National Security, Space-Based Capabilities and U.S. Deterrence

Space has many strategic vectors: economic, military, cybersecurity, and information warfare. It will play a vital role in the future of U.S. collaboration with its allies. Space is also on the list of domains that are part of The Chinese Dream (also: 1) for supremacy in areas like quantum computing and artificial intelligence. As China sees it, the U.S. could stand in the way of achieving its strategic aims in space.

Classic deterrence theory (i.e., nuclear proliferation and deterrence) has a storied history in military strategy and international relations. It is also a framework that applies more to the deterrence of nation-state actors in space than to the deterrence of China’s growing strength in emerging technologies like quantum and AI.

Such is the central premise according to the very recent report by International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, “Tailoring Deterrence for China in Space”, which states that “China may be motivated to exploit any evident U.S. vulnerabilities in the space domain to further its own objectives. Deterring China in space is, therefore, a priority for the United States Department of Defense and its allies and partners.”

The findings and recommendations of the report may be tailored to China, but they can be applied to Russia as well, especially considering the recent Russian anti-satellite [ASAT] test which broke up their Cosmos 1408 satellite, resulting in “an in orbit, debris-generating event that now has the International Space Station at risk”. In April 2020, A U.S Space Command press release also reported that a satellite “behaved similarly to previous Russian satellites that exhibited characteristics of a space weapon, conducted maneuvers near a U.S. Government satellite that would be interpreted as irresponsible and potentially threatening in any other domain. ” A subsequent follow-up statement in December 2020 described the event as having actually “demonstrated an on-orbit kinetic [ASAT] weapon.”

1.0:  Orbit path of Cosmos 1408 satellite prior to breakup – Courtesy of Leo Labs

 

2.0: International Space Station and Cosmo 1408 orbital debris – Courtesy of Leo Labs

Classis Deference Theory Applied to Space

The report offers a working definition of deterrence: “In classical deterrence theory, costs and risks can be imposed on an adversary via  denial of gains or via punishment; either way, the intent is to convince an adversary that the cost of taking a specific action would outweigh the gains of taking that action.” Deterrence has the following characteristics:

Offense Dominance and Deterrence via Punishment: Defensive capabilities figure prominently, with deterrence by denial marked by the degree of the military power of the actors, including the levels of resilience and effectiveness, including redundancy and reconstitution capabilities. The Rand authors point out that “the credibility of this approach often relies not on the relative military power of the actors but instead on the intent of the actor responding.”

Assured Retaliation, Credibility, and Attribution: We are all familiar with this feature of deterrence: global thermonuclear war and mutually assured annihilation. In the context of space, assured retaliation requires clear communication about the deterring country’s second-strike capabilities (a space arsenal’s ability to survive a space attack and launch a retaliatory space strike on the attacker’s space assets and capabilities). The report elaborates: “For credible assured retaliation to be an effective component of a deterrence strategy in space, a potential aggressor should have no doubt about the deterrer’s ability to retaliate and its intention to do so.”

Mutual Vulnerability and First-Strike Stability: “First-Strike Stability” was established as a condition of deterrence by theorists during the early Atomic Age. It is achieved when assured retaliation and mutual vulnerability combine on both sides of a conflict. First-strike stability is then  achieved when neither side sees an advantage to striking first.

Key Findings

Some of the findings from this report are specific to China, others are more agnostic and could be applied to Russia or any other nation-state actor. The implications and key findings of the space deterrence report are:

A deterrence strategy tailored to the space domain will need to consider capabilities, actions, and retaliatory responses in other domains and use this to shape China’s perception of the costs and gains of interfering in space.

A successful approach to deterrence in space requires credibility and legitimacy of cross-domain responses to aggression; alliances can help establish this credibility and legitimacy.

Establishing behavioral norms is important for a deterrence strategy in space, and an approach for building these norms needs to be tailored to a specific actor.

Because of China’s ambitions in space, deterring them requires the imposition of significant costs for aggressive action in space:  Imposing political costs on China for aggressive action can be bolstered through strategic coordination between the United States and its allies.

China’s view of space as a critical U.S. vulnerability makes U.S. space capabilities attractive targets for attack:  Highlighting China’s own reliance on space-based capabilities should be a part of a tailored deterrence strategy.

Recommendations

1. To develop an effective deterrence strategy, the United States should decrease the perceived utility of interfering with space-based capabilities, mitigate the perception that limited use of space force will act as a deterrent, and address the view of U.S. vulnerability in space.
2. The United States should reinforce its efforts by involving key allies and partners in deterrence.
3. U.S. public statements should avoid space-to-space calculations and encompass deterring China’s plans to impact the entirety of the U.S. effort through activities in space. Doing so could convince Beijing that such a plan would not work, or at least that it would be less effective than previously thought.

Future Research

Areas identified by the report for further exploration include:

• How China’s space programs are being employed to achieve its goals: Developing a richer view of Chinese perceptions and activities in space would contribute greatly to building a more nuanced approach to deterrence.
• Additional insights from interviews with government officials (U.S., Chinese, Japanese, and others) and other experts.
• Research on U.S. allies and partners’ potential roles in deterrence efforts against China in space deserves greater attention in future studies:  A focal point of these assessments should be the extent to which U.S. allies and partners properly understand Chinese goals and strategy in space to develop the most effective response.

Further Reading:

For further coverage by Leo Labs of the Russian ASAT, see Analysis of the Cosmos 1408 Breakup | by LeoLabs | Nov, 2021 | Medium

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