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Why Venezuela, Iran, and the Digital Battlefield May Be Reframing Global Statecraft

In early January 2026, the United States carried out Operation Absolute Resolve, combining combined elite airborne forces, covert intelligence, and, reportedly, cyber effects that plunged portions of Venezuela’s capital into darkness. President Donald Trump’s comments suggested that “certain expertise” had been used to disrupt Venezuelan infrastructure during the raid, fueling speculation about the deployment of offensive cyber capabilities alongside traditional military tools. This event was not just an example of integrated cyber operations, or even a cyber warfare event unfolding in the public spotlight. What was witnessed in Venezuela was cyber-enabled statecraft in action, a fusion of digital effects, kinetic force, and strategic signaling. Perhaps more importantly, it raised a significant question for modern diplomacy: Has the use of cyber strikes matured enough to be a viable tool of diplomacy rather than just conflict?

One thing is clear: cyber effects are not longer a shadow domain. Long considered a tool for espionage and technical disruption, cyber capabilities have ripened into full-spectrum instruments of state power. The clandestine Operation Olympic Games, which deployed Stuxnet against Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure more than a decade ago, signaled the first era of purposeful state-driven digital disruption. At the time, it was aimed at slowing Tehran’s nuclear drive without triggering open war.

More recently, disclosures reveal that during the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, cyber capabilities were used to disrupt air defense networks, shaping the physical battle space and preventing the launch of surface-to-air missiles. This points to a doctrinal shift where cyber tools are no longer an adjunct to war; they are integral. Israel’s campaigns against Iranian military power further reflects this where cyber operations (whether defensive counter-hacking or offensive disruption) have been part of a broader hybrid strategy to degrade adversary capabilities before kinetic forces are employed. And in Venezuela months of integrated planning blended digital effects with physical strikes to shape the battlefield and limit opponent reaction time – softening communications, degrading situational awareness, and tightening windows of operational advantage.

If military action and foreign policy are elements of state power, how does cyber diplomacy fit into the mix, particularly as it establishes itself as a distinct discipline of international relations? Cyber diplomacy extends beyond digital outreach and conventional global cybersecurity engagement, envisioning institutional frameworks, norms, and rules for how states engage across and about cyberspace. This includes establishing shared expectations on acceptable behavior in cyberspace, setting norms against targeting civilian infrastructure, and creating confidence-building measures that reduce miscalculation. Cyber attacks and the space in which they operate are essential human created existential risks whose ramifications can trigger cascading economic and political instability, eroding trust among nations. Therefore, the core promise of cyber diplomacy is to transform conflict from escalation to negotiation, tethering state behavior to common expectations rather than leave digital engagement to the unpredictability of unilateral cyber operations.

But this begs a larger question – are offensive cyber strikes compatible with diplomacy.

At first glance, the answer seems contrary. Diplomacy is about negotiation and cooperation and finding common ground upon which to formalize agreement. Cyber strikes, on the other hand, are more coercive, often deniable, but otherwise disruptive in both intent and execution, so how can they enable the former?

The key lies in their strategic signaling power, something that will become increasingly effective as more states adopt them. In classical diplomacy, deterrence is rooted in transparent capability of delivering a credible threat to persuade an adversary not to act hostilely. Cyber strikes can reduce the opaqueness typically associated with cyberspace where capabilities are surmise, attribution is continuous, and retaliation thresholds are murky at best. Properly executed strikes can:

  • Demonstrate capability and resolve without crossing thresholds that could escalate into full conflict. In the case of Venezuela, cyber-influenced blackouts showcased the power of digital leverage to shape conditions without requiring a kinetic invasion or inviting a kinetic response. Similarly, using cyber tools to disrupt Iran’s air defenses did not ignite a broader Middle Eastern war, but it signaled a strategic margin of control.
  • Lower the cost of signaling in a crisis by opening a channel for diplomatic engagement without catastrophic escalation. If adversaries understand that a state can deliver targeted, limited cyber strikes (ones designed to disrupt than cause widespread destruction), they may be more willing to negotiate. Unlike nuclear weapons, where any miscalculation can lead to catastrophic consequences, cyber operations can be calibrated and better contained. In that sense, the controlled use of cyber capabilities can create pressure to negotiate rather than push states toward open conflict.

However, cyber strikes can destabilize if they are ungoverned. When critical civilian infrastructure is targeted or even disrupted, there can be severe legal, ethical, and economic ramifications. Without shared norms, states are left to interpret cyber effects through their own unique prisms. This tension is exactly why cyber diplomacy is not the byproduct of cyber strikes but must be the companion to them.

Three components are necessary for cyber strikes to strengthen diplomacy:

  • Transparent Norms of Engagement. States must articulate what constitutes unacceptable use of cyber strikes particularly regarding civilian networks and critical infrastructure. This requires multilateral agreements, confidence-building measures, and crisis communication channels that reduce the risk of misperception.
  • Attribution and Accountability. Technical attribution alone is insufficient. Diplomacy must translate evidence into joint political actions such as shared statements, legal consequences, sanctions, and reputational costs for malicious cyber behavior.
  • Crisis Management Mechanisms. Just as nuclear powers once put hotline protocols in place, cyber diplomacy must create real-time communication pathways so that digital incidents do not escalate into full-blown conflicts.

Regardless of the exact mechanics of the power disruptions, the Venezuela and Iran cases are harbingers. Cyber effects matter strategically because they are woven into geopolitical confrontation in both kinetic operations and diplomatic interaction. But it’s important to not mistake digitized coercion for cyber diplomacy. One is a blunt instrument; the other is the craft of sustained state engagement. When calibrated and restrained, cyber strikes can signal capability and resolve in ways that reduce the risk of increasing conflict, but only if they are balanced with diplomatic frameworks that create norms, channels, and expectations. The states that master balancing the hard calculus of offensive capability with the nuanced art of diplomatic negotiation will not only deter adversaries but also be in the position to shape the digital order in the near term.

Tagged: geopolitical
Emilio Iasiello

About the Author

Emilio Iasiello

Emilio Iasiello has nearly 20 years’ experience as a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, supporting US government civilian and military intelligence organizations, as well as the private sector. He has delivered cyber threat presentations to domestic and international audiences and has published extensively in such peer-reviewed journals as Parameters, Journal of Strategic Security, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, and the Cyber Defense Review, among others. All comments and opinions expressed are solely his own.