Cognitive Warfare in Cyberspace: A Brief Look at China, Russia, and the United States

Cognitive warfare has emerged as one of the most significant dimensions of modern conflict.  Unlike traditional military operations aimed at seizing territory or kinetic assets, cognitive warfare seeks to influence, disrupt, or dominate how populations think and perceive reality.  It is the battle for the mind, and cyberspace has become its most effective battleground.  States now exploit the speed, scale, and anonymity of digital technologies to conduct operations that erode trust, manipulate narratives, and achieve strategic objectives without firing a shot.  Among the most active practitioners of cyber-enabled cognitive warfare are China, Russia, and the United States.  Each has used digital tools to influence domestic and foreign audiences, with varying degrees of subtlety and effectiveness.  Examining their strategies not only highlights how cognitive warfare is being waged today but also offers insights into what the future may hold.

China: Shaping Narratives Through Digital Control

China’s approach to cognitive warfare is rooted in the Communist Party’s long-standing priority of maintaining ideological control.  Domestically, this has been achieved through the “Great Firewall,” a combination of technical filtering, online monitoring, and platform manipulation that controls the flow of information.  The Party has mastered the use of cyber tools to suppress dissent, censor unfavorable narratives, and flood digital spaces with state-approved messaging.  This ensures that Chinese citizens are exposed primarily to narratives that reinforce Party legitimacy.

Externally, China has expanded its cognitive warfare efforts through “public opinion guidance.” The 50 Cent Army, a state-backed online force named after the alleged fee paid per post, floods international social media platforms with pro-China content and disinformation.  During the Hong Kong protests of 2019, Chinese state-linked accounts spread propaganda labeling demonstrators as violent extremists influenced by Western powers.  This was not a random information campaign; it was a deliberate attempt to shape global perceptions of the protests and discredit the movement.

China’s use of cyber elements in cognitive warfare also extends into gray zone competition.  For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese state media and online influence campaigns

narratives suggesting the virus originated in U.S.  military laboratories, an effort to deflect blame and sow distrust internationally.  By exploiting cyberspace, China was able to circulate these claims rapidly across multiple platforms, making them harder to counter in real time.

Russia: Exploiting Chaos Through Disinformation

Russia has arguably been the most aggressive practitioner of cyber-enabled cognitive warfare.  Moscow views information as a strategic domain on par with land, sea, air, and space, and its doctrine emphasizes the importance of shaping adversaries’ perceptions before and during conflict.  The most notorious example remains Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S.  presidential election.  Through the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Kremlin-linked troll farm, Russia used thousands of fake accounts to amplify divisive content on social media, organize rallies, and erode public trust in democratic institutions.  While much attention has been paid to the election outcome, the larger victory for Russia was demonstrating how effectively cyber platforms could be weaponized to polarize and destabilize societies.

Russia has employed similar tactics in Europe.  Disinformation campaigns targeted at NATO allies have sought to undermine support for the alliance, cast doubt on Western unity, and amplify grievances within local populations.  For example, in Lithuania, Russian actors spread false stories that German NATO troops had committed crimes against civilians, a tactic designed to weaken trust in NATO’s presence.  These operations demonstrate how cyber-enabled narratives can achieve strategic effects without direct confrontation.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked another inflection point.  In the lead-up to the war, Russian state media and online campaigns pushed narratives claiming Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian-speaking populations in Donbas.  This narrative was designed to justify military action while sowing confusion in international audiences.  At the same time, cyberattacks on Ukrainian infrastructure created a sense of chaos and vulnerability, complementing the disinformation efforts.  For Russia, cognitive warfare is not a side campaign; it is integrated into the broader hybrid strategy of weakening adversaries from within.

The United States: Strategic Communications and Cyber Influence

The United States has long engaged in strategic communications and influence operations, though often couched in the language of “public diplomacy” or “information operations.” With the rise of cyberspace, these activities have evolved into more overt forms of cognitive warfare, something that even a Chinese think tank has recently pointed out with respect to U.S.  involvement in the practice.  One of the earliest acknowledged cases was the Pentagon’s use of online influence campaigns in the Middle East during the Global War on Terror.  Programs like “Operation Earnest Voice” sought to counter extremist propaganda online by creating credible alternative narratives and engaging directly with online communities.  Though framed as counterterrorism, these operations highlighted the U.S.  recognition that cyberspace could shape perceptions at scale.

More recently, U.S.  Cyber Command has acknowledged conducting “hunt forward” and “defend forward” operations designed not only to disrupt adversaries but also to expose their tactics.  Ahead of the 2018 midterm elections, U.S.  cyber forces reportedly conducted operations to block internet access for the IRA, temporarily disrupting its ability to conduct disinformation campaigns.  This marked a shift in U.S.  strategy: using cyber operations not just defensively but also offensively to protect cognitive space.

The U.S.  has also leveraged cyber-enabled exposure operations.  In 2020, the U.S.  Department of State’s Global Engagement Center released detailed reports exposing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian disinformation campaigns related to COVID-19.  While exposure may not eliminate false narratives, it can undermine their credibility and inoculate audiences against manipulation.  This transparency-based approach contrasts with the more covert tactics employed by adversaries but reflects the democratic challenge of conducting cognitive warfare within ethical and legal constraints.

Shared Characteristics and Future Trajectories

Despite differences in style, the cognitive warfare campaigns of China, Russia, and the United States seem to share some common features:

• Reliance on Cyberspace: Digital platforms provide speed, reach, and plausible deniability.  Whether through bot networks, troll farms, or state media amplification, cyberspace is the arena where narratives are contested and shaped.
• Blurring of Peace and Conflict: Cognitive warfare is not limited to wartime.  Operations occur continuously, shaping the environment in ways that can influence future crises.
• Integration with Broader Strategy: Cognitive operations are rarely stand-alone.  They complement military, economic, and diplomatic actions, creating multi-domain pressure on adversaries.

Looking forward, cognitive warfare will likely grow more sophisticated.  Advances in artificial intelligence and deepfake technology will allow for increasingly persuasive and personalized disinformation campaigns to be executed at a more rapid pace and with the ability to be as widespread or as targeted as possible.  The challenge for defenders will be distinguishing authentic content from manipulated narratives in real time.  At the same time, states will face ethical and legal dilemmas.  Democracies like the United States must balance effective cognitive operations with commitments to transparency and freedom of speech.  Authoritarian regimes like China and Russia face fewer constraints, giving them greater latitude to operate in the cognitive domain.

What has become abundantly clear is that the cyber element has become the decisive enabler, transforming influence campaigns into global operations that can alter how entire populations think about legitimacy, trust, and truth.  As these operations continue to evolve, the battle for the mind will become as important as the battle for terrain.  States that can master the cyber-enabled tools of cognitive warfare will gain strategic advantage, while those that fail to recognize the threat risk having their societies fractured from within.  The future of conflict may be less about bombs and bullets and more about bytes and beliefs; and in that contest, cyberspace will remain the decisive domain.

For related reporting see:

America’s Most Critical Infrastructure is also Our Most Neglected Infrastructure

Sweden’s Psychological Defense Framework for Resilience and Strategic Communication

National Cognitive Infrastructure Protection:  What Can We Learn from the Swedish Psychological Defence Authority?

Ongoing Efforts to Combat Information Disorder and Strengthen our Cognitive Infrastructure