RAND researchers explore the “lessons and challenges from three historical crises between nuclear-armed powers” when managing the potential escalation of nuclear conflict—insights apropos to the tinderbox that is the Middle East and ongoing threats of nuclear escalation in Europe by Russian President Vladamir Putin.  A summary of the RAND report and insights can be found here. 

Managing Escalation:  Lessons and Challenges from Three Historical Crises Between Nuclear-Armed Powers

About the Report

“This supplemental report presents three historical case studies of nuclear-armed countries’ attempts to manage escalation during intense crises and conflict.”

The return of great-power competition and the war in Ukraine have highlighted the stark risks of conflict with nuclear-armed great powers, such as Russia and China. Such a conflict would entail escalation risks that the United States has not seriously considered since the Cold War. A key question for the U.S. Department of Defense is how to prevail in such a war while limiting the scope of escalation to inform force development and prepare future leaders for high-stakes deliberations on the risks and trade-offs involved in fighting another major power war should this war come to pass. This is the second in a series of two reports. The main report, unavailable to the general public, summarizes the overall project and presents its analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. 

RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corporation, is the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting the United States Air Force and the United States Space Force. PAF provides the DAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine, Force Modernization and Employment, Resource Management, and Workforce Development and Health. 

Report Summary 

“…we identify recurring behavior patterns and shed light on plausible blunders, hurdles, and accidents that U.S. planners can prepare to mitigate.”  

Issue: A war between the United States and a capable, nuclear-armed adversary would introduce the risk of destructive strikes on a scale the United States has not seriously contemplated since the end of the Cold War. The main debate in the policy world is between advocates of theories of victory that rely on denial and those of theories of victory that depend on cost imposition. Cost-imposition strategies, such as those requiring a distant blockade or a punitive air campaign, require the United States to successfully navigate what we refer to as the Goldilocks Challenge: how to identify with high confidence a “sweet spot” of pressure points that are valuable enough to influence enemy decisionmaking but not so valuable that they cause unacceptable retaliation.  The argument for a cost-imposition strategy rests on two assumptions that are fundamental but under-analyzed:

1. That such “sweet spots” exist and
2. That policymakers can identify and continuously track the boundaries of these sweet spots with sufficient confidence that leaders will authorize attacks against these targets as part of a broader campaign.

To help the U.S. Air Force evaluate the feasibility of a cost-imposition strategy and assess the associated risks of uncontrolled escalation, RAND researchers examined in this report the ability of past decision-makers to identify adversary thresholds and to apply this information to control escalation during militarized crises between nuclear-armed states.

Approach

In this report, [Rand researchers analyzed] three historical cases of militarized crises and conflicts between nuclear-armed major powers:

• the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union; 
• the 1969 border conflict between China and the Soviet Union, and 
• the 1995–1996 crisis between the United States and China over Taiwan.

These cases illustrate the scenarios U.S. policymakers could plausibly confront in the future but do not amount to a comprehensive sample of potential escalation and de-escalation pathways. The premise of this report is that historical analysis of prior crises between nuclear-armed powers can offer significant insights into prospective barriers to managing escalation risks during wartime. Because a major war between nuclear-armed states has never happened, no historical analogy can account for such a conflict’s attributes, including the pace of decision-making, scale of destruction, and perceived stakes.

Together, they can help to bind forecasts by revealing reoccurring pressures, dilemmas, distortions, and obstacles that may be heightened in a future conflict. We give special attention to how decision-makers perceived the risks of escalation, used the available information to infer adversary intentions, and assessed their options. We do not make specific predictions about how certain states will act during future crises and conflicts or evaluate the relative merits of potential theories of victory. Rather, we identify recurring behavior patterns and shed light on plausible blunders, hurdles, and accidents that U.S. planners can prepare to mitigate.  

For a research summary of this RAND report, go to this link.   For the full report, go to this link. 

What Next? 

While specific to nuclear-armed powers and managing the escalation of nuclear weapons-based conflict, the findings from this report also inform your organization’s tracking of U.S. decision-making, tactical responses, and strategic variables in the “de-escalation/escalation” climate of both the war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East:

Key Findings and Implications for U.S. Planners

Our historical analysis identified the following considerations for managing escalation risks during wartime: 

• The United States will have a limited ability to control how adversaries interpret its coercive actions. Adversaries may wrongly surmise U.S. intentions from uncoordinated, unauthorized, or unrelated policies or actions—and vice versa. Varied strategic cultures and historical experiences can also cause misinterpretations of intentions and signals.
• Decisionmakers may not immediately recognize that a crisis or conflict has begun. Delays can impede the transmission of coercive signals, skew assessments of adversary resolve and valuation of targets, and limit parties’ ability to avert or control escalation during crises or the opening stages of conflict.
• Decisionmakers’ assessment of the value of a target or the significance of a threat may change over time as a conflict evolves and potential costs become clearer. Leaders’ valuation of targets, evaluation of the relative costs and benefits of reprisals, and perception of adversary intent may change throughout a conflict. This suggests that the boundaries of any sweet spot within the Goldilocks Challenge framework will be fluid, increasing the prospect of inadvertent escalation.
• The reorganization or creation of decision-making bodies may alter information access or interpretation, complicating efforts to sway power centers. Changes in the composition or procedures of such forums may change the balance of influence among leaders and contribute to unpredictable outcomes. This may complicate attempts to tailor coercive strategies for individual leaders and confound behavioral predictions.
• A perceived loss of control over a confrontation’s intensity, pace, or scope might not compel a rival to capitulate. Leaders may respond unpredictably to unanticipated escalation or a loss of battlefield or theater awareness. To clear the fog of war, some leaders may choose to escalate.
• Nuclear threats may increase adversary fears without compelling substantial changes in behavior. In each case, an inferior nuclear power antagonized a more powerful rival. Varied attitudes toward the utility of nuclear weapons for warfighting may make some leaders more tolerant of nuclear threats.

OODA Loop Geopolitical Risk Briefings and Scenarios

In the Wake of the Iranian Drone Swarm and Ballistic Missile Attack on Israel: Future Scenarios:  The war in Ukraine was the beginning, and the Iranian attack on Israel by a swarm of over 200 drones and ballistic missiles is now the tail end of an elongated inflection point – propelling geopolitics into a new era of 21st Century “Algorithmic Warfare” based on asymmetric attrition-based systems and drone-based swarm architectures. A tick-tock of developments and links to live update resources in Israel can be found here – followed by an OODA Loop Scenario analysis.

After His Presidential Re-election Victory, Putin Escalates Drone, Cyber and Disinformation Offensives:  With Vladamir Putin’s “landslide” victory in the Russian Presidential election in the rearview mirror (the victory extends Putin’s autocratic rule through 2030, which will be his 18th year as president), we provide some situational awareness RE: Putin’s ongoing, global cyber and disinformation offensives – and the drone swarm attacks that are proving the 21st Century organizing principle of his barbaric land war in Ukraine, the first in mainland Europe since WWII. 

RAND Researchers Explore Scenarios for a U.S. Victory in a War with the PRC:  Policy researchers from the Rand Corp. ponder, “How can the United States prevail in a limited war with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while avoiding catastrophic escalation?” Find their analysis and scenarios here. 

Reorient Your Organization: Scenarios Exploring a Quantum Attack on Critical U.S. Power Grid Infrastructure:  The Hudson Institute report on “Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid” highlights the significant threat posed by potential quantum computer attacks on the US power grid. It emphasizes the grid’s vulnerability to such attacks, which could decrypt existing encryption systems and cause catastrophic outcomes. As we navigate the complexities of the quantum era, we used this scenario to formulate additional scenarios for your strategic consideration, including recommendations and insights for your organization (garnered from applying scenario planning and systems thinking methodologies). 

Additional OODA Loop Resources

Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompts global repercussions on supply chains and cybersecurity. This act highlights potential threats from nations like China and could shift defense postures, especially in countries like Japan. See: Russia Threat Brief

Israel and Gaza: The horrors of war in the region are also giving rise to uncertainty in markets, but for now, it seems the war will not spread throughout the Middle East. Many initiatives between Israel and Arab/Persian nations have been stalled due to the war.

Economic Weakness in China: China’s economy faces dim prospects exacerbated by disasters, COVID-19, and geopolitical tensions. Amid limited financial transparency, some indicators suggest China’s economic growth is severely stunted, impacting global economic stability. See: China Threat Brief

Networked Extremism: The digital era enables extremists worldwide to collaborate, share strategies, and self-radicalize. Meanwhile, advanced technologies empower criminals, making corruption and crime interwoven challenges for global societies. See: Converging Insurgency, Crime and Corruption

Food Security and Inflation: Food security is emerging as a major geopolitical concern, with droughts and geopolitical tensions exacerbating the issue. Inflation, directly linked to food security, spurs political unrest in several countries. See: Food Security

Demographic Time Bomb: Industrialized nations face demographic challenges, with a growing elderly population outnumbering the working-age demographic. Countries like Japan and China are at the forefront, feeling an aging society’s economic and social ramifications. See: Global Risks and Geopolitical Sensemaking

Geopolitical-Cyber Risk Nexus: The interconnectivity brought by the Internet has caused regional issues that affect global cyberspace. Every significant event has cyber implications, so leaders need to recognize and act upon the symbiosis between geopolitical and cyber risks. See The Cyber Threat

Embracing Corporate Intelligence and Scenario Planning in an Uncertain Age: Businesses also confront unpredictable external threats besides traditional competitive challenges. This environment amplifies the significance of Scenario Planning. It enables leaders to envision varied futures, thereby identifying potential risks and opportunities. Regardless of size, all organizations should allocate time to refine their understanding of the current risk landscape and adapt their strategies. See: Scenario Planning