Start your day with intelligence. Get The OODA Daily Pulse.

Home > Analysis > OODA Original > Security and Resiliency > Cyber Policy Shift: Decentralizing Federal Cybersecurity Responsibilities

The Trump Administration’s Executive Order 14306 marks a strategic pivot in U.S. cybersecurity policy, reducing federal cybersecurity responsibilities in favor of private sector autonomy and amending prior Biden and Obama initiatives focused on centralizing cybersecurity governance. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the EO is our source material for a breakdown of the impact and implications of EO 14306.

Summary

While agencies retain some cybersecurity obligations, including threat hunting and IoT security under Cyber Trust Mark standards, overall federal involvement in cyber governance is reduced.

On June 6, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14306, titled Sustaining Select Efforts to Strengthen the Nation’s Cybersecurity. Unlike prior administrations that consolidated cybersecurity authority within federal agencies, this EO redistributes or removes federal responsibilities, promotes private sector leadership, and amends Executive Orders 13694 (Obama) and 14144 (Biden) without full revocation.

Key changes include:

  • Eliminating mandatory secure software attestations;
  • Limiting AI use to cybersecurity automation;
  • Removing digital identity initiatives, and
  • Restricting cyber sanctions to foreign persons.

Why This Matters

These changes:

  • Decentralized U.S. cyber policy raises questions about the private sector’s capacity to handle nation-state threats without robust federal leadership.
  • Reverse or weaken previous regulatory gains, potentially affecting national digital security standards and supply chain integrity.
  • Signal a deregulatory posture, aligning with broader Trump administration goals to limit federal mandates on industry.

Key Points

  • Executive Order 14306 (June 2025) amended EOs 13694 (Obama) and 14144 (Biden), retaining text but performing targeted removals and edits (CRS Report IN12570).
  • Removed federal requirements for secure software attestations from contractors, shifting cybersecurity best practices to voluntary NIST guidelines (See: NIST SP 800-218).
  • Eliminated digital identity initiatives, including mobile driver’s licenses and digital identity verification.
  • Restricted cyber sanctions to foreign persons only, reaffirming but narrowing existing IEEPA-based sanction authorities
  • Limited AI use within agencies to cybersecurity automation rather than broader AI integration.
  • Reduced requirements for post-quantum cryptography adoption, potentially delaying quantum-resistant cyber readiness.
  • Continued programs such as Cyber Trust Mark IoT security, supply chain risk management per NIST, threat hunting, and securing federal internet/email traffic (See: FCC Cyber Trust Mark).

What Next?

The following are the strategic implications relative to the situational awareness captured in the OODA Loop 2024 Year-End Review: Cybersecurity:

2024 Cyber Year End ReviewEO 14306 Shift
Federal cyber centralization and expanded mandatesMoves toward deregulation and decentralization
Secure software attestations as baselineEliminated, replaced with voluntary guidance
Digital identity modernization underwayHalted federal involvement
Aggressive post-quantum cryptography adoption planningRequirements reduced
Federal AI integration expandingLimited to cyber automation only
Strong federal-private sector partnershipsGreater private sector autonomy, weaker federal coordination
  • Senate confirmations of the National Cyber Director and CISA Director may clarify implementation details and agency roles under this new framework (See: Nomination Tracker).
  • Congressional oversight is likely to increase scrutiny of reduced federal cybersecurity budgets in FY2026 (See: FY2026 President’s Budget).
  • Private sector adaptation will determine if voluntary compliance ensures adequate national cyber resilience amid evolving nation-state threats.

OODA Loop Scenario Implications Analysis: Cyber Conflict, Quantum Readiness, and AI Governance

DomainShort-Term ImplicationLong-Term Risk
Cyber ConflictPrivate sector burden increases.Fragmented national cyber defense weakens strategic deterrence.
Quantum ReadinessSlower migration to quantum-safe systems.AI deployment is limited to cyber automation.
AI GovernanceAI deployment limited to cyber automation.Loss of U.S. leadership in AI standards and strategic capabilities.

1. Cyber Conflict

  • Decentralized response posture
    By removing federal cybersecurity mandates and pushing responsibilities to the private sector, the U.S. may face fragmented cyber defense readiness against nation-state adversaries (e.g., China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea).
    Implication: Critical infrastructure and defense industrial base entities could become higher-value targets if voluntary security practices are unevenly adopted, increasing successful intrusions and geopolitical leverage.
  • Reduced deterrence signaling
    Limiting cyber sanctions to foreign persons only and rolling back proactive cyber regulatory frameworks weakens the strategic signaling necessary for cyber deterrence.
    Implication: Adversaries may test boundaries with more aggressive campaigns, anticipating lower retaliatory costs.

2. Quantum Readiness

  • Delayed post-quantum cryptography adoption
    E.O. 14306 reduced agency requirements for integrating quantum-resistant encryption.
    Implication: If adversaries achieve cryptographically relevant quantum capabilities (CRQCs) sooner than expected, federal systems may remain vulnerable to “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, compromising long-term classified and sensitive data confidentiality.
  • Private sector readiness divergence
    Without federal leadership and mandates, industries critical to national security (e.g., financial services, healthcare, defense contractors) may underinvest in quantum migration pathways due to cost or short-term risk prioritization.

3. AI Governance

  • Constrained federal AI adoption
    The EO limits AI use in agencies to cybersecurity automation rather than broader mission integration (e.g., fraud detection, supply chain monitoring, intelligence analysis).
    Implication: The U.S. federal government may lag China’s and the EU’s strategic AI integration, reducing the nation’s competitive advantage in AI-enabled governance and operational efficiency.
  • Reduced AI standards leadership
    Without federal prioritization for safe AI adoption frameworks beyond cybersecurity, U.S. influence in global AI safety and ethics standards could erode, creating openings for adversarial technological norms to take precedence.

Daniel Pereira

About the Author

Daniel Pereira

Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives.