This review of U.S. National Intelligence Strategy and observations on PRC reaction to it leads to insights that can inform corporate strategic planning not found anywhere else.

In August 2023, the United States released its 2023 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), a blueprint for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) with six primary goals: positioning the IC to intensify strategic global intelligence competition; recruit, develop, and retain IC workforce talent; deliver interoperable and innovative solutions at scale; diversity and expand domestic and international partnerships; expand IC capabilities and expertise on transnational challenges; and enhancing national security resilience.  The purpose of the NIS is to provide strategic guidance to the operations, investments, and priorities of the larger IC, and is supportive and complementary to the goals outlined in other top-level documents like the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment. Typically, these documents identify current and evolving threats from state/non-state actors, global emergencies (e.g., climate change, pandemics, supply chains), and emerging technologies that potentially pose a threat to the United States’ public and private organizations.

The strategy is purposefully a high-level view of intelligence priorities for the 18-agency IC, and as such, avoids specificities.  For example, cyber is mentioned vary sparingly in the document, even though cyber plays some type of role in most of the goals outlined in the NIS.  This is especially true for the state, non-state, and even sub-national (identified as entities ranging from multinational corporations to transnational social movements) actor threats the NIS identifies as key players in an increasingly strategically competitive threat environment.  Nonetheless, cyber factors significantly into the threat picture whether as a supportive element, a facilitator, or as a driving catalyst of influence, disruption, or destruction.

One of the goals cited in the NIS has been a cornerstone of the Biden Administration – the need for the United States to not only continue to strengthen current partnerships with the Five Eyes intelligence alliance nations (i.e., United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), but also foster new opportunities with other international stakeholders.  In addition to being goal 4 of the NIS, the need for expanding partnerships is echoed in three other goals underscoring the importance of aligning the United States’s security with the cooperation of likeminded nations. However, the NIS stresses the need for the IC to explore and pursue partnerships outside its typical channels, namely, with nonstate organizations and subnational actors that have influence in shaping “societal, technological, and economic futures.”  Indeed, the Strategy acknowledged the IC’s need to better harness this nonstate actor expertise particularly with respect to combatting cyber threats and safeguarding critical infrastructure.

The Strategy also clearly cited China and Russia as the United States’ two primary state “competitors,” a term purposefully used to soften hawkish rhetoric in an intelligence document.  Perhaps more telling was the Strategy’s advocacy of the U.S. IC bolstering its capabilities on everything from advanced technologies to supply chain control when competing against Beijing and Moscow across economic, military, and political spheres.  Although both countries are only mentioned once, the intent was clear enough that it garnered harsh reaction from Chinese press that criticized it as a throwback to Cold War thinking, and the U.S. need to fight against an adversary to justify itself in the world.

But the fact that China has been cited as a competitor is not as disconcerting for Beijing as the fact that it has been named in a document in which the United States stresses the need to build intelligence relationships across public and private sectors and even globally to bolster the United States’ reach and deepen its intelligence insight in priority areas.  Beijing has closely observed United States involvement in the Ukraine conflict and how it launched the Ukraine-Defense Contact Group – a coalition of 50 partner nations that have been engaged in providing fiscal and material backing to support Kyiv’s defense efforts – as well as lobbying the private sector to provide their expertise and assistance.  The results of these private and public sector partnerships have certainly helped Ukraine persevere, turning the conflict into a war of attrition with no immediate end in sight.

Similarly, China sees continued U.S. partnerships as a direct threat to its interests, particularly in cyberspace.  Chinese cyber operations are global in scope, having targeted public and private sector organizations across the world for more than a decade, stealing valuable intellectual property and sensitive economic, political, and military information.  Expanding its intelligence-sharing relationships with global private and public entities that have been victimized by the Chinese potentially gives Washington access to not only valuable intelligence on China, but possible partners to collaborate with to stem China’s cyber malfeasance.  This can include actual joint cyber operations to neutralize actor activity as are seen with U.S. Cyber Command’s(CYBERCOM) hunt forward team, or else forming economic/political alliances to help reign in or impose penalties on China for its cyber practices, or other areas of transgressions.  Despite being a pervasive cyber actor in its own rights, all signs point to China being a step below the United States with respect to capability, a fact reiterated by CYBERCOM’s commander when he described China’s “cyber and surveillance capabilities” as “not ahead of, or even comparable to, to those of the United States.”  This is a bold statement in not only acknowledging the power of U.S. cyber forces but diminishing the sophistication of those activities attributed to China thus far.

Beijing quickly responded to the NIS through its own intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) who criticized its hegemonic and confrontational themes, which is further perpetuated by the United States placing emphasis on build intelligence alliances against its competitors, as evidenced by the U.S. role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and its Quad engagement to counter Chinese aspirations.  Despite pushbacks, it appears that Beijing is more concerned with these partnerships than it wants to admit.  A high-ranking Pentagon official recently testified before Congress that the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy was showing positive results, developing the technologies and regional force partnerships it needs to counter Beijing’s pursuit of regional leadership in the Asia-Pacific, and deter future threats from China.  Therefore, it is unsurprising that Beijing continues to paint the United States as a “bully” using foreign cooperative governments as “pawns” and coercing them to bend to U.S. wishes and a “U.S.-centered world order.”

Organized blocs working in tandem with the United States to slow China’s strategic objectives is a disconcerting reality for Beijing, who has relied on cyber-enabled technologies and operations to support its increasing influence and growth.  A recent report reveals that Japan intends to build information networks for the Indo-Pacific to counter cyber attacks from states like China and Russia.  No doubt, such an endeavor would greatly benefit from Japan’s cybersecurity agreement with the United States, which was strengthened in January 2023 in response to the increased cyber threats posed by prominent cybercrime actors and nation states.  Adding the Five Eyes and the Quad to the mix will only further squeeze Chinese cyber operations, particularly at a time when Beijing is trying to improve its global image as it competes against the United States for world favor.  Adding potential private sector relationships into the mix is another turn of the screw, as the information possessed by critical infrastructure organizations, as well as tech and Internet companies would be an intelligence boon for U.S. IC with respect to Chinese cyber activities.

The NIS makes it clear the path forward for U.S. intelligence, and China sees the writing on the wall.  If successes in the Russia-Ukraine are a sign of what could happen, China may find itself slowly backed into a corner not just by cooperating governments, but key private sector stakeholders tired of being cyber targets and looking for their own satisfaction.  If this plan is successful – and it will require a concerted coordinated effort from partners to make it so – it may just be what’s needed to impact how China conducts its own cyber collection while building a multi-state cyber resilience framework model against the world’s most pervasive cyber thief.

Additional Resources:

Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompts global repercussions on supply chains and cybersecurity. This act highlights potential threats from nations like China and could shift defense postures, especially in countries like Japan. See: Russia Threat Brief

Economic Weakness in China: China’s economy faces dim prospects exacerbated by disasters, COVID-19, and geopolitical tensions. Amid limited financial transparency, some indicators suggest China’s economic growth is severely stunted, impacting global economic stability. See: China Threat Brief

Networked Extremism: The digital era enables extremists worldwide to collaborate, share strategies, and self-radicalize. Meanwhile, advanced technologies empower criminals, making corruption and crime interwoven challenges for global societies. See: Converging Insurgency, Crime and Corruption

Food Security and Inflation: Food security is emerging as a major geopolitical concern, with droughts and geopolitical tensions exacerbating the issue. Inflation, directly linked to food security, is spurring political unrest in several countries. See: Food Security