Some US intelligence experts say the government should rethink how it gathers information in the war on terror.

Four intelligence community veterans led by former C-I-A deputy director Richard Kerr offer their assessment in an unofficial C-I-A journal. The group was tasked with studying how the agency botched its assessment of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.One conclusion is that there are still problems of communication involving the various intelligence centers in government. The authors says analysis is suffering because of coordination problems, duplication, confusion and misuse of scarce resources. One agency treats the violence in Iraq as terrorism. Another will consider it insurgency.

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About the Author

Michael Tanji

Michael Tanji spent nearly 20 years in the US intelligence community. Trained in both SIGINT and HUMINT disciplines he has worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. At various points in his career he served as an expert in information warfare, computer network operations, computer forensics, and indications and warning. A veteran of the US Army, Michael has served in both strategic and tactical assignments in the Pacific Theater, the Balkans, and the Middle East.