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Weaponizing Perception: China and Russia’s Cognitive Warfare Against Democracies

The new front in great power competition is not cyber or space, but cognition. Beijing and Moscow are systematically weaponizing perception – deploying artificial intelligence, disinformation, and psychological operations to erode trust in institutions, fracture alliances, and weaken democratic resolve from within.

Chinese strategists increasingly view the human brain as the decisive battlespace of the 21st century: empowering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and aligned actors to operationalize cognitive warfare (the systematic targeting of human perception, trust, and decision-making).

Summary

Recent reports from allies such as Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and analyses from RAND, NDU, and others show how China is building the doctrine, technical capability, and operational playbooks to exploit vulnerabilities at scale. These range from AI-enabled propaganda, deepfake campaigns, and microtargeting of individuals to longer-term efforts at reshaping perception and undermining trust in democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, real-world cases (such as the BBC’s exposure of a Russian network in Moldova) demonstrate how adversaries weaponize cognitive vulnerabilities to disrupt elections and sow division. Collectively, this literature reveals an asymmetry: while adversaries integrate cognitive warfare into their doctrine, the U.S. and allies still lack a unified strategy.

Why It Matters

  • Strategic Asymmetry: Adversaries like China and Russia embrace cognitive warfare as a central doctrine, while Western responses remain fragmented.
  • Civilizational Vulnerability: Democracies are inherently exposed due to open information ecosystems, polarized societies, and algorithmic dependence.
  • Operational Blind Spots: Western militaries risk preparing for yesterday’s wars (focusing on physical readiness) while adversaries hack the cognitive infrastructure of minds.

As Defense One argued, the first step is definitional clarity: without a shared framework for “cognitive warfare,” defensive measures will remain ad hoc.

What is “Cognitive Warfare”? Definitions and Conceptual Framing

The term “cognitive warfare” (sometimes “cognitive domain operations” or “cognitive domain warfare”) refers to conflict focused on shaping, manipulating, or degrading adversary cognition (perceptions, beliefs, decisionmaking, sense of reality, and willingness to act) rather than (or in addition to) purely kinetic or cyber means. It can overlap with information warfare, psychological operations, influence operations, disinformation campaigns, and neuro-psychological techniques.

A few conceptual clarifications from the literature:

  • In The Ins and Outs of Cognitive Warfare (NDU/INSS), the authors propose that cognitive warfare spans biological, psychological, and socio-economic dimensions, and influence can be exerted “inside-out” (directly on neurocognitive processes), “outside-in” (by shaping environments, symbols, narratives), or in combination. Institute for National Strategic Studies
  • The U.S. Army’s MadSciBlog frames China’s cognitive warfare as a zero-sum struggle for reality, where “facts become lies and reality is created by machines crunching big data.” Mad Scientist Laboratory
  • Hung et al. (2022), in How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works, categorize Chinese cognitive operations into modes like military intimidation, bilateral exchanges, religious/cultural influence, and symbolic manipulation. OUP Academic
  • NIDS’ China’s Quest for Control of the Cognitive Domain and Gray Zone Situations (2023) treats the cognitive domain as overlapping with “gray zone” conflict (non-kinetic coercion, influence campaigns, and information operations).

In sum, cognitive warfare is about targeting human minds (belief, perception, decision, morale) often via stealthy, incremental influence vectors, amplified by digital technology (AI, social media, algorithmic tailoring, control of information flows).

Key Points

  • PLA Doctrine: Seizing the Mind
    The PLA frames the “cognitive domain” as a decisive front. The CASI study describes Beijing’s ambition to “win without fighting” by eroding adversary morale and legitimacy.
  • Integration with Gray Zone Operations
    Japan’s NIDS report shows how cognitive warfare is blended with cyber, information, and economic coercion to achieve cumulative effects.
  • Emerging Technology Enablers
    The RAND report highlights PLA exploration of neuroscience, brain science, AI, and data analytics to enhance psychological warfare.
  • Shaping Reality
    The U.S. Army’s MadSci Blog describes how the CCP seeks to blur fact and fiction, using algorithms to create adaptive realities.
  • Proof of Concept in Moldova
    The BBC investigation uncovered a paid propaganda network that aimed to delegitimize Moldova’s elections – a clear real-world application of cognitive operations.
  • U.S. Awareness Gap
    Analysts such as Elsa Kania have long warned that cognitive warfare is not futuristic but already operationalized. Yet institutional responses remain slow.
Case Studies in Russian Cognitive Conflict Strategy

The Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6, 2025, from the Institute for the Study of War highlights how Moscow sustains pressure on multiple Ukrainian fronts through attritional tactics, probing attacks, and combined arms supported by drones and electronic warfare. While lacking decisive breakthroughs, Russia’s strategy is to stretch Ukraine’s defenses, preserve freedom of maneuver, and reinforce narratives of momentum and resolve.

Meanwhile, Recorded Future’s CopyCop Deepens Its Playbook with New Websites and Targets details how the Russian-linked CopyCop (Storm-1516) network has scaled its covert influence operations. Since early 2025, it has launched over 200 deceptive websites impersonating media outlets and political groups across multiple countries, using deepfakes, fabricated interviews, and AI-generated content to manipulate discourse. The campaign now spans languages from Ukrainian to Swahili, showing how Russia operationalizes cognitive warfare globally by embedding false narratives into the information ecosystem.

What Next?

  • Escalation via AI: As generative AI tools proliferate, expect an exponential scaling of deepfake-enabled influence campaigns.
  • Election Interference: Moldova is a preview; U.S. and allied elections are likely targets of precision cognitive operations.
  • Civil-Military Divide: Without an integrated whole-of-society defense, military resilience alone will fail to counter population-level influence operations.
  • Doctrinal Convergence: NATO and allies may move toward recognizing the “cognitive domain” as a formal battlespace, akin to cyber and space.

Recommendations from the Reports and Real-World Cases

  • Define the Domain: Adopt shared definitions and doctrine for “cognitive warfare” across U.S. and allied institutions.
  • Build Resilience: Integrate media literacy, critical thinking, and mental resilience into military and civilian training.
  • Inoculate Populations: Develop public inoculation campaigns against disinformation, leveraging lessons from psychology and behavioral science.
  • Integrate Across Domains: Treat cognitive defense as inseparable from cyber, space, and information ops.
  • Red-Team Continuously: Run adversary-style cognitive ops simulations to test vulnerabilities in elections, military morale, and civil trust.

Additional OODA Loop Resources

A Deeper Dive

Key Reports and Sources

Daniel Pereira

About the Author

Daniel Pereira

Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives.