The Secure World Foundation’s 2025 report on global counterspace capabilities reveals a rapidly escalating arms race in orbit, with 12 nations actively developing technologies to disrupt or destroy satellites. This comes as the U.S. accelerates its vision for a “Golden Dome for America,” a proliferated constellation of space-based interceptors discussed in detail at the April 2025 OODA Network Monthly Meeting. As space becomes a contested warfighting domain, this assessment highlights the growing threat landscape and underscores the urgency of international norms and defensive innovation.

Overview

The OODA Network discussion framed space as the next frontier in layered defense, emphasizing the shift from traditional deterrence models to real-time, AI-enabled space operations. As adversaries refine electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber capabilities, the report provides an open-source foundation for understanding the geopolitical and technological implications of a contested space domain. In an era where orbital superiority may dictate terrestrial outcomes, space is no longer a sanctuary, it is the battlefield.

The Secure World Foundation’s 2025 report offers a comprehensive, open-source analysis of counterspace capabilities across 12 nations, categorizing technologies into five main types:

• Direct-ascent
• Co-orbital
• Electronic warfare
• Directed energy, and
• Cyber.

It details both destructive and non-destructive applications, military utility, operational use, and national doctrine. The report also introduces significant updates for the United States, Russia, and China, with notable developments such as the X-37B test flights, co-orbital maneuvering, and electronic jamming operations. The report is publicly available to stimulate awareness, debate, and policymaking around the weaponization of space.

Why This Matters

Space is no longer a peaceful sanctuary, it is a military domain. The report warns of rising risks associated with counterspace technologies, including escalation in conflict, debris proliferation, and threats to the global economy’s satellite backbone. As more nations explore kinetic and cyber capabilities, a lack of transparency, governance, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a destabilizing arms race in orbit.

Key Points

• Five Counterspace Categories: The report focuses on direct-ascent Anti-Satellite (ASATs), co-orbital systems, directed energy weapons (DEWs), electronic warfare (EW), and cyber capabilities.
• Country Tiers:
  • Destructive ASAT test countries: United States, Russia, China, India.
  • Developmental, non-destructive capability countries: Australia, France, Iran, Israel, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, United Kingdom.
• United States:
  • Advanced EW and SSA capabilities.
  • X-37B missions hint at dual-use Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) capabilities.
  • The Golden Dome program may lead to kinetic space interceptors.
• Russia:
  • Co-orbital programs like Burevestnik.
  • Use of EW systems in Ukraine and GPS spoofing across Europe.
  • Development of ground-based DEWs like Peresvet.
• China:
  • DA-ASAT programs are likely to mature for LEO, with MEO/GEO still in development.
  • Increasing use of SSA and RPO satellites.
  • Active investment in DEWs and EW is aligned with asymmetric warfare doctrine.
• Emerging players:
  • India: Continued development post-2019 ASAT test; progressing in RPO and DEWs.
  • France: Active defense satellites, lasers under the YODA and FLAMHE projects.
  • Israel, Iran, North Korea: Limited but growing EW and SSA developments.
• Cyber Domain:
  • Attacks are largely aimed at ground segments and user terminals.
  • Nation-states and non-state actors show growing interest due to low barriers of entry.
• Space Situational Awareness (SSA):
  • Critical for both offense and defense; the U.S. leads, but China and Russia are rapidly advancing.

FOr the full Secure World Foundation report, see:

SWF Executive Summary 2025 (English): An overview of key developments and country-level trends. Emphasizes the critical role of SSA and increased global counterspace investments.

Full Report PDF – SWF 2025 Global Counterspace Capabilities: Contains detailed technical annexes, imagery of suspected ASAT facilities, and exhaustive tracking of satellite RPO maneuvers.

What Next?

The commercial sector is no longer peripheral. Commercial systems will be both the target and the toolkit of space operations.

• Weaponization risks: As Space Situational Awareness improves and Rendezvous and Proximity Operations become more covert, misinterpretation of intent may trigger escalation.
• Debris concerns: Future anti-satellite weapons tests could render entire orbital bands unusable.
• Norms and governance: Urgently needed to set behavioral expectations and reduce risks of miscalculation.
• Space conflict is no longer hypothetical. Nations must plan for real-time engagements involving jamming, blinding, spoofing, and intercepts.
• AI is not optional. Human-speed operations will not keep pace with threats in orbit.
• Geopolitical risk is migrating into orbit. National strategies must account for how kinetic or gray zone actions in space could trigger geopolitical consequences on Earth.

Recommendations Based on the OODA Network Discussion

1. Build for Conflict in Orbit, Not Just Around It: Participants emphasized that space is no longer a sanctuary, it is now a warfighting domain. Golden Dome is a recognition that space-based platforms are not only targets but active participants in strategic defense.

Recommendation: Design defensive architectures, including the Golden Dome, not just for deterrence or passive ISR, but for real-world operational conflict in space, with maneuvering, survivability, and engagement capabilities.

2. Embrace Modular, Agile, and Open System Design: Rigid, monolithic systems will fail under the stress of orbital conflict. The future lies in mesh architectures: flexible, upgradeable constellations where satellites, sensors, and shooters can be swapped and scaled without redesigning entire systems.

Recommendation: All future space defense components, interceptors, tracking nodes, ground segments, must conform to open standards and plug-and-play architectures. Avoid vendor lock-in.

3. Operationalize AI for Space Battle Management: A recurring theme was that machine-speed warfare is not theoretical, it’s operationally necessary. AI and ML must be embedded in space command and control, from cueing intercepts to managing orbital debris avoidance.

Recommendation: Fund AI-driven “space fires” decision engines capable of managing complex sensor data, predicting threat behavior, and dynamically allocating response capabilities (cyber, EW, kinetic).

4. Counterspace Capability Requires Reversible Effects and Strategic Discipline: The discussion warned against over-prioritizing kinetic effects like destructive ASATs. Instead, non-destructive or reversible effects (e.g., dazzling, jamming, maneuver denial) provide the needed deterrent without space debris escalation.

Recommendation: Focus on developing and demonstrating reversible counterspace effects, both for deterrence signaling and operational flexibility.

5. Launch Tactical Prototypes, Not PowerPoint Systems: Golden Dome will succeed or fail based on iteration. The group praised TacRS (Tactically Responsive Space) and “Victus” missions as examples of rapid prototyping that should be scaled.

Recommendation: Treat every fiscal year as an opportunity to test, launch, and iterate on operational prototypes in orbit. Don’t wait for a perfect system, deploy and evolve.

6. Reframe Deterrence for Multi-Domain Adversaries: Traditional deterrence based on massive retaliation doesn’t translate to the space domain. Adversaries like China and Russia are experimenting with asymmetric, multi-domain gray zone tactics that may not trigger a conventional response.

Recommendation: Update deterrence frameworks to account for hybrid threats: GPS spoofing, cyber attacks on space command nodes, or close-in RPO maneuvers. Establish norms and red lines with enforcement plans.

7. Incentivize Commercial Innovation for National Defense: Space is increasingly a commercial theater. Participants agreed the government should move faster to leverage commercial space innovation, sensors, SSA tools, maneuverable platforms.

Recommendation: Create fast-track acquisition pathways and orbital testing partnerships for commercial technologies with military utility, especially for smallsat-based sensors, cislunar assets, and in-space servicing.

8. Prepare for Escalation Across Orbits and Domain

Several experts cautioned that future space conflict will not be limited to LEO or GEO, and will not remain in space. Kinetic or EW events in orbit could quickly spill into terrestrial cyber networks, regional missile defense, or maritime choke points.

Recommendation: Include Golden Dome within a broader cross-domain escalation strategy that fuses space, cyber, missile defense, and conventional forces under unified command concepts.

9. Plan for the Cislunar and XGEO Future Now: Discussion noted the strategic blind spot of assuming GEO is the outer boundary of space competition. Lunar infrastructure, asteroid mining routes, and Lagrange point platforms are already on the radar of major powers.

Recommendation: Begin prototyping sensors, SSA platforms, and defensive capabilities designed for cislunar and deep-space maneuvering. Don’t let the “GEO wall” limit forward strategic thinking.

10. Forge a Coalition of the Capable, Not Just the Willing: Participants warned that collective deterrence must be built around those who bring operational capabilities (not just political alignment). This applies especially to space domain awareness, rapid launch capacity, and orbital maneuvering.

Recommendation: Formalize tactical space defense coalitions (e.g., a “Space Five Eyes”) that combine SSA, response assets, and AI-enabled C2—beyond symbolic partnerships.