In 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published the first Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance In An Era Of Competition And Expansion “to address the main threats to the array of U.S. space capabilities, and examine space and counterspace strategies and systems pursued primarily by China and Russia and, to a lesser extent, by North Korea and Iran.” (1)  OODA analysts Michael Brooks, Matt Devost, and Bob Gourley extracted key elements of the 2019 report in the following post:

https://oodaloop.com/archive/2022/02/18/what-the-c-suite-needs-to-know-about-the-threat-to-space-based-systems-and-what-to-do-about-it/

DIA has followed up the inaugural version of the report with the recently published Challenges to Security in Space 2022.  This second edition expands on the insights of the first publication and provides an “unclassified overview of the threats to U.S. space capabilities, particularly from China and Russia, as those threats continue to expand.” (1)

Since 2019,  A Significant Expansion of the Chinese and Russian Operational Space Fleet

The following graph represents the growth of Russian and Chinese space capabilities since 2019:

Source:  Challenges_Security_Space_2022

Between 2019 and 2021 the combined operational space fleets of China and Russia have grown by approximately 70 percent. This recent and continuing expansion follows a period of growth (2015–2018) where China and Russia had increased their combined satellite fleets by more than 200 percent. The drive to modernize and increase capabilities for both countries is reflected in nearly all major space categories—satellite communications (SATCOM), remote sensing, navigation-related, and science and technology demonstration.

Since early 2019, competitor space operations have also increased in pace and scope worldwide, China’s and Russia’s counterspace developments continue to mature, global space services proliferate, and orbital congestion has increased.

As a result, DIA has published this new edition to:

• Expand its examination of competitor space situational awareness (SSA), and command and
  control (C2) capabilities;
• Detail the profiles of organizations operating space and counterspace systems based on new information;
• Deepen our characterization of new space and counterspace systems deployed and in development;
• Focus on China’s and Russia’s interests in exploring the Moon and Mars;
• Provide a new section on the use of space beyond Earth orbit and its implications;
• Widen our treatment of the threats posed to all nations’ space operations from space debris.

Challenges to Security in Space:  Executive Summary

Released on April 12, 2022, DIA’s report details Chinese and Russian efforts to establish space forces and expand space weapons capabilities that are contributing to the increased militarization of the space domain.  “The loss of space-based communication and navigation services could have a devastating impact on warfighters during a conflict — that’s one of the most serious scenarios anticipated. A secure, stable, and accessible space domain is crucial as China and Russia’s space-based capabilities and electronic-warfare activities continue to grow,” said DIA Director Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier. (2)

Both nations view space as a requirement for winning modern wars, especially against Western nations, and look to prove themselves as world leaders in space by establishing global norms of space behavior. They will persist in seeking ways to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and integrate their space and counterspace programs into their respective militaries, according to DIA. (2)

The 2022 report provides an Executive Summary, highlighting updates in the following areas:

Capabilities. Space-based capabilities impact many day-to-day aspects of the American way of life.  These and other benefits enabled by space systems are the results of more than 60 years of dedicated work by government agencies—military and civilian—supported by many commercial space providers.  Space systems also enable the United States and our allies to project combat power to areas of conflict and instability and allow our armed forces to collect vital intelligence on foreign threats, navigate and maneuver rapidly, and communicate with each other anywhere around the globe to ensure our security and quick response to international military and humanitarian crises.

Competition. Space competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union began in earnest with Moscow’s launch of the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, in 1957. China’s emergence as a space power in the late 20th and early 21st century and Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence have expanded the militarization of space as both countries integrate space and counterspace capabilities into their national and warfighting strategies to challenge the United States.   China and Russia, in particular, are developing various means to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in the space domain.  Beijing and Moscow seek to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. Through the use of space and counterspace capabilities, they aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership. Iran and North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade space-based communications and navigation.

Proliferation. Space capabilities are increasing across a growing list of nations, including missile warning, geolocation and tracking of friendly and adversary activities, target identification, and navigation services for their citizens and armed forces. Expanding constellations of remote-sensing satellites are reducing all countries’ ability to conceal sensitive tests, evaluation activities, and military exercises and operations.  Space commercialization is also growing as companies augment or replace government-provided launch, communications, SSA, remote-sensing—also referred to as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)— and human spaceflight services. These firms are opening access to space technologies, services, and products to government and non-government entities that can pay for their capabilities.  The growth of viable commercial space enterprises best represents how the use of space has expanded in scope, scale, and importance across the globe.

Counterspace. Space is being increasingly militarized. Some nations have developed, tested, and deployed various satellites and some counterspace weapons. China and Russia are developing new space systems to improve their military effectiveness and reduce any reliance on U.S. space systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). Beijing and Moscow have also created separate space forces. As China’s and Russia’s space and counterspace capabilities increase, both nations are integrating space scenarios into their military exercises. They continue to develop, test, and proliferate sophisticated antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk. At the same time, China and Russia are pursuing nonweaponization of space agreements in the United Nations.  Russia regularly expresses concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal, binding space arms control agreements to curb what it sees as U.S. strength in outer space.  The expansion of Chinese and Russian space and counterspace weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and facilitate their own space services.

Collisions. The probability of collisions of massive derelict objects in low Earth orbit (LEO) is growing and almost certainly will continue through at least 2030 because of rising numbers of space launches— especially those with multiple payloads—and continuing fragmentation from collisions, battery explosions, and further ASAT testing events.

Key Space Issues Through 2030 and Beyond

The 2022 version of the report provides the following strategic forecasting:

Growth of Reusable Space Technology – Commercial Opportunities and Military Advantage:  Access to space has traditionally required the use of expendable spacecraft: single-use launch vehicles, satellites, and capsules that are designed to maximize performance and then be discarded. Reliance on expendable vehicles has made access to space expensive and exclusive. Reusable technologies, while even more difficult and expensive to develop and build, stand to greatly reduce the cost of spaceflight by recovering, refurbishing, and reusing rocket stages, fairings, and capsules. Foreign nations increasingly seek to repeat U.S. successes in reusable technologies by developing their own reusable SLVs (R-SLVs) and spacecraft.

Reusable spaceflight technology will also enable the commercial space tourism industry, both for suborbital and orbital flight. The cost savings provided by reusable technology will be key for lowering ticket prices and widening the market. British, Japanese, and Russian firms are among those developing tourist spacecraft.

Human Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations:   Human spaceflight and space operations of most types to and beyond the moon will very likely increase in the future. Threats to the U.S. and allied military space capabilities will persist as humanity expands its reach into space. Nations are motivated to pursue new scientific missions, compete for military advantage, expand communications and data processing, and obtain greater national and international prestige. Economic competition to exploit the potentially large amount of natural resources on the Moon, Mars, or even asteroids, while a nascent endeavor today, will become a driver for more space-capable states or consortiums in the future.

https://oodaloop.com/archive/2021/12/10/the-next-commercial-space-industry-darpa-explores-biomanufacturing-in-cislunar-space/

New Competition for Space Beyond Earth’s Orbit:  During the past two decades, foreign competitors have looked to lunar missions as major demonstrations of technological sophistication and national strength. Other nations have been involved in human spaceflight—more than 40 nations have orbited astronauts with Russian or U.S. human spaceflight missions.  Many nations have contributed to the scientific knowledge of Earth with deep-space probes and missions to the Moon and Mars.  Deep-space operations beyond Earth orbit, sometimes called xGEO, are focused on scientific missions and exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Spacecraft in xGEO are much harder to track and characterize, and could threaten U.S. or allied high-value satellites.  Adversaries could also place operational or reserve satellites in deep space so they are much harder to monitor for later use in lower orbits.

Challenge to Space Operations – Debris and Orbital Collisions:    The probability of collision between massive derelict objects in low Earth orbit (LEO) is rising and almost certainly will continue to rise until at least 2030 as a result of fragmentation events such as collisions or battery explosions, ASAT testing, and a rapidly increasing number of space launches worldwide.  The collision risk is to all civilian, commercial, and government satellites of all nations. This adds to the difficulty of ensuring safe space operations and the overall stability of the space environment.  The 2022 report expands on this discussion, addressing specifically:

• Debris in Orbit. Collisions between and explosions of massive derelict objects almost certainly will continue to add to the amount of space debris in orbit. As of January 2022, more than 25,000 objects of at least 10 centimeters in size were tracked and cataloged in Earth’s orbit, including active satellites.  The primary risk to spacecraft in orbit is from uncataloged lethal non-trackable debris (LNT), which are objects between 5 millimeters and 10 centimeters in size. An estimated 600,000 to 900,000 pieces of uncataloged LNT are in LEO.
• Threats of Massive Object Collision. Of the cataloged objects, there are nearly 1,300 massive—greater than the size and weight of an automobile—derelict objects in LEO that pose a unique threat to LEO space operations. These objects approach each other within 5 kilometers daily, some passing well within 1 kilometer monthly, at 10–15 kilometers per second.
• Threats Posed by Debris. Space debris can cause damage and destruction to satellites and crewed spacecraft, as well as increase costs if satellite manufacturers add additional shielding to withstand small fragment impacts and fuel to allow for more frequent avoidance maneuvers. The cost of any maneuvers increases fuel usage, adds to operational complexity and expense, and shortens spacecraft lifetimes which may require more space launches to maintain the same level of capability.
• Postmission Disposal (PMD). In 1993, the United States set debris guidelines for space operators, which were adopted by many nations and the UN-affiliated Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. In LEO, all objects were to be placed in orbits allowing for their eventual decay within 25 years of the end of mission. The usual PMD maneuver placed objects at or below 650 kilometers.  However, even if international and national guidelines were made legally binding, mitigation thresholds were made more stringent, or if compliance were even close to 100 percent; there would still be a formidable debris problem from the remnants of the first 63 years of space operations.    While U.S. compliance is higher, current worldwide compliance with this guideline is well under 50 percent. The increase in the number of objects in orbit has implications for policymakers worldwide and is encouraging the development of space debris remediation technology.

What The Business Decision-Maker Should Do About This?

The DIA reports provide useful insights that are rarely discussed in open venues. This is a positive step in helping inform the business community. While the 2022 version of the report expanded the discussion of the growth and opportunities for the commercial space industry, the reports do not provide actionable recommendations for industry (this is not the charter of DIA).  Businesses can and should take action now to reduce risk to operations from conflict in space.

Here are our recommendations for mitigating space threats to your business provided by our team:

• Assess your dependence on space. This includes understanding how your business and supply chain use space to communicate, as well as any inputs to your decision-making process that come from data collected from assets in space.
• After assessing your dependence on space assets, assess space-related risks. We recommend doing so through scenario-based evaluations involving the materialization of risks.
• Decide who in the executive team is responsible for understanding and mitigating risks due to war in space. Ensure appropriate governance over actions related to space including processes that depend on space.
• Ensure the leadership team of your organization is involved in developing response and recovery plans tailored to your dependence on space and the risks to your business. Document response and recovery plans as part of your overall disaster recovery process.
• Develop incident response processes aligned with your business. This may include leveraging your internal Security Operations Center as a hub of information during an incident.
• Practice incident response including periodic executive-level tabletop exercises that run through scenarios of space-based incidents.
• Periodically evaluate your space incident response plans and dependence on space by using independent evaluation, verification, and validation services.
• Ensure you are collaborating with peer organizations, including your sector’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), and ensure space topics are being discussed in these venues

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The Commercial Space Internet, Exponential Disruption and Change

The James Webb Space Telescope Launch (On-Demand Live Stream) and the Promise of Spinoff Technology

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