Weaponizing the Private Sector: A Cautionary Tale for Private Sector Risk and Global Norms

By now, it’s clear that the incoming cyber strategy crafted under President Donald Trump is poised to reshape not just how the United States defends its networks, but how it engages in cyberspace offensively, strategically, and institutionally. But beneath the rhetorical commitment to “dominance” lies a pattern that should give a moment of pause, especially with its intent to aggressively leverage the U.S. private sector to expand the United States’ footprint globally. According to reporting based on a draft of the new national cyber strategy, the Trump administration is preparing to involve private businesses not only in defensive cybersecurity efforts but in offensive cyber operations against foreign adversaries – a sphere historically reserved for intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense. The strategy explicitly contemplates enlisting private firms to “help mount offensive cyberattacks” on hostile actors outside the U.S. government. This move indicates that the U.S. government expects private companies to become integral cyber partners, not just in defense but now offense.

This is a departure from previous U.S. practice, where offensive cyber capabilities have been typically controlled within government channels. Cyber threats today are pervasive, complex, and increasingly sophisticated. Indeed, from finance to telecommunications U.S. networks across sectors are under near-constant assault by sophisticated adversaries, including state-linked actors as well as cybercriminal gangs. The sheer volume of this activity has made those within the government to support the leveraging of all available resources – including private ones – to counter these adversaries as a necessary evolution in the fight against cyber malfeasance.

However, there are a series of issues that come with this strategy, one no bigger than the fact that there is currently no legal precedent that clearly empowers private companies to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. This gap creates significant legal, ethical, and operational ambiguity, that further muddies the water of what is acceptable in cyberspace by not only governments, but private companies, as well. Another issue is that it ostensibly elevates private companies to the role of a government surrogate in conducting offensive campaigns, allowing an adversary to potentially interpret a company’s actions as a decision by the government. This could lead to any of a variety of responses including but not limited to:

• Retaliation by hostile cyber-capable states resulting in the physical disruption and/or destruction of infrastructure or network assets.
• Disrupting potentially essential supply chains.
• Formal/informal economic repercussions such as sanctions or trade reprisals.
• Impacting public confidence in firms, reducing sales, and even geographical/international boycotts.

The move appears to be pivotal with respect to the way U.S. strategy is headed for the near future. The larger National Security Strategy for 2025 underscores resilience and collaboration with industry for cyber defense, consistent with the new administration’s moves with respect to how it is approaching cyber. Proposing private sector involvement in offensive cyber operations comes at a time when the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requests increased funding for cyber programs (e.g., mobile communications, artificial intelligence security, cyber workforce) under the Department of Defense. Dovetailing with this, the NDAA will allocate approximately USD $417 million for U.S. Cyber Command for its operational and maintenance activities reinforcing the U.S. government’s commitment to engaging in its defense-forward strategy and normalizing cyber operations as a core defense role.

But there is little that the United States does of which the rest of the world, particularly its adversaries, doesn’t take note. Empowering some of its private sectors to engage in offensive cyber attacks could set the tone for other governments to follow suit, only in their case, they may lack or flat out ignore any legal safeguards about how such operations are conducted. In fact, authoritarian regimes might require companies to join cyber campaigns against foreign targets, either for political leverage or economic advantage. While some companies have already been identified or at least suspected in aiding a government’s cyber spying apparatus, the U.S. move could legitimize foreign companies to do just that. If cyber aggression continues down this path, cyber conflict no longer becomes an inter-state issue, but also one that is corporate.

Expanding the offensive toolkit may be tempting for policymakers weary of persistent intrusion and looking to bolster current defense-forward policy. Yet without clearly defined legal authorities, transparent oversight, and a realistic assessment of after-action effects, such expansion risks harming the very stability it seeks to protect. The United States’ cyber policies must account not just for the immediate tactical advantage, but for the strategic tempo they set for others. Because when Washington normalizes a model that entangles private enterprise in state cyber operations, it implicitly legitimizes similar behavior elsewhere, including in countries far less constrained by law, norms, or respect for commercial independence. As the global community struggles to codify state rules of behavior in cyberspace, any writing of new rules puts into jeopardy any progress that has been made, especially in relation to how digital power is used. Furthermore, if other governments get involved it could rewrite what the use of cyber force is and how it can be used; jeopardize trust in U.S. brands globally; and further balkanize the Internet into competing spheres of influence.

If the cyber world has taught us anything it’s that states will do whatever they want, especially if there is not proper incentive to do otherwise. If other nations sense that there is no penalty for weaponizing private firms, they will do so, and quickly. Companies in Europe, Japan, India, and elsewhere may find themselves coerced by their governments to engage in activities that conflict with international norms or U.S. interests. And U.S. firms engaged in offensive operations could become the collateral damage as a result.

Moving forward, it’s important to remember that a national cyber strategy should advocate not just defense and deterrence but also uphold the rule of law. Encouraging private sector organizations to conduct attacks may seem attractive, given the years of being victimized by actors that have generally escaped accountability, but it comes at a price that may not be worth it in the long run. History has taught us that strategic advantage is not just about winning battles; it’s about shaping the rules of engagement.