/1679 and under Chapter 7, AMIS would transition to a UN peacekeeping operation, a transition that will stagnate if allowed to.
However, the withdrawal of the AU from a security posture at various IDP camps is reason for concern. AMIS reduced its presence in IDP camps, especially in Shangil Tobayi, Tabit, Gallap, and Dar es Salaam, based on attacks against personnel, assets, and patrols; these camps may be a hotbed for violence. The AU presence ameliorated the polarization of the IDPs at the camps, so their removal may cause more tension, violence, and lawlessness. Once in place, though, the UN blue hats, assuming they receive sufficient geo-political history, orientation, and situational awareness training, will be far better prepared and equipped for peacekeeping.
FIGHTING CONTINUES
The DPA, brokered by the US, is deeply unpopular with some Darfuris. Violent protests often come concurrently to food shortages from the World Food Program (WFP). Many Darfuris believe that the peace deal does not compensate victims, does not proportionally represent various groups, and does not disarm the Janjaweed that sparked much of the Darfur atrocities. Meanwhile, IDPs’ distrust of central authority, which they contend forced them into refugee camps, sparks various killings, often of civilians and humanitarian workers. This distrust is perpetuated when the judicial system is “superficial and inadequate,” according to UN Security Council report S/2006/430, to remand those who commit human rights violations.
As the wet season approaches, humanitarian and sanitation programs must be implemented to avoid deadly disease, like cholera, that is likely to spark simmering tensions. And, to win the proverbial hearts-and-minds campaign and to regain the trust of the IDP population, the UN peacekeeping mission must prioritize economic recovery, reconstruction, and compensation.