Cyber Operations Against Venezuela: How Washington Is Reimagining Cyber Power

Today’s geopolitical realities are that cyber power sits alongside diplomacy and military force as a fundamental instrument of statecraft. The United States’ evolving use of cyber operations, and its suspected actions against Venezuela, offer a harbinger of how Washington will wield digital tools against future adversaries short of periods of conflict via precise and sustained actions integrated into broader strategic campaigns. This shift from traditional kinetic and/or economic coercion to nuanced digital pressure potential foreshadows a new cyber doctrine in formation, and one that will be shaped by geopolitical urgency, technological advantage, and a recognition that the founding model of cyber restraint has been surpassed by adversaries’ incorporation of digital operations into their own security architectures.

In mid-2026, Washington’s diplomatic and defense elites floated a concept that would have seemed radical ten years earlier: using a calibrated campaign of cyber operations to coerce Caracas into compliance with U.S. demands rather than resorting to expanded military strikes or invasion. A seminal analysis in Lawfare argued that U.S. cyber pressure (e.g., disruptions, ransomware-style effects on government systems, and attacks on key economic nodes) might offer an effective tool to exert coercive pressure while avoiding lethal escalation and the humanitarian and political costs of kinetic conflict. More than an academic exercise, this idea has real legs in Washington’s strategic calculus. According to reporting on operations linked to the U.S. intervention in Venezuela, cyber operations reportedly preceded and shaped more visible elements of that campaign: disruptions of power grids in Caracas to facilitate a rapid extraction mission and targeted intrusions against radar and defense networks to reduce operational risk. Taken together, these developments reveal an emerging U.S. doctrine where cyber effects are not ancillary but central to coercive strategy, especially in environments where full-scale military action is politically costly, legally ambiguous, or just undesirable.

Venezuela appears to have been a good venue to explore how cyber operations could be used effectively in conjunction with other activities. From a geopolitical lens, it offered the right circumstances to explore how surgical cyber attacks might integrate with other statecraft tools such as economic leverage in the form of sanctions, and a formidable military posture without precipitating uncontrollable escalation. As the Lawfare article points out, even if cyber pressure cannot force a revolution or regime collapse, it can shape preferences and behavior, tipping medium-sized decisions in Washington’s favor that collectively advance U.S. interests.

More importantly, the Venezuela case lies against a backdrop of broader strategic evolution in U.S. cyber policy under successive administrations, most recently with the return of Donald Trump to the presidency. Some cyber followers foresee an administration that champions a more assertive cyber posture, one that embraces “defense forward” operations and expands the willingness to disrupt adversaries’ networks before they reach U.S. shores. Operationally, this posture is supported by structural innovations within the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community. At the time of its nomination and confirmation hearings, Lt. Gen. Joshua Rudd, President Trump’s nominee for dual leadership of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and the National Security Agency, emphasized maintaining integrated cyber and intelligence operations while assessing how best to enable rapid offensive and defensive effects. This continuing debate over CYBERCOM’s “dual hat” organizational design suggests that Washington is wrestling with how to balance strategic agility against institutional complexity.

dual hat

So, what does this new U.S. model entail? Based on recent activities including what happened in Venezuela, some guiding principles include:

Precision Over Destruction.Unlike traditional bombing campaigns, cyber operations can be calibrated to disrupt without destroying targets. Temporarily blacking out an electrical grid, cutting communications, or disabling command-and-control can slow an adversary without triggering massive civilian casualties or overwhelming international condemnation. Ironically, this precision mimics the type of tactics used by adversaries in the past. One example is Iran’s use of Internet blackouts to manage domestic dissent highlights how controlling digital infrastructure can stifle information flows and inhibit coordinated resistance. While that case has more to do with maintaining control and regime survival, it also shows how digital networks have become central to modern conflict and societal control – offensive and defensive alike. For Washington, the strategic use of cyber pressure balances coercive leverage with minimization of mass harm, something conventional military actions might struggle to accomplish.

Sustained Pressure, Not One-and-Done Strikes. Traditional cyber operations have often been episodic, typically revealed only in classified after-action reports or covert intelligence disclosures. The Venezuela crisis suggests a shift toward sustained cyber campaigns, with persistent access to critical systems and the ability to re-strike as conditions evolve. This continuous presence becomes an intelligence advantage as well as a lever on political dynamics. This pattern resembles what can be called “campaign effects” where cyberspace is used not for a singular dramatic blow but as a pressure application mechanism over time.

Integration with Other Statecraft Tools.Cyber pressure alone will rarely achieve strategic objectives. In the Venezuela case, it merged with economic sanctions, targeted naval operations, and diplomatic maneuvering. Together, this whole-of-government approach demonstrates how cyber operations are being woven into integrated geopolitical strategies rather than siloed as technical exploits.

As Washington wrestles with adversaries, especially those with substantial cyber capabilities (e.g., China, Iran, Russia), this Venezuela model yields several lessons:

• Coercion Without Escalation: Cyber pressure allows the U.S. to signal resolve and impose costs without crossing thresholds that trigger kinetic retaliation.
• Flexible Targeting: Cyber operations can adapt to the adversary’s vulnerabilities regardless of sector or industry.
• Interagency Integration: Cyber campaign success depends on coordination across military, intelligence, and diplomatic domains.
• Legal and Normative Challenges: Deploying cyber pressure raises questions regarding international law, state sovereignty, and attack attribution, with which policymakers must contend even as these tools are leveraged.

If the United States did execute cyber operations against Venezuela as many believe, the engagement is instructive, encapsulating a transition in how Washington conceptualizes the use of cyber power in the future. While they will always be an enabler of espionage or digital insecurity, their use as a deliberate tool of coercion and influence against the right targets may the current Administration’s sweet spot. As adversaries refine their own digital arsenals and domestic regimes like Iran weaponize digital control for internal security, Washington’s cyber doctrine must balance offensive capability with defensive resilience and normative leadership. Whether future engagements adopt the Venezuela template wholesale remains uncertain. But what is clear is precise, sustained, and political integrated digital operations will be central to how states contest power in the 21^st Century.