As hybrid threats intensify, Sweden’s modern psychological defense principles—which include resilience, threat intelligence, deterrence, and strategic communication—offer a robust framework to counter foreign information manipulation, safeguard democratic systems, and fortify public trust. We have framed them here at OODA Loop as a nation’s “Cognitive Infrastructure.” A recent report provides a framework derived from Sweden’s implementation of the defense system.

Why It Matters

The digital era has amplified the complexity and scale of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency (MPF) exemplifies how nations can adapt historical strategies to contemporary challenges by:

• Enhancing societal resilience against misinformation and propaganda.
• Tracking and mitigating foreign influence campaigns.
• Employing strategic communication to counteract disinformation.
• Building international cooperation to address global hybrid threats.

The Swedish model serves as a potential blueprint for countries facing similar challenges.

Key Points

Principles of Psychological Defence: Sweden’s psychological defence is built upon four interrelated principles: resilience, threat intelligence, deterrence, and strategic communication.

Resilience focuses on strengthening societal structures, critical thinking, and public trust to reduce vulnerabilities to misinformation. It encompasses media literacy programs and fostering a well-informed citizenry.

Threat intelligence emphasizes monitoring and analyzing external threats, such as disinformation campaigns, to understand their methods and intent.

Deterrence aims to discourage adversaries by increasing the costs of conducting psychological operations, including exposing and countering malign actors.

Finally, strategic communication involves proactive engagement in the information environment, educating the public, and neutralizing hostile narratives through targeted campaigns.

Historical Context
Sweden’s psychological defence strategy has its roots in the 1950s during the Cold War, forming part of the “total defence” doctrine designed to counteract propaganda and protect democratic values. Originally focused on countering traditional forms of psychological warfare, the concept has evolved to address modern hybrid threats. These include disinformation, influence campaigns, and cyber-attacks, which target not only political and military systems but also societal trust and cohesion.

Modern Challenges
The digital age has exponentially increased the reach and complexity of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Disinformation campaigns leverage social media platforms to amplify false narratives, polarize societies, and undermine trust in institutions. Cyber threats and the blurred lines between state and non-state actors further compound these challenges. Psychological defence now must address these multifaceted challenges by integrating technological tools and strategies tailored to the digital environment.

Policy and Institutional Evolution
The creation of Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency (MPF) in 2022 represents a significant step in modernizing psychological defence. This agency coordinates efforts across public, private, and civil sectors to build a cohesive national response to FIMI. MPF also emphasizes collaboration with international organizations like NATO and the EU, recognizing that hybrid threats transcend national borders. The agency’s mandate includes raising public awareness, providing training, and developing tools to counteract disinformation while safeguarding fundamental freedoms like freedom of expression.

Global Implications
Sweden’s approach to psychological defence serves as a model for other democracies grappling with similar threats. By integrating historical insights with modern practices, the Swedish model demonstrates the value of combining resilience-building efforts with cutting-edge threat intelligence and communication strategies. As hybrid threats increasingly target democracies worldwide, international collaboration and knowledge-sharing become critical components of an effective global response.

Report Summary: Psychological Defence: Concepts and Principles for the 2020s

The report, authored by James Pamment and Elsa Isaksson, explores the evolution of psychological defence in Sweden from its Cold War origins to its modern application against hybrid threats in the digital age. It outlines the four key principles of psychological defence—resilience, threat intelligence, deterrence, and strategic communication—as a comprehensive framework to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).

The modern approach focuses on building societal resilience through media literacy, analyzing and countering foreign propaganda, and employing strategic communication to mitigate disinformation. The creation of Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency (MPF) in 2022 exemplifies how nations can adapt historical strategies to address contemporary challenges such as disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and influence operations.

The report emphasizes the importance of international collaboration, with Sweden actively contributing to NATO and EU initiatives. It also highlights how psychological defence can safeguard democratic values while providing a model for other democracies facing similar threats. For more, visit the report’s detailed page linked above.

Pamment, J., & Isaksson, E. (2024). Psychological Defence: Concepts and Principles for the 2020s.
Link to report

What’s Next?

1. Enhance Cross-Border Collaboration:
   • Develop shared international frameworks for psychological defence.
   • Expand partnerships with NATO, the EU, and other regional actors.
2. Innovate Detection Techniques:
   • Advance AI-based monitoring tools to identify and counter disinformation more effectively.
   • Invest in public education initiatives to improve media literacy.
3. Institutional Strengthening:
   • Support ongoing research to refine strategic communication techniques.
   • Encourage multi-stakeholder engagement, integrating private-sector expertise in tech and media.

Recommendations

1. Policy Recommendations:
   • Advocate for a European-level psychological defence body, as suggested by the European Commission.
   • Implement legal frameworks to penalize FIMI activities and protect national information ecosystems.
2. Practical Initiatives:
   • Launch public awareness campaigns on disinformation risks.
   • Train government and civil society actors in resilience-building and rapid response strategies.
3. International Leadership:
   • Share best practices and insights from the Swedish model with global allies.
   • Host workshops and joint simulations to address emerging hybrid threats.

National Cognitive Infrastructure Protection: What Can We Learn from the Swedish Psychological Defence Authority?

In 2019, in what now reads like a strikingly prescient premonition, OODA CTO Bob Gourley penned a two-part series on the neglect of our national Cognitive Infrastructure:

America’s Most Critical Infrastructure is also Our Most Neglected Infrastructure

Mitigating Risks to America’s Cognitive Infrastructure

In the series, Bob discussed the efforts by the U.S. government in the 1990s to create a framework for “Critical Infrastructure Protection” when talking about manufacturing, dams, the energy sector, nuclear reactors, the materials and waste sector, and transportation systems.  In 2007, all these critical infrastructure protection efforts were encapsulated in the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), which in 2018 became the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).  And much of this “Critical Infrastructure” framing and language is still a central part of the policy lexicon today.  Most recently, the policy framework was used by the current administration when extending critical infrastructure protections through cybersecurity and industrial control systems initiatives in July and October of last year.

The U.S-based efforts which most closely resemble the working definition of Cognitive Infrastructure Protection offered by Bob back in 2019 include the short-lived CISA website Rumor Control (to address disinformation associated with the 2020 United States presidential election) and the analysis and recommendations made by the recent Aspen Institute Commission on Information Disorder Final Report.   To date, the problem continues to dwarf any viable holistic solutions and appropriate governmental responses of any scale.

It took from 2007 to 2018 for cybersecurity to get top billing in the creation of CISA.  Is it time for the establishment of an independent National Cognitive Infrastructure Directorate?

Back in 2020, The Swedish government concluded it was time for just such a governmental entity.  In May of 2021, Sweden committed to a new authority to develop and coordinate psychological defence, including “the establishment of a National Centre for Psychological Defence within the new authority whose main task will be to develop, coordinate and strengthen the national ability to identify, analyze and face undue information influence.”

For Additional OODA Loop News Briefs and Original Analysis on this topic, go to OODA Loop | Cognitive Infrastructure