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In early April 2023, the China Cybersecurity Industry Alliance (CCIA) published a report that reviewed notable cyber attacks allegedly conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies, using analysis from cybersecurity organizations, news sources, and supposed leaked U.S. intelligence documents.  The report chronicled some of the most advanced malware observed since 2010, and suspected U.S. exploitation of IT products and encryption standards, the expanse of U.S. cyber activities, tools used, and an advanced persistent threat (APT) group believed to be tied to at least one U.S. intelligence agency.  Moreover, the report linked these actions to some of the bigger threats facing the global community to include attacks on key infrastructure, supply chain compromise, and cyber weapon development.  The implication is clear: Beijing is putting forth its thesis that the United States is not the benevolent cyber actor it portends to be.  It appears that Beijing is capitalizing on the political divide in the U.S., a tumultuous geopolitical landscape, and a distracted U.S. foreign policy to take an aggressive stance against Washington.

There is little doubt that the United States is the primary cyber power in the world.  Its two primary intelligence services’ prominent cyber capabilities are accepted by most, even if they are not overtly acknowledged by the agencies themselves. And while some of the U.S. Cyber Command’s “hunt forward” missions have made it into news cycles, those of the CIA and NSA have not, a node to the nature of their covert and clandestine work.  However, by primarily using the analysis and findings of outside sources from creditable non-U.S. cybersecurity companies as well as other media, Beijing is shining a light on the type of questionable cyber activities that Washington has typically called other countries out on to include the weaponization of cyberspace, jeopardizing infrastructure security, compromising the integrity of information technology development, and undermining state sovereignty and the larger global cyber order.

The timing of this report conspicuously comes when Beijing is robustly competing against Washington in an advanced technology race, and where it is asserting itself as a viable competitor as a global leader.  Under Xi’s stewardship, Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to butt against Washington when it is in China’s interest to do so.  One such area is in cyberspace where the two cyber powers publicly condemn the other’s cyber improprieties in an effort to deflect from their own transgressions.  Starting March 2022, China started countering U.S. narratives of Chinese cyber malfeasance with its own accusations.  In the past, China has consistently denied U.S. allegations of intrusion activity, lamenting its own difficulties in shoring up cybersecurity from wily hackers that use Chinese networks to launch attacks elsewhere.  It would cite attribution difficulties in proving Chinese guilt, and a failure on the U.S. or any other government’s part for sharing the evidence to support the accusations.  But now, China is aggressively supplying its own charges against the United States, and perhaps taking a cue from the United States cybersecurity vendors, using its own cybersecurity companies as foils to “expose” U.S. cyber hostilities.

Backing such a bold play are the leaks that have put the United States in a precarious light.  While it is generally accepted that states spy on one another, the issue strains relations when friends are the ones spying.  Notably, after the Snowden leaks, stalwart ally Germany ended its spy pact with the United States.  In the wake of the recent Pentagon leaks, South Korea has downplayed disclosures of U.S. spying on it suggesting the documents had been altered or were untrue, though this seems more about publicly “saving face” though domestic oppositionist

lawmakers are using this fodder to attack the pro-U.S. administration in place.  Indeed, China has used issues of U.S. global surveillance in several of its own press outlets to question Washington’s image as a “beacon of freedom and democracy,” contending that the United States jeopardizes global cybersecurity as a result of its monolithic cyber-enabled spying apparatus.  Such allegations only reinforce China’s support for global cybersecurity to be a shared interest among states rather than the via the efforts of one or a few trying to push their vision and standards and who might use it to conduct “cyber thefts and attacks.”  The intent is to drive a wedge between Washington and other Western democracies while simultaneously trying to cultivate closer ties with them.  

Beijing has ramped up its efforts in calling out Washington’s recent enactment of its CHIPS and Science Act, imposition of technological export control power, and an executive order clamping down on surveillance tech as cyber hegemonistic measures that keep the United States in a dominant position.  Such moves appear contradictory, especially given the discovery that one U.S. agency had purchased such surveillance technology after the signing of the order, and further fuel Beijing’s attacks of the United States using the pretext of “national security” to justify its actions.  China is not the first country who has called out the United States as a cyber hegemon.  North Korea and Pakistan have made similar claims as well.  The recurrent theme of global surveillance against enemies and friends alike does not sit well with allied nations.  Though no Western states have publicly made similar claims, China’s focus on Washington’s intelligence collection is intent on trying to influence the international community that the United States is an unreliable partner.  In the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, both France and Germany called the surveillance “unacceptable.”

Fully aware of its own reputation as pervasive cyber thief, Beijing understands that it doesn’t necessarily have to bury that stigma as much as dull its shine. As such, promoting the image of Washington as an unreliable cyber partner and the leading “starter of cyber war” is just one prong in Beijing’s strategy to reduce U.S. global influence.  Adding to its cyber hegemony accusations, Beijing has asserted itself as a broker of peace deals, a role typically played by Washington, showing that China can fill any void left by a distracted United States.  Beijing is also campaigning to recruit states to dethrone the dollar as the dominant global currency to further reduce U.S. influence and seems to be gaining a favorable audience as several governments are discussing potential alternatives.  

China seeks to capitalize on the United States’ perceived vulnerability and seems confident that its role as the leading trading partner for more than 120 countries will hold more sway with the international community than any of its transgressions.  Perhaps more disconcerting is its attempts to exploit fissures in historically strong alliances to its favor.  Recently, in a presidential  visit to Beijing, France’s Macron advocated for Europe to reduce its dependence on the United States and not be dragged into confrontation with China.  Some Latin American countries look to be following suit the longer perceptions of U.S. ambivalence toward the region persists.  

The United States has yet to effectively respond to China’s cyber accusations, electing to remain silent, at least for the time being.  However, the longer a response is put on the back backburner, the more opportunity it gives Beijing to further refine the narrative and supports China’s surge in political and diplomatic activity.  This is not to say that U.S. allies will suddenly defect to China, but it may play to the rest of the world that views China trade and Chinese partnership as a viable alternative to the United States.  And such partnership can lead to diplomatic victories like are being seen in Latin America, especially regarding the Taiwan issue.  With the future of cyberspace still being shaped by the international community, Beijing may be trying to replicate this strategy by framing the United States as an obstacle and not a conduit to peace and harmony in cyberspace.  And if it is not careful, the technology war may not be the only issue where Washington finds itself on the losing end.

Emilio Iasiello

About the Author

Emilio Iasiello

Emilio Iasiello has nearly 20 years’ experience as a strategic cyber intelligence analyst, supporting US government civilian and military intelligence organizations, as well as the private sector. He has delivered cyber threat presentations to domestic and international audiences and has published extensively in such peer-reviewed journals as Parameters, Journal of Strategic Security, the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, and the Cyber Defense Review, among others. All comments and opinions expressed are solely his own.