The mailbag fills up early today:

When are you neocons going to give up? 500 shells is not a WMD program! They are so old they probably wouldn’t even work! Even your own president doesn’t care!

Dude, easy on the exclamation points . . .

If your reading comprehension skills were up to snuff you’d notice that said just last night that there were not the items we were looking for (not in a Jedi-like way either) though they are indicative of the problem that was Iraq: lying nut dealing with bad guys, holding on to bad things, and trying to gather up more of both. I’m not sure how many files that document the presence of terrorists in Iraq pre-war you need to see, or how many items of WMD we need to find (that the terribly effective and totally thorough UN and ISG said were not there) for you to understand that while things are leaning in “our” favor, the fact of the matter is that we do not fully know what was going on in Iraq. The IDA/JFCOM study is a good start, but there is much, much more data on hand that needs to be addressed. The final chapter has yet to be written.

I AM disturbed about the lack of enthusiasm in the administration about these discoveries, but I also know that still waters run deep. Saddam didn’t get his goodies by rubbing a lamp and asking a Genie for them, and when you’re trying to keep the few sort-of friends you have and are trying to avoid making outright enemies of others, you tend to let things slide. I don’t agree but I understand.

I also understand all too well that there is one thing our Uncle doesn’t like to do and that is publicly acknowledging his shortcomings, and keeping our inability to effectively deal with this material quiet is standard operating procedure. It can be fixed, it isn’t rocket science, but that would require people in charge who actually thought the work was important. Got enough scars from that fight, thank you.

My biggest concern, which I have voiced over at the Standard, is that we’re turning this into a very useful but classified-unclassified history that no one will see for thirty years. There is a lot of material on hand that could be put to good use today. I don’t know about you but I’d rather use this material to solve various Middle East (and European) problems sooner rather than later.

About the Author

Michael Tanji

Michael Tanji spent nearly 20 years in the US intelligence community. Trained in both SIGINT and HUMINT disciplines he has worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. At various points in his career he served as an expert in information warfare, computer network operations, computer forensics, and indications and warning. A veteran of the US Army, Michael has served in both strategic and tactical assignments in the Pacific Theater, the Balkans, and the Middle East.