The ruling regime in Tehran presides over a turbulent political environment through a complicated and contradictory system of governance that includes some democratic principles existing within the overarching religious-political philosophy of clerical supremacy, wilayat-e-faqih.
In the near term, three critical issues represent fault-lines that could destabilize the Islamic Republic. In the order of their relative threat, these issues are: sizable minority groups chafing under the discriminatory policies of the central government; intra-conservative party battle to succeed the ailing Supreme Leader; and an extremely youthful, Iranian population suffering under economic and political freedom deficiencies.
Ethnic Minorities
The aspirations among Iran’s ethnic minority groups for cultural and political autonomy have been met by discriminatory central government policy that has led to ethnic unrest along Iran’s borders. As 40 percent of Iran’s population is comprised of ethnic minorities, these aspirations are an inherent vulnerability to Iranian unity. Moreover, an invading foreign force targeting the regime in Tehran could exploit their overwhelming position on the borders.
The Azeris are Iran’s largest minority group, comprising roughly ¼ of the total population. While some members of this community have thrived under the Islamic Republic (Supreme Leader Khamenei is Azeri), the overall degrading treatment of the group by Iranian society has previously manifested rampaging Azeri riots. Iran’s minority Arab population resides in the oil rich, southwest region of the country. This sector has likewise experienced violence, as there is general resentment among Iranian Arabs in that they live atop such incredible wealth but are one of the more economically depraved ethnic groups in Iran.
Moreover, the unrest has spawned terrorist groups that operate against Islamic Republic forces and institutions. These groups include PEJAK in the Kurdistan region along the Iraqi border (Previous Report) and the Sunni Jundallah in the southeast province of Baluchistan. The latter is group is believed to have al-Qaeda connections and has developed a reputation for brazen assaults – attacking government motorcades and bombing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) owned transportation vehicles.
Conservatives Battle for Top Position
While recent reports of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s impending death have been premature, his ailing health indicates a transition at the top of Iran’s government structure is likely in the near future. Given Iran’s intense political rivalries and the diffusion of power among various parties and institutions, the process of electing a new Supreme Leader will be contentious.
As the political situation currently stands (and it can change quickly in Iran), TRC would project the wily cleric Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to become the next Supreme Leader of Iran. Rafsanjani’s extensive experience serving the Islamic Republic, his consolidation of power among the pragmatic conservatives, and astounding success in the recent elections for the Assembly of Experts makes him the strongest candidate.
The early reign of Rafsanjani is likely to bring about a period of instability in Iran. The cleric is not a beloved figure, but more a political survivalist who is equally distrusted by reformists and hard-line conservatives. Indeed, it is uncertain whether hard-line conservatives would pledge loyalty to a Rafsanjani wilayat (clerical rule). This faction is a strong supporter of Rafsanjani’s bitter political rivals – President Ahmanidejad and his spiritual mentor Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Likewise, during his reign as Iran’s President, Rafsanjani continually butted heads with the leadership of the IRGC. This precedent of disobedience under Rafsanjani bears particular relevance as the IRGC is intimately involved in Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Political Repression and Economic Hardship
The Iranian government under the administration of Ahmadinejad has curtailed political, religious, and social liberties, cracking down on those advocating personal rights. Several popular activists have died recently while in detention, ‘secular leaning’ professors have been forced out of universities, and multiple newspapers voicing contrary opinions to the government were forced to shut down.
The Iranian economy has also weakened under Ahmadinejad’s administration. The stock market has plummeted, and both unemployment levels and inflation rates remain high. Oil and gas production is appreciably less than under the Shah and foreign investment pales in comparison to that of comparable neighboring countries. The government, and its endemic corruption, maintains a dominant and pernicious influence over most aspects of the economy.
Furthermore, the population, suffering under these economic and political freedom deficiencies, is youthful – a product of the devastating Iran-Iraq war that wiped out multiple generations. A lack of economic opportunity and restrictions on peaceful outlets of political expression combined with a restive, youthful Iranian populace is a volatile mixture – and perhaps the largest threat facing the clerical regime today.
