


# INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT



## (U//FOUO) Recent Plots and Attacks Targeting Major Sporting Events Overseas Provide Insight on Potential Tactics and Targets

2 February 2017



Homeland  
Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

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## **(U//FOUO) Recent Plots and Attacks Targeting Major Sporting Events Overseas Provide Insight on Potential Tactics and Targets**

*(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Coordinated with the FBI, NCTC, TSA Office of Intelligence and Analysis, National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC).*

### **(U) Scope**

**(U//FOUO)** This *Assessment* provides situational awareness and analysis of tactics, targets, and procedures violent extremists overseas employed in five select terrorist plots and attacks targeting sporting events since June 2016. I&A has no information indicating ongoing, specific, or credible threats to sporting events or venues in the Homeland. This *Assessment* is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials, first responders, and private sector partners in deterring, preventing, preempting, and disrupting terrorist attacks against the United States. Information in this *Assessment* is current as of 23 December 2016.

### **(U) Key Judgments**

**(U//FOUO)** I&A assesses that five separate plots and attacks against soccer matches or associated venues overseas between June and December 2016 demonstrate the continued interest by foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and other violent extremists in targeting sporting events. Violent extremist messaging by FTOs, such as al-Qa'ida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), shows that the prospects for media attention and the potential for mass casualties in such attacks likely enhance the attractiveness of targeting high-profile sporting events.

**(U//FOUO)** I&A assesses that recent plotting underscores terrorist actors aspirations to target both individuals and venues affiliated with sporting events—including spectators, team members, security personnel both at the stadiums themselves or at associated venues—and suggests that security and response planning should consider the implications of attacks against potential secondary targets, in addition to attacks against the primary venue. We also assess that while security measures, such as the presence of metal detectors or armed security, at entrance checkpoints likely deterred some potential operatives from attempting to gain access to stadiums and arenas, plotting likely shifted to locations that were perceived to be less secure.

**(U//FOUO)** I&A assesses that although terrorists' interest in attacking sporting events is not new, the number of ISIL-linked plots in the last six months—two of which were directed by Syria-based ISIL operational planners—probably indicates a greater focus on these events by the group in the near future. Nevertheless, we assess that complex and coordinated attacks employing multiple tactics and teams of operatives, as seen in at least one recently disrupted ISIL plot, are more likely to occur in locations overseas, such as Europe and the Middle East, than in the United States, based on presence of potential operatives, ease of travel across borders, and proximity to the conflict zones, such as Syria and Iraq.

**(U//FOUO)** I&A assesses that the small number of examples of aspirational or disrupted plotting in the United States targeting stadiums suggests that sporting events are only one of many targets US-based

homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) consider for attacks.\* We further assess that the most likely scenario for such plotting in the Homeland would involve an HVE or small cell targeting attendees or uniformed security at such an event, likely outside the security perimeter, using simple tactics.

### (U) Overseas Attacks Targeting Stadiums and Associated Venues Since June 2016<sup>1</sup>



- » (U) **Istanbul, Turkey:** Two coordinated attacks in Istanbul on 10 December 2016 resulted in at least 38 dead, mostly police officers, and more than 160 wounded. The first attack targeted a police bus, leaving the Besiktas Vodafone Arena, using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), following a Turkish league soccer game, according to a Turkish government official. Moments later, a suicide operative detonated his vest at a nearby park after being stopped by police, according to press reporting citing Turkish officials.<sup>2</sup> The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), a splinter group of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>3</sup>
- » (U) **Shkodër, Albania:** Kosovo police disrupted a 12 November 2016 plot directed by ISIL, possibly involving as many as 19 operatives, to target a 2018 World Cup qualifying match between Albania and Israel at Loro Borici Stadium. The alleged plotters reportedly discussed "synchronized terror attacks," which included attacking the Israeli national team or sports fans with firearms and explosives, or smuggling explosives into the stadium, according to press reporting citing unnamed police investigators<sup>4,5</sup> Officials believe the group may also have planned corresponding attacks in Kosovo.<sup>6</sup> Police reportedly seized explosives, firearms, and an unmanned aerial system at a location associated with the plotters.<sup>7</sup>

\* (U//FOUO) DHS defines an **HVE** as a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.

- » (U) **Jeddah, Saudi Arabia:** Saudi Arabian police disrupted on 11 October 2016 an ISIL-directed plot involving four operatives who planned to detonate a VBIED inside a parking garage next to Al-Jawhara Football Stadium in Jeddah during a World Cup qualifier match between the Saudi and UAE national teams, according to official statements issued by the Saudi government.<sup>8,9</sup>
- » (U) **Brussels, Belgium:** Belgian police arrested three suspects on 18 June 2016 in connection with a likely ISIL-affiliated plot to attack fans gathered in either a public square or bar in Brussels to watch a Euro 2016 soccer match scheduled to take place in France on 18 June 2016 between the Ireland and Belgium national teams, according to press reporting citing Belgian officials. No weapons or explosives were recovered, but police surveillance suggested that the group was considering using firearms.<sup>10</sup> The suspects were associates of perpetrators of the 22 March 2016 attacks in Brussels and the November 2015 attacks in Paris, France.<sup>11</sup>
- » (U) **Multiple locations in France:** Ukrainian security officials on 6 June 2016 arrested and charged an alleged French “ultra-nationalist” after he purchased weapons for use in a plot to attack targets related to the Euro 2016 soccer tournament. The suspect purchased machine guns, grenade launchers, explosives, and detonators, according to Ukrainian security officials. The suspect also allegedly planned to attack critical infrastructure, such as bridges and railways, Jewish and Muslim institutions, and French government buildings.<sup>12</sup>

### **(U//FOUO) Terrorists Maintain Interest in Sporting Events; Media Attention and Potential for Mass Casualties Likely Enhances Targeting Value**

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that five separate plots and attacks against or associated with soccer matches overseas between June and December 2016 demonstrate continued interest by foreign terrorist organizations and other violent extremists in targeting sporting events. Violent extremist messaging by FTOs, such as al-Qa’ida and ISIL, indicates that the prospects of media attention and the potential for mass casualties likely enhance the attractiveness of attacking high-profile sports events. Sporting events offer the potential to inflict casualties on crowds of spectators and take advantage of heightened media attention and international attendance at some events to expand the reach of their messaging and extend the effects of the attack beyond the host country. Soccer tournaments are likely especially desirable targets in Europe and the Middle East, as they often attract tens of thousands of multi-national attendees and millions of television viewers.

- » (U) ISIL and al-Qa’ida messaging has emphasized attacks against large crowds in the West, using “all available means,” to inflict mass casualties, and specifically has suggested sports stadiums as targets. For example, the early November 2016 third issue of ISIL’s official magazine, *Rumiyah*, highlighted “large outdoor conventions and celebrations, pedestrian-congested streets, outdoor markets, festivals, parades, and political rallies.” The magazine’s inaugural issue also called for supporters to stab, shoot, poison, and run over Australians at multiple locations, including at the Melbourne and Sydney cricket grounds.
- » (U) Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula released the 11th edition of its *Inspire* magazine, in March 2013, praising Dzhokhar Tsarnaev<sup>USPER</sup> and Tamerlan Tsarnaev for their attack against the 2013 Boston Marathon. The magazine specifically commended the pair’s choice in targeting an iconic and “symbolic” race, which attracted international media attention and thousands of participants and spectators. It also applauded their placement of IEDs “near the finish line where large crowds cheer from, reporters and media cameras gather,” and the use of sequential detonations to inflict significant casualties.

### **(U//FOUO) Terrorists Likely to Consider Targeting Both Individuals and Locations Associated with Sporting Events**

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that recent plotting underscores terrorist actors’ aspirations to target both individuals and venues affiliated with sporting events—including spectators, team members, and security personnel both at the stadiums themselves or at associated venues—and suggests that security and response planning should consider the implications of attacks against potential secondary targets, in addition to the primary location. We also assess that, although security measures, such as the presence of metal detectors or armed security, at entrance checkpoints likely deterred some potential operatives from attempting to gain access to stadiums and arenas, terrorist plotting likely shifted to locations that were perceived to be less secure. Locations plotters considered included areas just beyond the stadium security perimeter,

such as parking areas and attendee lines at stadium entrances and exits, as well as crowded venues such as bars, public viewing areas, and transportation infrastructure.

- » (U//FOUO) Both the attack in Turkey and the disrupted plot in Saudi Arabia targeted areas immediately beyond each stadium's security perimeters or those in close proximity. The Istanbul attack primarily targeted riot police officers directly outside the stadium and officers in a park less than a mile away. The number of civilian deaths was likely mitigated because fans had already left the venue, as the match had concluded two hours before the attack, according to Turkish press reporting.<sup>14</sup> Saudi officials have said that they believed the VBIED intended to detonate in a parking garage in Jeddah would have been used either to target people in the garage, nearby fans watching the game, or spectators as they left the event.<sup>15</sup> It is estimated that the vehicle had the capacity to carry over 800 lbs. of explosives and could have possibly caused the structural collapse of the garage and the stadium, according to press reporting citing Saudi officials.<sup>16</sup>



(U) Investigators search for evidence following explosion at the Vodafone Arena.<sup>13</sup>

- » (U//FOUO) Plotters in Belgium and France planned to target venues away from, but associated with, last summer's Euro 2016 soccer tournament. A Belgian plot reportedly intended to target a likely crowded bar or public square in Brussels, where fans were gathered to watch a match taking place in France.<sup>17,18</sup> Separately, the disrupted plot by a French national was allegedly to attack multiple locations and transportation infrastructures, such as bridges and railways, before and during the tournament.<sup>19</sup> The attacker's emphasis on targeting critical infrastructure during a large-scale event would have harmed not only civilians but also impaired first responders' ability to provide lifesaving care to victims. Both incidents emphasize the need for information sharing with private sector stakeholders, who may not be aware of potential threats or vulnerabilities related to major events.

### **(U//FOUO) ISIL Plotting against Sporting Events Likely Increasing; Overseas Attacks More Likely to be Complex than in the Homeland**

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that, although terrorists' interest in attacking sporting events is not new, the number of ISIL-linked plots in the last six months—two of which were directed by Syria-based ISIL operational planners—probably indicates a greater focus on these events by the group in the near future. Nevertheless, we assess that complex and coordinated attacks, employing multiple tactics and teams of operatives, as seen in at least one recently disrupted ISIL plot, are more likely to occur in locations overseas, such as Europe and the Middle East, than in the United States. We assess ISIL or other terrorist groups could exploit high-profile sporting events to attack coalition countries in locations where ISIL perceives there is a lower level of security, or where ISIL operatives have access to facilitation networks to recruit or deploy attackers and acquire weapons. The highly publicized nature of these events, which are often scheduled several months or even years in advance, could assist terrorists with long-term planning; however, we assess that lengthy operational planning cycles, especially those involving international communication, travel and acquisition of weapons or explosives for teams of operatives, could also increase the chances of disruption. In particular, ISIL has shown an ability to plan attacks remotely—a tactic used by the Belgium-based cell responsible for the 2015 attacks in Paris—which could assist in concealing the intended target of a plot or in avoiding scrutiny of law enforcement in the targeted country or area.



- » (U//FOUO) Members of a plot disrupted in November 2016 to use firearms and explosives in a coordinated attack on Loro Borici stadium in Albania reportedly discussed smuggling explosives into the stadium. Although we lack information on how plotters might have sought to conceal the IEDs, prior ISIL-related plots featured the use of both suicide vests and artfully concealed IEDs. Operational planning for the attack included persons in Syria, Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia, and targets in Albania and Kosovo. Some cell members belonged to a group that was recruiting Albanian citizens to fight in Syria, and the attack was, at least in part, considered revenge for Albanian Government counterterrorism efforts.<sup>20,21</sup> Bag restrictions and effective security screening may help mitigate attempts to introduce IEDs into a stadium; however, open, unsecured areas where large crowds congregate, such as loading and unloading zones, could remain vulnerable.



(U) View of Loro Borici stadium in Shkodër, Albania.<sup>22</sup>

- » (U//FOUO) Five ISIL operatives in two teams conducted a series of bombings in November 2015 at the Brussels Zaventem International Airport and in the Brussels Metro system, killing 32, including four Americans, and injuring more than 300.<sup>23</sup> One of the attackers told investigators the group had originally intended to target the 2016 European soccer championship, but quickly changed plans after Belgian law enforcement arrested a cell member, according to French press reporting citing law enforcement sources.<sup>24</sup> Exploitation of a computer recovered from a trashcan near the group's safe house in Brussels revealed files indicating that the group had also discussed multiple well-known targets in Belgium and France, in addition to the soccer championship.<sup>25</sup>
- » (U//FOUO) A group of ISIL members based out of neighboring Belgium executed the November 2015 Paris attacks at seven locations armed with automatic weapons and explosives, killing more than 130 and wounding at least 352 people. As part of the attack, a team of three suicide bombers detonated person-borne IED vests outside the 80,000 seat Stade de France during a sold-out soccer match between the French and German national teams. Shortly after the start of the match, the first bomber attempted to enter the stadium but was prevented from doing so by an alert security officer. After being denied entry, the bomber detonated his vest outside the secure area, killing himself and a bystander. Ten minutes later, the second bomber detonated his vest outside another stadium entrance, and the third bomber detonated his vest 20 minutes later next to a restaurant near the stadium, killing himself and injuring several nearby.<sup>26</sup>

(U//FOUO) I&A's assessment that complex and coordinated attacks, employing multiple tactics and teams of operatives, are more likely to occur overseas than in the United States, is based on several factors, including the demonstrated, repeated targeting of such events overseas; the number of foreign fighters who have returned to or who maintain contact with violent extremists in countries where such plots have occurred overseas, as opposed to the United States. ISIL complex plotting overseas could leverage the geographic proximity and ease of travel between conflict zones—such as Syria and Iraq—and host countries in which such plots have occurred, coupled with the presence of existing terrorist and foreign fighter facilitation networks in those countries, as opposed to the relative lack of such networks in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility of complex plotting in the Homeland similar to that conducted overseas.

### **(U//FOUO) Historical Plotting Suggests Sporting Events Only One of Numerous Targets by US-based Violent Extremists**

(U//FOUO) I&A assesses that the small number of examples of aspirational or disrupted plotting targeting stadiums in the Homeland suggests that sporting events will likely remain only one of many targets US-based HVEs might consider for attacks. The same factors that make sporting events attractive to terrorists also apply to other mass-gathering events, such as concerts, outdoor events, conferences, political events, festivals, or other events featuring public figures or dignitaries. These targets almost certainly will be considered by terrorists and would fall in line with violent extremist messaging suggesting attacks on mass gatherings. We note that—because of the individualized nature of the radicalization to violence process—it is difficult to assess triggers that will contribute to HVEs attempting acts of violence. Moreover, HVE lone

offenders\* present law enforcement with limited opportunities to detect and disrupt plots, which frequently involve simple plotting against targets of opportunity.†

- » (U) ISIL supporter Abdul Malik Abdul Kareem<sup>USPER</sup> was convicted in March 2016 for providing weapons to Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi, both of whom were killed on 3 May 2015 during their attack targeting a “Draw Muhammad” contest in Garland, Texas. A few months before the attack, Kareem discussed targeting the 2015 Super Bowl in Phoenix with Simpson and Soofi, according to a press report citing a federal indictment.<sup>27</sup>
- » (U) Miguel Moran Diaz<sup>USPER</sup> was sentenced to 10 years in prison in July 2015 on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the investigation, Diaz expressed interest in conducting a small arms attack and claimed to have a rifle with a collapsible stock, which could be placed in a backpack and carried into a stadium “undetected,” according to press reporting citing a criminal complaint. Diaz made statements in support of ISIL and reviewed violent extremist media to learn how to build an IED.<sup>28,29</sup>
- » (U) Raja Lahrasib Khan<sup>USPER</sup> was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison in June 2012 for attempting to provide material support to al-Qa’ida.<sup>30</sup> In addition to providing funds to Pakistan-based terrorists with links to al-Qa’ida to support attack planning, Khan also discussed attacking an unspecified stadium in the United States in August 2010 by remotely detonated concealed IEDs placed in multiple locations, according to a US government press release.<sup>31</sup>
- » (U) Sami Samir Hassoun<sup>USPER</sup> was sentenced to 23 years in prison in May 2013 for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted use of an explosive device as part of an effort to destabilize the city of Chicago. Hassoun was arrested in September 2010, as part of a controlled operation by federal agents, shortly after placing a backpack he thought contained an explosive device in a trash container on a crowded street late on a Saturday night near Wrigley Field, according to a US government press release. As part of his preoperational surveillance, Hassoun also filmed potential targets around the stadium on multiple occasions, focusing on the bars, restaurants, and potential security in the area, while also assessing the potential tactical advantages and risks of perpetrating an attack at the multiple locations he observed.<sup>32</sup>

## (U) Outlook

(U//FOUO) We judge that terrorists—particularly HVEs—in the United States will continue to represent a threat through 2017 and seek to plan attacks against mass gatherings, possibly including stadiums, sporting events, or associated venues. We judge the most likely scenario involving a stadium or large-scale sporting event would involve a lone HVE or small cell targeting attendees, likely outside the security perimeter of the event or at an associated event with less stringent security protocols. The most likely tactics would be simple, using easily accessible weapons, such as small arms, edged weapons, or vehicular assaults, although some HVEs could attempt to use rudimentary IEDs. We base this judgment on our assessment of the counterterrorism operating environment and our review of numerous examples of plots and attacks in the United States since 2012.

## (U) Importance of Suspicious Activity Reporting

(U//FOUO) Some observed activities that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity. These activities should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency’s suspicion the observed behavior is not innocent but, rather, reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism. No single behavioral indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.

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\* (U//FOUO) DHS define a **lone offender** as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who operating alone supports or engages in acts of violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.

† (U//FOUO) DHS defines **radicalization** as the process through which an individual changes from a nonviolent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to effect societal or political change.

- » (U//FOUO) New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;
- » (U//FOUO) Reports to law enforcement or security officials that a community member has adopted a new name, style of dress or speech, and/or other significant changes in presentation to others in association with advocacy of violence;
- » (U//FOUO) Communicating with known or suspected homegrown or foreign-based violent extremists using e-mail or social media platforms;
- » (U//FOUO) Photography or videography focused on security features, including cameras, security personnel, gates, or barriers;
- » (U//FOUO) Attempts to purchase all available stock of explosives precursors (e.g., cellphones, pagers, timers, hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, fertilizer), acquire materials in bulk without explanation or justification, or making numerous smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time, which could be a possible sign of covert stockpiling;
- » (U//FOUO) Theft of chemicals, hazardous substances, weapons, precursor materials, or items that could compromise facility security, such as badges, uniforms, identification, blueprints, vehicles (or components), technology, or access keys or cards;
- » (U//FOUO) Internet research for target selection, acquisition of technical capabilities, planning, or logistics;
- » (U//FOUO) Participation in weapons training, paramilitary exercises, and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner that is reasonably indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;
- » (U//FOUO) Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition; and
- » (U//FOUO) Activities that a reasonable person would deem as suspicious, indicating a storage facility or other area is being used to construct an explosive device.

## **(U) Protective Measures**

(U//FOUO) In light of the potential threats posed by US-based violent extremists and criminally motivated attackers, we urge security personnel to consider protective measures, which should integrate available equipment, personnel, current procedures, and information to improve threat detection. The following protective measures have been effective in assisting safety, security, and counterterrorism efforts:

- » (U//FOUO) Increase visibility of armed security and law enforcement personnel in areas adjacent to and in front of security checkpoints to deter unwanted activity;
- » (U//FOUO) Ensure personnel receive training and briefings on active shooter preparedness, IED and VBIED awareness and recognition, and suspicious activity reporting procedures;
- » (U//FOUO) During times of heightened threat, maintain awareness of travel and patrol patterns and, if possible, vary times and routes to avoid predictability;
- » (U//FOUO) Establish regular communications with local, state, and federal law enforcement, emergency responders, and public health organizations to enhance information sharing or clarify emergency responses;
- » (U//FOUO) Conduct law enforcement and security officer patrols around drop-off and pick-up points at venues where there are large numbers of people concentrated in restricted spaces;



- » (U//FOUO) Restrict all vehicular traffic through controlled and secure "pedestrian only" areas. Depending on the nature of the event, security protocols can range from basic physical barriers and traffic flow detours to enhanced exclusionary techniques, such as vehicle inspections and technical detection screenings;
- » (U//FOUO) Create separate, controlled access for pedestrian and vehicle traffic, to include separate ingress and egress routes for delivery vehicles away from the event, with deliveries limited to off-site points and delivered to the venue by authorized personnel;
- » (U//FOUO) Report missing or stolen equipment (credentials, uniforms, weapons) to the proper authorities;
- » (U//FOUO) Raise community awareness of potential threats and vulnerabilities;
- » (U//FOUO) Be familiar with the "If You See Something, Say Something™" campaign and appropriately report all odd or suspicious activity to security officers or local law enforcement; and
- » (U//FOUO) Encourage employees, tenants, and visitors to report anything that appears to be odd or suspicious.

### (U) DHS Hometown Security: Tools to Help Your Community Prepare

(U) DHS provides free tools and resources to communities because the Department recognizes communities are the first line of defense in keeping the public safe and secure. The Department encourages businesses to **Connect, Plan, Train, and Report**. Applying these four steps in advance of an incident or attack can help better prepare businesses and their employees to proactively think about the role they play in the safety and security of their businesses and communities.

- » (U) Find more at <https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security>.

#### (U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) This Assessment is based on open source media reporting, including reports citing US and foreign government officials, and government press releases. I&A has **medium confidence** in our assessments due to incomplete information about the incidents cited. We have some concerns about the quality of information in media reporting because of ongoing investigations into the incidents cited. Additional media reporting or information from law enforcement or judicial sources pertaining to the investigations would strengthen our assessments. I&A has no information indicating ongoing, specific, or credible threats to the Homeland; however, we assesses that sporting events and other mass gatherings in stadiums or associated venues will continue to be targets of interest for FTOs and their adherents in the West, based on their persistent interest in conducting attacks overseas and attempts to incite such attacks in messaging published by FTO media outlets.

#### (U) Report Suspicious Activity

**(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.** Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.6.2.4HSEC-8.8

- <sup>1</sup> (U); DHS; Analysis review of compiled spreadsheet; 23 DEC 2016; DOI 06 JUN to 14 DEC 2016; (U); Sporting Events: Terrorist Targets and Tactics; Extracted information UNCLASSIFIED; Overall spreadsheet classification is UNCLASSIFIED.
- <sup>2</sup> (U) Arwa Damon, Max Blau, and Ralph Ellis; CNN; "Istanbul explosions: 38 killed, 155 wounded in twin blasts"; 11 DEC 2016; <http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/10/europe/istanbul-explosions/index.html>; accessed on 12 DEC 2016.
- <sup>3</sup> (U//FOUO); OSC; LIR2016121159164491; 11 DEC 2016; DOI 11 DEC 2016; (U); Istanbul: Armed Group TAK Claims Deadly Attack; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED; Overall document classification is UNCLASSIFIED.
- <sup>4</sup> (U//FOUO); OSC; EUL2016110847035027; 14 DEC 2016; DOI 08 NOV 2016; (U); Sources: Albania Acts on Mossad Intel to Arrest Four People Plotting 'To Disrupt' Soccer Match; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED; Overall document classification is UNCLASSIFIED.
- <sup>5</sup> (U); Jack Moore; *Newsweek*; "Kosovo Arrests 19 in ISIS Plot to Attack Israel World Cup Qualifier Against Albania"; 17 NOV 2016; <http://www.newsweek.com/kosovo-arrests-19-isis-plot-attack-israel-world-cup-football-against-albania-522222>; accessed on 22 NOV 2016.
- <sup>6</sup> (U); *The Independent*; "Isis attack on Israeli football team foiled by police at World Cup qualifier in Albania; 17 NOV 2016; <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-attack-israeli-israel-football-team-police-kosovo-terror-simultaneous-a7422696.html>; accessed on 09 JAN 2017.
- <sup>7</sup> (U//FOUO); OSC; EUL2016111743531679; 14 DEC 2016; DOI 17 NOV 2016; (U); Kosovo Police Reports on Operations To Prevent Terrorist Acts, Arrest of 19 Suspects Tied to ISIL; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED; Overall document classification is UNCLASSIFIED.
- <sup>8</sup> (U); Harvey Day; *Daily Mail*; "Saudi Arabia foils plot to bomb stadium during a World Cup qualifying match after arresting members of two cells linked to ISIS"; 31 OCT 2016; <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3887870/Saudi-Arabia-foils-plot-bomb-stadium-World-Cup-qualifying-match-arresting-members-two-cells-linked-ISIS.html>; accessed on 22 NOV 2016.
- <sup>9</sup> (U//FOUO); OSC; EUL2016111063025881; 11 NOV 2016; DOI 10 NOV 2016; (U); Albanian ISIL Commanders Order Attacks at Albania-Israel Soccer Match, Revenge for Convicted Imams; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED; Overall document classification is UNCLASSIFIED.
- <sup>10</sup> (U); Alissa Rubin; *The New York Times*; "Belgium Says It Prevented a Terror Attack on Soccer Fans"; 18 JUN 2016; <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/world/europe/brussels-belgium-terror-attacks-raids.html>; accessed on 28 NOV 2016.
- <sup>11</sup> (U//FOUO); OSC; EUO2016062021444013; 28 NOV 2016; DOI 20 JUN 2016; (U); Belgium: ISIL 'Lone Wolves' Suspected of Planning to Target Euro Soccer Supporters' Venue; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED; Overall document classification is U//FOUO.
- <sup>12</sup> (U); Jane Onyanga-Omara; *USA Today*; "Ukraine arrests French man for planning Euro 2016 attacks"; 6 JUN 2016; <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/06/06/ukraine-arrests-french-man-planning-euro-2016-attacks/85476422/>; accessed on 22 NOV 2016.
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Product Title:

All survey responses are completely anonymous. No personally identifiable information is captured unless you voluntarily offer personal or contact information in any of the comment fields. Additionally, your responses are combined with those of many others and summarized in a report to further protect your anonymity.

**1. Please select partner type: \_\_\_\_\_ and function: \_\_\_\_\_**

**2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive?**

**3. Please complete the following sentence: "I focus most of my time on:"**

**4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:**

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate a law enforcement investigation       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats   | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own regional-specific analysis   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Share with partners   | <input type="checkbox"/> Initiate your own topic-specific analysis      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel)                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Develop long-term homeland security strategies |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Reprioritize organizational focus   | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not plan to use                             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Author or adjust policies and guidelines  | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: <input type="text"/>                    |

**6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product.**

**7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would?**

**8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements?**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N/A
This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**9. How did you obtain this product?**

**10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback?**

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name: <input type="text"/>	Position: <input type="text"/>
Organization: <input type="text"/>	State: <input type="text"/>
Contact Number: <input type="text"/>	Email: <input type="text"/>



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