Facing a tsunami of disinformation about the treatment of Muslims that has in recent months fueled protests from Stockholm to Baghdad, Sweden decided it needed to fight back. It turned to the Psychological Defense Agency, a part of the Ministry of Defense that its government created last year. The agency has become the first line of defense for a country facing a sustained information attack from abroad.  The country’s leaders are borrowing from an old Cold War strategy to steel the country’s 10 million people for the possibility of “total war” with the Soviet Union. Today’s main threat — though not the only one — is the Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia. According to the agency’s officials, the Kremlin has targeted Sweden with a concerted online campaign on social media and elsewhere to discredit the country and undermine its bid to join the NATO alliance.  After working quietly behind the scenes, the agency has now explicitly accused Russia of exploiting recent protests by immigrants and others in Sweden that have included burning copies of the Quran, an act of desecration that is deeply offensive to Muslims. The outrage has already had an impact: delaying Sweden’s accession to NATO because of objections by another member, Turkey. 

“They were on a level that we’d never seen before,” Mikael Tofvesson, the agency’s director of operations, said in an interview, referring specifically to Russian efforts to amplify global reaction online to a protest outside Stockholm’s largest mosque on June 28.Other countries have scrambled in recent years to counter foreign influence operations, including France, which has created a similar agency, but Sweden is now on the front lines of a fight over the country’s security, its social cohesion and even its democratic foundations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and Sweden’s subsequent decision to seek NATO membership — have put the country in the Russian cross hairs.  The work of the Psychological Defense Agency could become a model for how democratic governments can fight back — or a symbol of how ineffective they are against determined authoritarian adversaries.

“The best way to protect a society against disinformation…is to increase awareness about the threats and your own vulnerabilities among the population, so they make the right decision.”

The decision to revive the country’s capacity to combat information war came after Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, beginning a military intervention that has been characterized by waves of disinformation. Officials in Sweden, as elsewhere, have expressed concern that the propaganda has succeeded in sowing confusion and doubt among European electorates, undermining government policies to counter Russia’s aggression.  “When it comes to information war,” said Pär Norén, a senior analyst who conducts training sessions for the agency, “it is the brain that is the battle space.”  “What we see now is a full-blown, full-scale war in Europe,” said the agency’s director general, Magnus Hjort, a former historian who wrote a report proposing the reconstitution of a department devoted to psychological defense. “And Sweden is not neutral.”  “The best way to protect a society against disinformation, if you live in a democratic society, is to increase awareness about the threats and your own vulnerabilities among the population, so they make the right decision,” said Mr. Tofvesson, the director of operations. “And that is the Swedish way.”

China’s “Discourse Power”

While the Chinese press may push the narrative that the U.S. wants to return to the structures of the binary fractures of the cold war, the CPC is turning its innovative powers to a new construct they call “discourse power” –  which includes formal, global operations (tethered directly to Beijing) used to influence the global narrative (with both criticism of rivals and propoganda designed to promote the “Chinese Dream”).

Starting in April 2022 through its most recent publication in August 2023, the Altantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab’s (DFRLab’s) “discourse power” series has released three reports, with insights and analysis on China’s discourse power (what we used to call “soft power”) efforts on the global media stage and through the digital network ecosystem.

What is “Discourse Power”?

According is the DFRLab authors, “as China’s military and economic power has grown, so too has its investment in propaganda and influence operations. Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power and China’s adoption of a more confrontational foreign policy, the country saw a need to sway global public opinion in its favor. Beijing refers to this as “discourse power,” a strategy to increase China’s standing on the world stage by promoting pro-China narratives while criticizing geopolitical rivals. The end goal is to shape a world that is more amenable to China’s expressions, and expansion, of power.”  For our full analysis of the DFRLab reports and Chinese Discourse Power, go to this link. 

China’s social-media attacks are part of a larger ‘cognitive warfare’ campaign

Defense One reports: 

The phrase “cognitive warfare” doesn’t often appear in news stories, but it’s the crucial concept behind China’s latest efforts to use social media to target its foes.  Recent stories have ranged from Meta’s “Biggest Single Takedown” of thousands of false-front accounts on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X, and Substack to an effort to spread disinformation about the Hawaii fires to a campaign that used AI-generated images to amplify divisive U.S. political topics. Researchers and officials expect similar efforts to target the 2024 U.S. election, as well as in any Taiwan conflict. Chinese government and military writings say cognitive operations aim to “capture the mind” of one’s foes, shaping an adversary’s thoughts and perceptions and consequently their decisions and actions. Unlike U.S. defense documents and strategic thinkers, the People’s Liberation Army puts cognitive warfare on par with the other domains of warfare like air, sea, and space, and believes it key to victory—particularly victory without war. Social media platforms are viewed as the main battlefield of this fight. China, through extensive research and development of their own platforms, understands the power of social media to shape narratives and cognition over events and actions. When a typical user spends 2.5 hours a day on social media—36 full days out of the year, 5.5 years in an average lifespan—it is perhaps no surprise that the Chinese Communist Party believes it can, over time, shape and even control the cognition of individuals and whole societies.

A recent PLA Daily article lays out four social-media tactics, dubbed “confrontational actions”: Information Disturbance, Discourse Competition, Public Opinion Blackout, and Block Information. The goal is to achieve an “invisible manipulation” and “invisible embedding” of information production “to shape the target audience’s macro framework for recognizing, defining, and understanding events,” write Duan Wenling and Liu Jiali, professors of the Military Propaganda Teaching and Research Department of the School of Political Science at China’s National Defense University. 

Discourse Competition (话语竞争)The second type is a much more subtle and gradual approach to shaping cognition. The authors describe a “trolling strategy” [拖钓], “spreading narratives through social media and online comments, gradually affecting public perception, and then helping achieve war or political goals.”

Here, the idea is to “fuel the flames” of existing biases and manipulate emotional psychology to influence and deepen a desired narrative. The authors cite the incredible influence that “invisible manipulation” and “invisible embedding” can have on social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter in international events, and recommend that algorithm recommendations be used to push more and more information to target audiences with desired biases. Over time, the emotion and bias will grow and the targeted users will reject information that does not align with their perspective.

Stochostic Terrorism – The Cruelty is the Point:  Terror and the Secondary Trauma of Social Media

“And while it may seem like being an active, informed citizen requires such immersion in raw imagery, I am also a social psychologist and should know better.”

Douglas Yeung is the Associate Director, Management, Technology, and Capabilities Program, RAND Homeland Security Research Division; A Senior Behavioral and Social Scientist; and a Faculty Member at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.  Yeung recently shared a personal and professional perspective in a commentary in USA Today, excerpts of which we have included her: 

“Like many, I’ve recently been using social media to follow the war in the Middle East. As a habit, following news like this makes a certain amount of sense—social media has often been one of the better sources for breaking information on emerging crises. Many aspects of this war are unique, but what is increasingly common is that my social media feeds, along with those of many others, are populated with extremely graphic images, many of which, having seen them, I fervently wished I could unsee. Yet I still felt compelled to follow the news, to seek out ever-more visceral videos and details of this unfolding human tragedy. I am far from alone in my exposure to this extreme content. And while it may seem like being an active, informed citizen requires such immersion in raw imagery, I am also a social psychologist and should know better.

Immersive Sensory Experiences Tied to Secondary Trauma

“Thanks to technology, however, it can now afflict anyone with a smartphone…the proliferation of traumatizing social media content is, make no mistake, a deliberate choice. People post war dispatches for many reasons, such as to expose atrocities, but also to deceive and to serve as propaganda.”

The effects of a traumatic event—and the events in Israel and Gaza are certainly that—are, as we psychologists well know, contagious. That is, their effects can spread well beyond their initial victims. In war, those victims include those who are displaced, injured, and killed, as well as those who have lost a loved one. The effects of a traumatic event are contagious. That is, their effects can spread well beyond their initial victims. The idea of secondary trauma recognizes that people indirectly exposed to an event like war can suffer as well.  Take, for example, drone operators, who endlessly scan live footage and take split-second orders to fire rockets at suspected terrorists, then commute home in time for dinner. Even though they are not physically exposed to harm, these immersive sensory experiences become associated with real trauma.

That jarring disconnect, especially because it often goes unacknowledged, becomes its own form of trauma for people in critical roles such as emergency rescuers, social media content moderators, law enforcement, and intelligence analysts. Secondary trauma was, for a long time, largely confined to people involved in the initial event, like first responders. Thanks to technology, however, it can now afflict anyone with a smartphone.  And now, as graphic images from Israel and Gaza proliferate on social media, it is likely that these images are having significant negative impacts on the mental health and well-being of many—especially adolescents and young adults, who already struggle mightily.

And Social Media Choices Help Spread Secondary Trauma

The proliferation of traumatizing social media content is, make no mistake, a deliberate choice. People post war dispatches for many reasons, such as to expose atrocities, but also to deceive and to serve as propaganda. Hamas attackers have hijacked victims’ social media accounts to sow even more terror. For their part, social media platforms have actively encouraged the spread of misinformation—this after layoffs shed their ability to weed it out.  Social media algorithms (PDF) also drive people to extreme content, even when they’re not actively looking for it.  The global mental health impacts of this war are only just beginning. But, like its casualties, they will likely be staggering. Social media companies could and should do more to moderate the virality of such content, but they have largely abdicated this responsibility.

… Trauma is often described as a shattering of one’s assumptions or worldviews. That is, when events collide with our expectations, beliefs, or hopes, we are forced to reconsider what is truly possible. This latest war—set in a world still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, grappling with social isolation and mental health crises—has provided plenty of traumatizing developments, with the grim promise of more to come. Mitigating their impact on global mental health might require some combination of regulations, “healthy” social networks, or personal behavior change. It certainly requires making hard choices and doing the work to forge community bonds that prioritize everyone’s well-being. And much of that work starts with knowing the spillover effects of trauma, and how it affects us all.

How information travels during Gaza’s communications blackouts

“People in Gaza turn to eSIMS and other solutions amid cellular and internet outages”

Layla Mashkoor from the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab)  provides an on ground, first-hand account of the residents of Gaza’s cognitive infrastructure conditions, or lack thereof, “amid Israeli-imposed internet blackouts, civilians, journalists, and humanitarian organizations in Gaza have lacked dependable and uninterrupted means of communication with the outside world. When blackouts occur, the risk to humanitarian services and information transparency grow exponentially.  Despite this, Palestinians have managed to find effective ways of getting their messages out.  

Having experienced two communication blackouts in six days, civilians, journalists, and humanitarian organizations in Gaza continue to lack dependable and uninterrupted internet and mobile services. In times of war, the heightened risk of internet shutdowns goes beyond disrupting methods of communication, as also it impedes vital access to life-saving services and interrupts the necessary documentation of events on the ground. Safeguarding internet and telecommunications infrastructure during times of war is imperative to protecting humanitarian services and information transparency. 

The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens

In The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) President Emeritus Richard Haass offers a provocative guide to how we must reenvision citizenship if American democracy is to survive:  In The Bill of Obligations, Richard Haass argues that for American democracy to survive, or better yet thrive, the very idea of citizenship must be revised and expanded. The Bill of Rights is at the center of our Constitution, yet our most intractable conflicts often emerge from contrasting views as to what our rights ought to be. As former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out, “Many of our cases, the most difficult ones, are not about right versus wrong. They are about right versus right.” The lesson is clear: rights alone cannot provide the basis for a functioning, much less flourishing, democracy.

But there is a cure: to place obligations on an equal footing with rights. The ten obligations that Haass introduces here are essential for healing our divisions and safeguarding the country’s future. These obligations reenvision what it means to be an American citizen. They represent commitments that we make to fellow citizens and to the country to uphold democracy and counter the growing apathy, anger, selfishness, division, disinformation, and violence that threaten us all.

Additional OODA Loop Resources

Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompts global repercussions on supply chains and cybersecurity. This act highlights potential threats from nations like China and could shift defense postures, especially in countries like Japan. See: Russia Threat Brief

Networked Extremism: The digital era enables extremists worldwide to collaborate, share strategies, and self-radicalize. Meanwhile, advanced technologies empower criminals, making corruption and crime interwoven challenges for global societies. See: Converging Insurgency, Crime and Corruption

Geopolitical-Cyber Risk Nexus: The interconnectivity brought by the Internet has made regional issues affect global cyberspace. Now, every significant event has cyber implications, making it imperative for leaders to recognize and act upon the symbiosis between geopolitical and cyber risks. See The Cyber Threat