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Recent news reporting indicates that Chinese-sponsored cyber espionage threat actors have been conducting operations against Russia in an attempt to collect sensitive military and defense systems since the Ukraine war began. Researchersfrom a Taiwan cybersecurity company these incursions have been occurring since at least May 2022 and have been collecting information related to Russia’s planning such as battlefield operations, military tactics, and Western weapons being used by Ukraine. Despite such revelations, Moscow has not publicly addressed or even acknowledged these activities although according to one news outlet, the Russian government is concerned about them based on a classified Russian intelligence assessment of the espionage. If valid, it’s clear that Beijing feels confident conducting this information theft as it still provides nonlethal support to Moscow during the conflict.
At first blush, this sounds counterintuitive as the two governments have been trying to find areas of mutual concern like cybersecurity and evolving technology where they can cooperate and collaborate to offset Western dominance. The two governments have agreed to a “no hack” agreement, though to be fair, this was addressing the use of disruptive/destructive types of attacks, and did not include cyber espionage. Still, it must be disconcerting to Moscow that Beijing should take advantage of it at such a time and after both governments have frequently declared their friendship and strategic partnership to the global community, sending a message to the West and the United States that they, as well as Iran and North Korea, would back each other on the world stage to protect their interests.
The intent behind Chinese cyber espionage against Russia is important because it focuses on the military aspects of Russia’s war planning. China’s modern military has not fought engagements like this and while it has gone through several evolutions of how it is structuring its military to fit modern times, it has not actually used its resources in conflict to this scale. It is no secret that Beijing wants to reunify with Taiwan and will likely be challenged by many of the same obstacles Russia has been facing if it chooses to pursue a similar course of action. Executing its military forces effectively, addressing the volume of news covering the issue, managing public opinion, and contending with other countries coming to the aid of its target, and most importantly, dealing with the aftermath whether successful or not are all factors that need to be weighed.
So, on one hand, Moscow could almost “understand” Beijing’s intent for wanting to learn from a more experienced partner. However, the surreptitious way of getting this information may be more revelatory about the nature of the alliance than anything else. It’s certainly quite reasonable that Moscow would not share its war plans with Beijing, particularly if the latter is only serving as a nonlethal ally providing material resources. What’s more, the fact that the classified Russian assessment about the activity suggests that a “tense and dynamically developing” is developing between the two governments, a disconcerting turn of events for two countries trying to counter the West. China’s aggressive actions may reflect Beijing’s perceptions that it is the dominant partner in the relationship, taking what it wants with little fear of repercussion particularly as it continually supplies Moscow what it needs to keep its war efforts ongoing.
However, this may reflect a deeper fissure in the nature of these adversarial partnerships, suggesting that they may be more about show than something that will be put into practice with any consistency. Take the recent U.S. bombing of Iranian enrichment facilities as another example. While Iran’s “friends” have publicly condemned the strikes, they have pretty much remained on the sideline thus far, likely failing to see how any more ardent involvement would advance their interests. Russia is embroiled in war, North Korea is helping Moscow, and China seems to be taking advantage of their friends’ involvement in interactions with the West and the United States to glean decision making advantage information for its future moves. It would not be a surprise if China engages in cyber espionage against Iranian government and military entities to ascertain some of the details from the bombing to further add to their knowledge of U.S. stealth bombing operations.
What this indicates is that these adversary governments do a good job standing together publicly, but that that they may only elect to put it into practice their commitments if they are able to advance their interests as a result. How this translates into the cyber agreements already in place remain to be seen. Certainly, it is easier to share best practices with one another especially with respect to the monitoring and protecting against Western and U.S. cyber operations. But just how far this translates into collaborating/coordinating their own offensive cyber activities against the West still seems to be a work in progress, if at all.
On the one hand, due to the historical acceptance of certain cyber activities, it could be argued that now is the time to experiment with this endeavor, at least with non-lethal cyber incursions. On the other, as the U.S. increases its strength on the world stage and demonstrates its willingness to execute operations – including cyber-enabled ones – decisively and independently of outside support when it deems its warranted, any such infractions could be met with swift and severe cyber repercussions. With perhaps the exception of North Korea dedicating troops to aid the Russian war effort, for the most part, it appears that adversary partnerships are more about advocating solidarity than actually practicing it.
China is arguably the more influential member of these adversarial relationships, and junior partners will undoubtedly look to Beijing to ascertain the full extent of Chinese support and what that might look like in times of crisis. And the current climate has brought to light that Beijing is more focused on playing the long game for strategic benefit than over committing to short term gains that may yield no meaningful advantage to its interests. This may be the biggest takeaway for these governments, and serves as a lesson that adversaries would be wise to acknowledge and accept before engaging the West for the foreseeable future.
About the Author
Emilio Iasiello has nearly 20 years’ experience as a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, supporting US government civilian and military intelligence organizations, as well as the private sector. He has delivered cyber threat presentations to domestic and international audiences and has published extensively in such peer-reviewed journals as Parameters, Journal of Strategic Security, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, and the Cyber Defense Review, among others. All comments and opinions expressed are solely his own.
Informing your decisions with actionable intelligence
Informing your decisions with actionable intelligence