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Overall, the war in Ukraine has acted as an accelerant in a clash between a wide range of points of view in the debate surrounding the future of war and the future of the defense industrial base.
A sampling of various voices on the issues is captured here which have been curated from an archive of sources from Q422 (a timeframe which appears, in hindsight, to have been a crucial period in the debate) along with a vital hearing from just last week.
“…what are the barriers to the Department rapidly adopting such technologies? As we work to deter World War 3, time is not on our side.”
Thursday, February 9, 2023 – 8:30 am
Location: Rayburn 2118
Purpose: The subcommittee met to receive testimony on the changing character of warfare and how the Department of Defense is preparing for the future.
“I am thrilled to lead this subcommittee with my friend and colleague, Representative Ro Khanna, with whom I have worked productively for six years. I would like to enter into the record an op-ed that Representative Khanna and I wrote together as freshman members of Congress. While this piece focused on Congressional Reform rather than Defense, it demonstrates that we have long been willing to work across party lines to modernize this institution. While Ro is a progressive and I am a conservative, we both like to think for ourselves and we both believe DoD can do better when it comes to innovation.
The only way to truly win World War 3 is to prevent it. If we accept the slow, bureaucratic status quo, deterrence will fail again, as it failed in Ukraine. On this subcommittee, we will dedicate ourselves to deterring war. There are three questions we must answer:
First, is the Pentagon prepared for an invasion of Taiwan that has already begun in cyberspace?;
Second, what technologies are most important for winning a future war and what are the barriers to the Department rapidly adopting such technologies?; and
Third, are the Services and the Pentagon sensibly structured and resourced to recruit, train, maintain, and equip cyber warriors?
As we work to deter World War 3, time is not on our side.”
Since Russia invaded Ukraine early this year, Defense Department leaders are starting to think differently about the development of capabilities for current and future wars.
Ukraine’s savvy application of different technologies in the ongoing conflict sparked by Russia’s invasion is informing how Pentagon leaders are thinking about and approaching the development of new and emerging capabilities for future wars. It’s also highlighting the need for robust support from America’s defense industrial base to sustain high-tech fights.
Celeste Wallander, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, pinpointed lessons her team is grasping as Russia and Ukraine continue to battle. High on her list is “the importance of our defense industrial base,” she said at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies earlier this week.
“One of the things we have been able to do that Russia is struggling with, is we’ve been able to keep this steady supply of support to Ukraine and to ourselves and to allies and partners — even as the Russian defense industrial base is really struggling just to supply Russia itself,” Wallander explained. “So we need to, as the defense and security community, understand it’s not just the forces you have — it’s the ability of your defense industrial base, and your economy, to sustain your defense enterprise and that of your allies and partners going forward.”
Wallander noted that, over the last few months, she and her colleagues have “worked closely on that,” with Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks leading the engagement with industry.
Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon told DefenseScoop on Monday that Hicks is frequently engaging with executives from key technology industries to communicate the department’s priorities and be directly informed about defense industrial base concerns. The Pentagon’s No. 2 official recently attended the White House Summit on Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing, for example, and also met with the Aerospace Industries Association executive committee of aerospace CEOs.
…what we’ve learned there is [about the] democratization of technology — it’s available, it’s out there, and so we need to be more active in this space…”
Many lessons about the use of technology in contemporary and future warfare are also being analyzed.
“My own takeaway is that we do have new technologies — we’ve seen how [drones] have been used and deployed in this conflict,” Wallander noted. But in her view, going forward, “it’s not an ‘either/or’” choice between legacy and emerging military capabilities, noting that the availability of more traditional assets like “armor, artillery, air defense capabilities have been key” in the fight between Ukraine and Russia.
“The balance might be different in different potential conflicts globally. But the United States really needs to be investing in new technologies and investing in modernization, but have that sort of 360 [degree] approach to defense requirements if we’re going to have global responsibilities with our allies and partners,” Wallander said.
Early in the present conflict, Elon Musk’s SpaceX started providing internet and connectivity to Ukraine through its commercially available Starlink satellite network, which is now underpinning many other dual-use technologies in the ongoing fight. Ukrainian drones have been able “to drop bombs on forward Russian positions using the Starlink capability,” according to the Defense Innovation Unit’s Acting Director Mike Madsen. At the same time, “civilians in war zones are able to contact their loved ones” using the Starlink tech.
“So, what we’ve learned there is [about the] democratization of technology — it’s available, it’s out there, and so we need to be more active in this space to understand what that technology is and to get it before adversaries get their hands on it,” Madsen said last week at a summit in Texas. (1)
“We’re not fighting [in] Ukraine with Silicon Valley right now, even though they’re going to try to take credit for it,” – Pentagon acquisition czar Bill LaPlante.
The Pentagon’s top acquisition official has some harsh words for Silicon Valley “tech bros” who might seek to take credit for Ukraine’s recent military successes against Russia.
“The tech bros aren’t helping us too much in Ukraine,” Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said Friday at a conference hosted by George Mason University and Defense Acquisition University.
“They want to…. [but] Ukraine is not holding their own against Russia with quantum [computing]. They’re not they’re not holding their own with AI [artificial intelligence]. … It’s hardcore production of really serious weaponry,” he said. “That’s what matters.”
LaPlante added that he wasn’t suggesting that the Pentagon should curtail investments in AI or quantum computing, as those emerging technologies continue to hold promise for the department. “What I am saying is … that we’re not fighting [in] Ukraine with Silicon Valley right now, even though they’re going to try to take credit for it,” he said.
LaPlante did not elaborate on his remarks about Silicon Valley except to say he wouldn’t “name names” as to which firms have triggered his frustration. However, his comments come as the Pentagon finds itself embroiled in ongoing discussions with SpaceX over Ukraine’s ongoing use of the Starlink constellation.
Note: There is a recent development regarding Starlink in Ukraine:
SpaceX curbed Ukraine’s use of Starlink internet for drones -company president | Reuters
Musk restricts Starlink for Ukraine, cites World War III | Fortune
Roman Schweizer, a defense and aerospace analyst with Cowen and Company, said LaPlante’s comments may be less about frustration with Silicon Valley firms or emerging technologies like AI or quantum computing, and more about setting the ground for a budget battle in DC.
“Some of these tech bros — like [Jeff] Bezos or Palantir — have significant roles in the defense industrial base,” Schweizer said. (Bezos, best known as the founder of Amazon, also founded private space company Blue Origin, which has won Pentagon contacts. Palantir Technologies, which makes big data analytics products in use by the US military and intelligence agencies, was established by a group of entrepreneurs that includes Paypal founder Peter Thiel.)
However, the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia may be prompting Pentagon leaders to recognize that a sustained war against a near-peer adversary will require more legacy platforms and munitions than they had previously planned — and that increased funding for greater production is needed.
“Whether its satellite communications technology or command and control or, probably, cyber, there are contributions throughout the range of companies, whether that’s high-tech Silicon Valley or traditional [defense contractors],” Schweizer said. “But I think the lessons learned here is that the US, NATO, allies…everyone is realizing their assumptions for platforms and munitions are way too low.”
Throughout his speech, LaPlante emphasized that the Pentagon needs to do more to put emerging technologies into production, while at the same time ramping up production of legacy weapon systems like Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Javelin anti-tank weapons, and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System — all of which have seen extensive use on Ukrainian battlefields and are now in greater demand by US allies and partners.
“If we’re going have surge production, we’re going to have to contract for it. It’s that simple,” he told the audience.
However, the Pentagon’s appetite to buy more weapon systems comes at a time when inflation and supply chain difficulties have plagued companies worldwide, and midterm elections have raised questions about whether the United States will remain committed to Ukraine in the coming years. All this has left defense contractors unsure whether expanding production lines would be a wise long-term move.
“Ask them all those questions because that’s what matters. And don’t tell me it’s got AI and quantum in it. I don’t care.”
Last month, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., and ranking member, Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., offered an amendment to the fiscal 2023 defense policy bill that would give the Pentagon the ability to broker multi-year contracts for certain munitions made by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, BAE Systems, and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace over FY23 and FY24, Defense News reported.
Although lawmakers have not yet voted on that specific proposal, LaPlante said last week that he believes Congress ultimately will grant the department multi-year production authority — a power that LaPlante has repeatedly argued is the best way to signal the Pentagon’s intentions to industry.
“They’re going to give us funding to really put into the industrial base — and I’m talking billions of dollars into the industrial base — to fund these production lines. That is [what] I predict is going to happen,” he said.
“Contracts are what matters. Money is what matters,” he said. “When people see that there’s multiyear contracts coming along for munitions and that we’re going to put production lines at a higher capacity, and we’re going to pay for it and we’re going to put it in the [request for proposal] and we’re going to award to it, they’ll pay attention.”
LaPlante’s focus on enabling production was not limited solely to legacy platforms and munitions being used in Ukraine. During the Obama administration, when LaPlante served as the Air Force’s top acquisition official, the US military’s ability to prototype and test cutting-edge technologies had stagnated, LaPlante said.
Recent efforts such as the establishment of the Defense Innovation Unit and the use of new contracting mechanisms such as “other transaction authorities” more readily allow the Pentagon to do business outside the traditional defense establishment. However, the department still fails to transition emerging technologies from the development stage into production.
Now, “there’s a lot more experimentation, a lot of prototyping, Section 804 [mid-tier acquisition programs], OTAs, it’s everywhere. That’s really good. But it doesn’t matter if it stays as a prototype. It doesn’t matter if it doesn’t go into production,” he said.
“If somebody gives you a really cool liquored-up story about a DIU [project] or OTA [contract] ask them when it’s going into production, ask them how many numbers, ask them what the [unit cost] is going to be, ask them how it will work against China,” he said. “Ask them all those questions because that’s what matters. And don’t tell me it’s got AI and quantum in it. I don’t care.” (2)
“The Pentagon is saying all the right things when it comes to defense innovation but real, lasting change isn’t evident just yet…”
“While there are promising things that are being experimented with, they are not getting in the hands of the warfighter yet because of this lag time between a decision to produce something and to actually reach [initial operating capability] and then produce it in numbers,” David Ochmanek, a senior defense analyst for the RAND Corporation, said Monday during a virtual Brookings Institution event on defense innovation and great power deterrence. Ochmanek, who served as deputy assistant defense secretary for force development from 2009 until 2014, contrasted the U.S. effort with China’s.
“China’s not standing still. They’re still cranking out hundreds and hundreds of accurate ballistic and cruise missiles every year. They now have the largest Navy in the world…their training is getting more realistic…so we’ve got to run pretty hard just to stay even with that,” he said. Chris Brose, the chief strategy officer for Anduril Industries, said previous administrations have not been able to translate their view of China as the pacing threat into the fundamental culture and programmatic changes. “We’re starting to make progress, but I don’t think it’s as much or as fast as it needs to be,” Brose said.
He cited the Navy’s unmanned-systems efforts. “The Navy has been on a long journey to wrap its head around unmanned systems and embrace the concept. I think they’re making strides, they’re saying the right things. They’re coming to the realization that the only way they’re going to have the capacity, the magazine depth that they’re going to need is on the back of unmanned systems,” Brose said. But they haven’t been able to produce, that is building programs around unmanned systems and making it an “enduring priority where you’re going to spend a lot of money over a long period of time.”
“Are we making enough progress fast enough?”
Ochmanek noted various service efforts to implement reforms, such as the Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability. “You see every service creating entities to spur innovation, whether it’s AFWIC in the Air Force, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Army Futures Command, etc, etc. And that’s all good. At the end of the day, it comes down to execution,” he said.
What’s lacking, he said, is a drastic shift in how the services spend money on the things they say they want. “We’ve admitted we have a problem. We are focusing on that problem. We are generating ideas and concepts for getting after the problem. I have not seen any service actually take the plunge into altering its investment priorities in a dramatic way to get after what looked like the most promising ways to actually execute these new concepts.” Brose said it’s a bit too soon to tell but those shifts—including Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s operational priorities, designed to drive how the service funds programs—provide something to hope for. “It’s good that we can actually point to a series of things that we can try to be hopeful about. I think the big question is: are we making enough progress fast enough? Thus far, I would say the answer to that is still no.” (3)
Former US Deputy CTO Nick Sinai argues the Pentagon must embrace Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial culture and work to ensure the latest technology reaches the battlefield
Dr. LaPlante is right to focus on the volume production of munitions. This is a critical issue for Ukraine and for our own national security. I can appreciate his passion for wanting DoD to send a demand signal to ensure sufficient, long-term manufacturing capacity for Javelins, Stingers, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), and other advanced munitions that America and its allies would need in a future conflict. His flippant comments on commercial technology, however, are misleading. “Tech bros” aren’t providing artillery, but the Ukrainians are directing the war fight on iPhones, social media, secure messaging apps, Starlink, and software applications they’re building on the fly. They are getting their intelligence from commercial satellite companies. And they are directing strikes using commercial drones. Commercial technology matters in the current conflict. More so than in any recent combat operation.
I’d humbly suggest to Dr. LaPlante that if commercial technology isn’t scaling fast enough inside the DoD, it is precisely because the DoD isn’t focused on scaling commercial technology. And that falls squarely in his inbox as DoD’s chief acquisition executive.
“The existing defense industrial base isn’t sufficient…”
Building the necessary capabilities to aid the Ukrainians and deter China requires considering not only how much we produce, but also what we produce, and how fast. This is one of the central findings in the interim report of the Strategic Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) Economy Panel. It calls for a new American techno-industrial strategy that harvests the best of traditional defense manufacturing and emerging technology through improved public-private partnerships.
We will not be able to maximize our probability of deterring future conflict with China by focusing on systems that align with our current concepts and operational plans. That is exactly the same mistake Russia made, and we should not repeat it.
Let’s be honest: will the existing traditional defense contractors create small unmanned drones, new cyber tools, and space-based communication and sensing capabilities — at high volumes and radically lower costs? That we can easily share with allies? That can be rapidly adapted, integrated, and repurposed — even in the fog of war.
Heidi Shyu, the DoD CTO, has identified 14 critical technology areas that are vital to national security. And the former Defense Innovation Unit Director, Mike Brown, observed that the commercial industry already leads in 11 of those 14 areas. Maintaining our technological edge depends more on partnering with “tech bros” than ever, even if that’s not the industrial base that makes the Pentagon comfortable.
Of course, we need traditional defense contractors and weapons systems. But they are not sufficient. We need to focus on how fast the DoD can incorporate emerging commercial technologies into its existing arsenal and future plans.
As former Navy acquisition executive James “Hondo” Geurts and Gen. Joe Votel have argued, we need to take “full advantage of [technology] initially intended for commercial purposes … and agilely adapt such emerging technologies to defense use without costly and time-consuming reinvention and reduplication.”
The good news: many of the newer, innovative companies we need already exist.
Startups and especially scaleups — startups that have good product-market fit and are rapidly growing revenue — can help DoD field important new capabilities. There is an entire ecosystem of ambitious defense-tech and dual-use companies in Silicon Valley and in other innovation hubs around the country. U.S. defense and aerospace startups raised $10 billion in 2021, triple the amount from 2019. More broadly, across industries, artificial intelligence, and machine learning startups raised $115 billion in 2021, according to Pitch
Insight Partners, where I work, has invested in Rebellion Defense, Hawkeye360, Shift5, and LeoLabs — and we have met with most of the national security entrepreneurs seeking venture capital. We are also one of the larger venture and growth investors in AI, cyber, and enterprise software companies — many of which are also serving the U.S. government.
I can say from a firsthand perspective: that innovation is here today. In most cases, commercial vendors are delivering important new capabilities at a much faster rate than any of the large defense contractors.
Software and data analytics — which drive the intelligence that DoD desperately needs to deter next-generation conflict — do not rely primarily on physical production. Instead, software and AI are made, iteratively, by product managers, software developers, system reliability engineers, and data scientists.
Fortunately, VC-backed scaleups attract some of the best software and AI talent in the world. Scaleups compete on talent density, which creates product velocity and faster customer feedback cycles. And increasingly, talented technologists want to work on national security problems.
More good news: thanks to the efforts of current and past public servants — most notably the late Secretary Ash Carter, who was instrumental in pushing the DoD on this topic — thousands of startups and scaleups are already working with DoD. Through labs, rapid prototyping groups, and innovation units, venture-backed companies are coming through the DoD front door, alongside the traditional defense industrial base. It’s a positive development that the Department has become more startup-friendly with its R&D dollars. Now, it’s time to move the winners — those that have product-market fit inside the DoD — into production.
The DoD should accelerate the buying and integration of commercial technologies by focusing on where procurement happens at scale: the program executive offices (PEOs). From ships to planes to enterprise logistic systems, PEOs are how the Defense Department buys and integrates technology into existing platforms, primarily through large defense contractors.
The Department should provide incentives for acquisition professionals inside the PEO portfolios to buy emerging tech for integration into existing programs. Winning technologies should be able to scale across different programs — what is known as “portfolio management” — even programs that comprise a number of different traditional defense contractors. Imagine the impact that would result from technology companies competing to become a “capability of record” for the DoD, rather than owning a smaller piece of a single program of record.
PEOs should support innovative commercial companies by committing to procurement actions at the speed of relevance — and committing to experiment continuously with their capabilities. PEOs could accomplish this by creating a new executive role — a Portfolio Innovation Director — and giving them resources, tools, and most importantly, an innovation scaling mandate.
Building bridges with the PEOs are a two-way street, and the innovation community needs to do its part. I’ve been honored to participate in the U.S. Air Force training program, Banshee, talking with talented mid-career acquisition officials about how VC-backed companies differ from the defense contractors they are more familiar with. And as part of the Defense Ventures fellowship program, Insight Partners has hosted active-duty service members — including acquisition professionals — to build greater familiarity with the VC-backed innovation ecosystem.
Dr. LaPlante’s “tech bros” comments divert attention from the real issue: DoD won’t win a future war without embracing commercial tech. Commercial technology has changed the course of the conflict in Ukraine. Deterring a peer adversary like China will require the DoD to exploit a wide array of commercial technologies across the U.S. and our allies. And if deterrence doesn’t work, the side that can introduce new emerging technologies and updated software faster than the other is likely to gain a competitive tactical and operational advantage.
As a former public official, I know how hard it can be to make changes in a large bureaucracy. It takes knowing the system deeply, starting small but aiming big, and partnering with unlikely allies. Heck, I wrote a book about it. The DoD machinery of requirements generation, acquisition, and budgeting is big and complicated. It’s easy to criticize DoD from the outside, and hard to make the meaningful changes from the inside. But with leadership commitment, it can be done. Dr. LaPlante, you are the chief buyer for the entire Defense Department. You can lead the way. Will you put Silicon Valley into production? (4)
https://oodaloop.com/archive/2023/02/13/the-disintermediation-of-the-defense-industrial-base/
https://oodaloop.com/archive/2023/02/06/designing-quantifying-and-measuring-exponential-innovation/
https://oodaloop.com/archive/2023/02/13/innovation-in-xai-applications/
https://oodaloop.com/archive/2023/02/06/ooda-loop-on-exponential-disruption/
https://oodaloop.com/archive/2023/01/20/ooda-almanac-2023-jagged-transitions/
About the Author
Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives.
Informing your decisions with actionable intelligence
Informing your decisions with actionable intelligence