Trump’s Cyber Playbook: The Case for U.S. Leadership Beyond UN Norms

The United States stands at a decisive crossroad in cyberspace policy. Not long after the Trump Administration signaled a reshaping the United States’s approach to cybersecurity, CyberScoop recently reported a debatable move where Washington intends to withdraw from its participation international cyber organizations. This marks a sharp turn from pursuing cyber norm building through multilateral forums, an effort that has been viewed by the Administration as redundant and not aligning to U.S. interests. Instead, it appears that Washington will reposition itself to a more unilateral, capability-driven, and strategically offensive-leaning posture. It’s a deliberate reframing of strategic leverage in a domain where speed and decisive action matter far more than weak consensus-driven goals.

The global community, as well as U.S. cyber diplomacy, has long pursued codifying norms via the United Nations (UN) Group of Government Experts (GGE) or the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) both of which have consistently stumbled when confronted with divergent national interests. These forums were supposed to forge consensus on everything from attribution to confidence-building measures and the applicability of international law but have repeatedly failed becoming venues where competing interests have diluted any meaningful progress. Indeed, even some experts sympathetic to multilateral engagement once noted that the OEWG and GGE risked being “preferred avenues for states like China, Iran, and Russia” precisely because they allowed broader but less principled participation. Governments got lost in the language semantics of consensus building, forfeiting any real chance of making a difference.

What’s left is something that resembles cyber globalization masquerading as governance.

Why Is the United States Walking Away?

The core criticism of these forums isn’t merely that they frequently produce watered-down language that lacks the type of bite that alters behavior. It’s that they produce no binding mechanisms, no enforcement, and ultimately, no deterrence. While there is general agreement that the application of international law “is essential,” it rarely translates into the type of action that would impede malicious actors or hold them accountable.

Trump’s approach offers an alternative that is more centered on demonstrated capability and budget-driven modernization with the United States at the tip of the spear. It’s about charting a pragmatic, risk-informed way forward: reinforce robust defensive and offensive-ready capabilities, accelerate modernization through executive direction, and leverage diplomatic influence clear demonstrations of capability, reliable deterrence, and disciplined coalition-building with like-minded partners. This can be clearly seen in the following moves in the U.S. defense and security establishment:

• The alleged use of cyber attacks against Venezuela that knocked Caracas’ Internet offline during the period of time that coincided with Maduro’s removal from the country. In fact, the potential use of offensive cyber actions against adversarial states by Trump is being socialized in the mainstream with recent reporting showing that the President was briefed on potential cyber courses of action against Iran.
• The recent National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 included an unprecedented USD $15.1 billion boost for U.S. Cyber Command, a budget surge reaffirming the administration’s focus on operational power vs. procedural diplomacy. The legislation mandates “enhanced cybersecurity protections” for senior Defense personnel’s communications, acknowledges the strategic importance of secure telecom infrastructure, and reflects a clear integration of cyber missions into overall military strategy.
• The release of a new national cybersecurity strategy in 2026 that will advocate the importance of peace through strength with offensive cyber actions as a key policy cornerstone to create a credible and effective deterrence to the most aggressive cyber threat actors.

These actions underscore a fundamental truth for the current Administration: successful cybersecurity in the 21^st century will not rely on diplomatic resolutions or trying to harmonize normative “cyber” language among diverse stakeholders. It’s about demonstrated capability in the forms of resilience and deterrence. One thing is clear: to date, words without teeth have done little to stop nation-state intrusions, the onslaught of ransomware cartels, or deft supply-chain compromises.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Trump is not happy with the status quo of cyber diplomacy. U.S. departure from international cyber organizations is not about creating a vacuum as much as recalibrating U.S. interests in cyberspace by abandoning “leadership by committee.” Simply, the GGE or OEWG has not been delivering the types of outcomes the United States favors. So, instead of leading from within the pack, it appears that Trump is redefining what cyber leadership in the 21^st century looks like: shaping environments where power, norms, and consequences align, a them consistent with Trump’s desire to lead from strength, not collective mediocrity.

There Are Critics, But…

This move has already alarmed legacy supporters of GGE/OEWG, but not because it undermines U.S. leadership. Critics will ask: how durable is this approach? Will adversaries adapt, or will they attempt to outpace American capabilities with faster innovation cycles or different governance models? The answer lies in perpetual modernization, continuous reassessment, and the willingness to adapt strategy in real time. The Administration already has a track record of bolstering cyber command’s mission with robust budgets, reorienting cyber governance for agility, and reframing strategic objectives toward deterrence and resilience. Taken collectively, it suggests cyber resilience and durability are less about grandiose statements and more about institutional capacity because in the digital domain, durability is the ultimate political weapon: it restricts strategic uncertainty for allies and complicates adversaries’ plans.

A practical illustration of this strategic realignment lies in how the United States can export deterrence and resilience, rather than simply export talks. Promoting leadership through action also invites a broader coalition of like-minded states and non-state partners who value resilience, shared defense, and a rule-based but practical cyber order. Washington can offer a model to partners where norms are underwritten by the tangible capacity to enforce them, and where international cooperation is pursued through coalitions with shared risk and shared payoffs. This would be a welcome change from the anemic efforts stalled at the UN.

A New Cyber Doctrine on the Horizon

Ultimately, U.S. departure from these groups marks the beginning of a strategic reassessment: the United States will no longer chase ineffective multilateral frameworks that have produced little in the way of enforceable norms or tangible deterrence. The U.S. will likely take a forward-leaning approach that invests in operational cyber offense to achieve an unequalled digital dominance; reposition U.S. engagements with likeminded partners that will yield real security results; and create standards that are formed through measurable action achieved through readiness and credible retaliation.

As the dust settles on this evolving landscape, observers should watch not just which forums the United States abandons or joins, but how quickly and effectively it translates capability into deterrence, resilience, and reliable, allied action. The true measure of leadership in cyberspace will be the ability to protect the public while shaping a durable, practical framework that others can and will follow. If Trump’s cyber moves succeed in transforming power into predictable, lawful, and resilient outcomes then the United States could redefine what leadership means in a digital age that tests every nation’s resolve.