In 1932, Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell led a naval exercise that should have changed history. Commanding aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga, Yarnell’s planes successfully executed a simulated attack on Pearl Harbor, dropping flour sacks to represent bombs. Despite this clear demonstration of vulnerability, military leadership disqualified the results, deeming them unrealistic. Nine years later, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor followed an eerily similar approach to what Yarnell had demonstrated.

Today, we face a similar inflection point with small, warfighter-portable drones.

A few months ago, I started an analysis of whether small drones might be impactful in the Indo-Pacific, based on what trends we were seeing both in Ukraine as well as in the Red Sea. The result is a draft report that I’m sharing here. I’m sharing the report on OODA Loop with the disclaimer that it is still undergoing final formal review. 

The reason why is simple – the events of this past weekend in Russia have demonstrated with stark clarity what some of us have been arguing for months: small drones can dramatically impact modern warfare. Ukraine’s effective use of drone swarms to push back Russian forces – including striking strategic bombers – provides real-world validation of concepts that, until very recently, were being dismissed by segments of our defense establishment.

Yet as recent as three days ago, I was encountering significant pushback from parts of the U.S. Department of Defense and the defense industrial base questioning whether small drones would ever be effective in combat scenarios. This resistance persists despite mounting evidence to the contrary. My biggest concern is that we risk a “Pearl Harbor”-like event if we don’t recognize the speed of which drone and drone-swarm technologies, even in comms-denied environments and environments with large distances and vast amounts of ocean like the Pacific. 

I’ve made the decision to share a pre-publication version of my report, “Strategic Sufficiency: Mapping DoD Small Drone Requirements to Potential Warfighter Needs in the Indo-Pacific,” through OODA Loop. While this document is still pending final formal review, the rapidly evolving situation demands timely discussion of these critical issues especially given what we just saw Ukraine do to Russia with drones. 

About the Report

The report, entitled “Strategic Sufficiency: Mapping DoD Small Drone Requirements to Potential Warfighter Needs in the Indo-Pacific” examines the potential requirements for small, warfighter-portable unmanned systems in the Indo-Pacific region, with particular focus on countering China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. While limited to open-source information only, the report identifies gaps in current Department of Defense approaches to drone development, acquisition, and employment – gaps that could leave U.S. forces at a disadvantage in potential future conflicts.

I was to strongly emphasize that this report relies entirely on open-source information, which brings inherent limitations. The estimates and projections presented should be understood as informed approximations rather than definitive assessments. Information on Chinese military capabilities, particularly regarding counter-drone systems and electronic warfare, is often incomplete or outdated. Even attempting to extract estimated numbers – either on U.S. drone acquisitions or the number of drones that would be required for a conflict scenario – are at the end of the day only estimated dependent on open-source information that may be incomplete or not exact in its specificity. 

Despite these limitations, the analysis provides valuable insights into capability trends and strategic priorities that can inform broader discussions and more detailed non-public assessments.

Evolution of the Report

Part of the biggest challenge though was simply the speed of change happening as I attempted to complete the report. The events of 2025 alone have demonstrated that the use of small drones in battlefield situations has been on an accelerated OODA loop. 

The original version of the report was completed in mid-April was approximately 40 pages. Thanks to thoughtful input from numerous reviewers, it expanded to about 60 pages by mid-May. In the interim, the Secretary of Defense issued new guidance on unmanned systems, the U.S. Army has announced plans to field 1,000 drones per division in the Pacific, and TRADOC G-2 has released important analysis on how China plans to fight in the Pacific through conventional military, space-based, cyber, and related forms of warfare. This required an additional update which resulted in 84 pages for what I thought was the near final version of the report as of seven days – last week. 

Only to have the events of the week demonstrate the use of small drones in battlefield situations advance. The report now stands at 84 pages. I’m deeply grateful to all who contributed their expertise and perspectives to strengthen this analysis.

Key Findings

The analysis performed by the draft report identifies several critical needs:

1. Critical Capability Gap: The U.S. lacks enough small, attritable drones that can be deployed by individual warfighters or small teams without specialized equipment or dedicated operators.
2. Contested Environment Reality: China has reportedly developed sophisticated counter-drone capabilities. Future conflicts will require overwhelming numbers of low-cost, attritable drones to saturate defenses, with mass deployment as the primary counter to advanced defensive systems.
3. Urgent Timeline to Act Now: Incremental approaches or minor adjustments to existing programs will not address the fundamental misalignment between current capabilities and operational requirements.
4. Accelerated Innovation Imperative: China’s rapid advancement in drone and counter-drone technologies threatens to erode U.S. technological advantages. The traditional acquisition cycle is too slow to keep pace with technological change, requiring novel approaches to rapidly develop, test, and field innovative drone capabilities.
5. Drone Carrier Concept Gap: The report identifies a significant strategic gap in the development of drone carrier platforms that can deploy, control, and recover large numbers of unmanned systems across multiple domains. China is reportedly developing dedicated drone carrier vessels for later deployment this year. These platforms will be essential for projecting unmanned capabilities across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific theater and enabling the mass deployment required to overwhelm advanced defensive systems.

These capabilities would provide U.S. allies in the Pacific – including Guam, the Philippines, and Taiwan – with powerful tools to protect against aggression. Swarms of drones operating in air, on the surface of water, and underwater could make invasion prohibitively difficult for any adversary.

A NATO Perspective

I’m writing this from Denmark, where I’m currently participating in a NATO wargame and open innovation event. The timing is remarkable – NATO partners are closely watching Ukraine’s innovative use of drones against Russia and recognizing the need to accelerate their own innovation cycles while challenging conventional thinking about warfare.

Several themes are emerging from these discussions: Tanks may matter less relative to drone swarms; expensive platforms may be defeated or deterred by much less expensive systems; and thinking differently together is essential for future security.

I want to particularly highlight the NOICE 2025 event – NATO Open Innovation Conference and Expo – which exemplifies the Alliance’s growing recognition that traditional defense innovation approaches are insufficient for today’s rapidly evolving threats. This initiative represents a crucial step forward in fostering collaboration across NATO’s diverse membership, despite the inherent challenges of aligning different national interests, industrial bases, and security considerations. Open innovation frameworks that can bridge these differences while accelerating capability development will be essential to NATO’s future effectiveness. 

It’s worth noting that within large organizations like NATO or national defense establishments, those who advocate for transformative change are often initially viewed as heretics. These positive change agents push against established norms and bring unconventional thinking that challenges institutional comfort zones. Yet in times of rapid technological and geopolitical change, such voices are precisely what organizations need most. Supporting these change agents – providing them with the space, resources, and protection to pursue innovative approaches – is not merely beneficial but essential for organizational adaptation and survival.

The discussions here also have highlighted NATO’s evolving perspective on the Arctic region. While Russia has traditionally been the primary focus of Arctic security considerations, China’s growing interests and activities in the region are increasingly drawing attention. There’s a growing awareness amongst NATO partners that China’s self-declared status as a “near-Arctic state” and its investments in polar research, infrastructure, and shipping capabilities represent a strategic calculation that extends beyond mere economic interests. This emerging dynamic adds yet another dimension to the complex security environment facing the Alliance.

Moving Forward

The strategic implications of the drone revolution for U.S. military operations in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be overstated. Small, warfighter-portable unmanned systems have fundamentally transformed modern warfare, enabling distributed operations, overwhelming adversary defenses through mass, and providing persistent surveillance and precision strike capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional platforms.

Current DoD approaches to drone development, acquisition, and employment appear insufficient to meet emerging challenges, with minimal investment in truly warfighter-portable systems and production capacities far below what would be required in a major conflict.

I want to extend my sincere gratitude to my long-time friend and colleague Bob Gourley for all that he and Matthew Devost have been doing to urge companies and countries to speed up their OODA loops. Their tireless advocacy for faster decision cycles and more adaptive organizational responses has been instrumental in advancing these critical conversations across both public and private sectors. Their work at OODA Loop has created an invaluable platform for sharing insights and catalyzing action on emerging security challenges.

While this report shared here with this post is still pending additional formal review, I believe the events of the past 24 hours compel us to begin this conversation now. We cannot afford to repeat the mistake of dismissing Admiral Yarnell’s 1932 demonstration until it’s too late.

I welcome your thoughts and feedback on this pre-publication version as we work collectively to ensure our forces have the capabilities, they need to deter aggression and prevail in conflict.

For more see: Strategic Sufficiency: Mapping DoD Small Drone Requirements to Potential Warfighter Needs in the Indo-Pacific