Future scenarios involving the Recoding of War Doctrine and the Disintermediation of the Theater of Operation by the Swarm Architecture are transformative, heralding a shift in the very fabric of military strategy and operations. While still evolving, these concepts suggest a future where warfare is increasingly dominated by autonomous systems and decentralized decision-making, fundamentally altering traditional battlefield dynamics.  Find theoretical frameworks and real-world case studies here. 

• Like the principles of war, the principles and inverse principles of warfare represent the first-order principles militaries must adhere to when engaged in armed conflict. They are the animating forces that underpin the basic requirements which transcend technology of land forces.

• As we transition from a human-centric era of warfare into one that will arguably be dominated by artificial intelligence, human-machine integrated formations and a multitude of autonomous systems, Army concepts and doctrine must evolve. The Army must boldly push into new and challenging cognitive areas to help forecast how war and warfare might change, remaining open to novel terminology, concepts and doctrinal ideas.

• Concept developers, doctrine developers, science and technology experts and force designers must work together to develop pragmatic ideas and designs for future forces that integrate the key aspects of future technology without neglecting the enduring challenges of land warfare.

Myths and Principles in the Challenges of Future War

This is the second article in an AUSA series examining the future of armed conflict…This installment scrutinizes a compilation of arresting myths which inhibit the cognitive maturation of Western militaries to address the challenges of contemporary and future armed conflict. To counterbalance these myths, we also provide a set of standards grounded in the belief that technological innovation has a quick decay time; this is because self-organizing adversaries always respond in self-preserving strategies to battlefield novelty.

In Brief

• A set of myths in contemporary military thinking are holding back a broader appreciation for the challenges, opportunities and solutions for future war. The neglect of adaptive and self-interested oppositional innovation is the theme that binds each of these myths; ultimately, it is why they provide limited utility for the practitioner and scholar of armed conflict.
• Principles of war each have an inverse quality that—like that of a negative of a photograph—is just as important as the principle itself. 
• The purpose of the principles outlined in this article is two-fold: first, to spur a penetrating examination of conventional wisdom by breaking the tyranny of the institutional hive-mind; and second, to provide the intellectual stimulus needed to energize the origination of theories and concepts that are compatible with the reality of armed conflict and are adequate for the future of war and warfare.
• War is the strategic considerations of armed conflict; warfare is the operational and tactical considerations, namely, where actual combat occurs.  
• Preparing appropriately for the future of war means accounting for contingencies, not just for preferential outcomes. 

The conclusion section of this paper is really a unique intellectual provocation –  and worth a read:

To address the challenges of the future of armed conflict, Western military thinking must expand beyond the confines of engrained institutional thinking. It must periodically question its assumptions and its extant mental models. To keep pace with change, it must discharge obsolete ideas and concepts, regardless of how uncomfortable doing so might initially feel. This thought must move beyond appeals to authority to legitimize its guiding ideas. Moreover, Western military thinking must not fall victim to emotionally reacting to flashy videos on social media to make claims about fundamental changes in war and warfare. Military thinking is far too serious a business to allow emotionally charged reactions to drive adaptations in doctrine and force structure.

Further, the principles of war are common property, meaning that they do not belong to a specific institution. An institution’s doctrinal definitions or modifications to the principles of war reflect the narrative that they want to advance their own military operations. Because the principles of war are common property, they are subject to refinement by the community of interest. Refinement that does not align with a military’s own modifications, such as offerings that do not align with the U.S. military’s modification of the principles of war to principles of joint operations, is valid. Moreover, when an institution modifies a common property idea to the point of fundamentally altering it, like the U.S. military did with the change from principles of war to principles of joint operations, they do gain ownership of that new concept. In addition, when an institution develops a new concept, like the U.S. Army’s Convergence or MDO, they own the idea. The difference here is that common property concepts can be modified by bottom-up change, whereas ideas that are proprietary can only be modified by the owner. As a result, common property ideas, like the principle of war, maneuver warfare and many others, should be vigorously debated within and outside military institutions.

In the case of war, conformity and uniformity, or patterned thinking, often prove disastrous. In that spirit, the principles of war introduced within this paper reflect the keen importance that system theory and determinism have on the actions of all the belligerents within a conflict. Moreover, the principles reflect war’s duality through the novel use of inverse principles to present each principle’s negative image and to illustrate its importance.

Lastly, all military thinking, whether it is common property or an institution’s original work, must be thoughtfully critiqued. Rigorously examining military concepts, doctrine, strategies and non-specific ideas is the method by which those ideas are improved. Improvement is not for improvement’s sake, but so that the forces using those ideas have a correct frame and a set of theoretical practices from which to draw when they are planning for and participating in conflict. To close, it is important to remember the words of J.F.C. Fuller.  He cautioned: “Method creates doctrine, and a common doctrine is the cement which holds an army together. Though mud is better than no cement, we want the best cement, and we shall never get it unless we can analyze war scientifically and discover its values.”

The collective community of interest must shake itself awake and move beyond the institutionally reinforcing and traditionalist thinking. The community of interest must take Fuller ‘srecommendation to thinking scientifically about war and warfare and provide detailed criticisms of where current military thinking is falling short. Otherwise, Western militaries could end up on the inverse side of winning.

Western Military Thinking and Breaking Free from the Tetrarch of Modern Military Thinking

This article, the first in a five-part series on theory of the future of war, seeks to start a dialogue on military thinking about the future of armed conflict. This series sets aside conventional wisdom, institutionally perpetuated myths and Futurist ideology, instead probing into the future from a Conflict Realist perspective. Probabilistic qualitative analysis fuels Conflict Realism’s understanding of modern war and warfare while serving as the foundation from which Conflict Realism views future armed conflict. Within that taxonomy, Conflict Realism accepts the reality of multivariable dependencies, causal mechanisms, economic theory of rational choice, systems thinking, power dynamics, sequential rationality, conditional dominance and variable determinism on both war and warfare.

In Brief

• Strategy, concepts, doctrine, plans and theory form an institutional tetrarch [one of four joint rulers or chiefs] that maintains agency over military thinking and impedes independent, groundbreaking thought.

• Military theory, developed by interested practitioners, civilians and scholars, provides a unique opportunity for thought exploration because it is often unbound by existing institutional constraints.

• Western militaries would be well served by encouraging and rewarding military theorists, whether or not in uniform, in addition to investing in the institutional tetrarch.

From the conclusion of this first installment of the AUSA series:  “In closing, the need for budding theorists looking to solve the challenges of future war and warfare is great. The Association of the United States Army’s Education and Programs department provides an excellent forum for the publication of works of theory and debate of ideas. The remaining articles in this series will carry forward the ideas on probabilistic theory to help start the theoretical debate about the future of armed conflict.

‘Swarm pilots’ will need new tactics—and entirely new training methods: Air Force special-ops chief

Air Force Special Operations Forces Command (AFSOC) will expand on groundbreaking experiments this summer:  “We’re gonna have to break some old paradigms…” 

As first reported in Defense One: Experiments with ever-larger drone swarms are revealing a need for new concepts of operations and new ways of training human operators, the” Air Force Special Operations Forces Command says.  In the next few months, AFSOC will expand upon a groundbreaking December experiment that saw a single drone crew guide not one but three MQ-9 Reapers and even to air-launch a smaller Group 2 drone as part of the command’s Adaptive Airborne Enterprise effort. Now, the command aims to repeat the experiment with even more drones—and add the ability to hand off control to troops in the field.

“The hope with the summer now is: how can we start to bring those aspects together and then work with our joint force teammates? And now how do we manage multiple MQ-9s air-launching a small number of” smaller drones, “and then hand that swarm off to a joint force teammate, whether in a terrestrial or maritime situation?” Lt. Gen. Tony Bauernfeind said in an interview at the SOF Week conference…

But the Air Force still has some pioneering work to do in designing concepts of operation for piloting drone swarms, and that means more focus on what aspects of flight or drone operation to automate and what to leave to humans.  “We’re gonna have to break some old paradigms,” Bauernfeind said. “We really have to reinforce to ourselves that it’s going to be a human on the loop, not in the loop”—that is, the operator will monitor a drone’s execution of its assigned mission rather than steering the thing. “Cognitively, it will require us to train our air crews in a new way.”  “I think is going to be a new opportunity,” he said. “You got to figure out how to handle an epic level of multitasking.”  The task could get even more complicated, depending on how many of the drones are expected to return home, he said.

Bauernfeind is also interested in how Ukrainian forces are using 3-D printers to make small drones near the front line. “3-D printing is really bringing in a new generation of [innovation], how quickly we can mass produce some of the smaller UAVs. And so I see an opportunity there.  How can we quickly ensure we have the right levels of stock, the right levels of sensors? And so it’s pretty impressive to see where some of our industrial teammates are going with 3-D printing.”

But some innovations in the Ukrainian battlespace are more controversial, such as the use of autonomy to find and hit targets on the battlefield. The Pentagon has ethical principles to govern its development and use of AI in conflict. But concern is mounting that the United States might abandon those principles if it found itself in a conflict in which it was losing. 

Marines Expanding Drone Resupply Missions

The goal is to “build out a distributed network of logistics in a contested environment…that’s an asymmetrical advantage…that…should rest with the Marine Corps…”

The Marine Corps has successfully integrated resupplying troops in the field using small drones and will soon expand payloads to deliver even more material.  It’s all about delivering the “Bs: beans, bullets and Band-Aids as well as batteries” to frontline Marines in contested environments over the last tactical mile, Gregg Skinner, Navy and Marine Corps program manager for small tactical unmanned aerial systems, said at the recent Modern Day Marine conference.  Under the Small Unmanned Logistics System-Air program, the Marines in October reached initial operating capability to launch small drones that can autonomously carry 50 to 120 pounds of supplies as far as 7.5 miles.

They take the place of Marines who would otherwise be at risk attempting to deliver the food, ammunition, or medical supplies to positions that might be under fire, Skinner noted.  They’re inexpensive — or attritable — meaning if one is shot down or doesn’t make it for whatever reason, it is not a great loss. Another is sent in its place.  The Marines are going to expand the tactic using larger unmanned aerial systems. The service will experiment with larger drones — under the Medium Unmanned Logistics System-Air program — that can carry 500 to 600 pounds of supplies and fly some 100 nautical miles.

Contractors Kaman Aerospace and Leidos are under rapid prototyping contracts to demonstrate the capability at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona this summer…Ultimately, the Marines and the Navy are looking at “blue water” resupply at distances of 2,500 nautical miles, he said.  The goal is to “build out a distributed network of logistics in a contested environment,” Skinner said.  “That’s an asymmetrical advantage that’s going on there, and that advantage should rest with the Marine Corps, not someone else,” he added. 

The Rise of the Navy Robots

From robotics specialists to laser projects, the Navy embraces evolving tech for future challenges.

“Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Challenge of Regulation”

What Next? 

“…we must not sit on our hands and continue relying on hundred-year-old ideas to define modern and future principles for war and warfare.”

From the conclusion of  The Principles for the Future of Warfare and Stand-Off Warfare: 

[Writing about the principles of war in 1949, American military strategist Bernard] “Brodie points out that one of the reasons so little change occurs in military thought is not conservatism or the lag of tactical and strategic concepts behind developments in materiel but rather “the absence of the habit of scientific thinking.”  Perhaps Brodie’s assessment is a bit harsh, but maybe he’s also correct to some extent. For the]  Army’s principles of war to remain relatively unchanged for nearly 100 years does not reflect their timelessness but rather the community of interests’ unwillingness to engage with the material in any meaningful way. This neglect should be alarming, especially considering that we are transitioning from a very human-centric era of warfare into one that will arguably be dominated by artificial intelligence, human-machine integrated formations and a multitude of autonomous systems. Therefore, a handful of considerations might be helpful for evolving Army concepts and doctrine as we continue to integrate novel information age technology into how the Army might operate, organize, and equip for conflicts in the future.

First, the principles and inverse principles outlined here might not correctly address the challenges presented by those technologies. Nor will those principles necessarily support all the ways in which systems theory and networked, data-centric warfare will impact Army and joint operations. Nonetheless, we must not sit on our hands and continue relying on hundred-year-old ideas to define modern and future principles for war and warfare. Concept developers, doctrine developers, military thought leaders and Army leaders must boldly push into new and challenging cognitive areas to help forecast how the future of war and warfare might change. Yet in doing so, they must use new language where appropriate and make sure to not shoehorn existing terminology, concepts and doctrinal ideas into future idea space not yet tainted by institutional bias. This will allow clarity of thought and, hopefully, the articulation of operating concepts and operations doctrine that clearly identifies causal mechanisms, feedback loops and network pathways into a coherent warfighting approach, not just another dusting off of AirLand Battle.”

Further OODA Loop Scenarios

“These developments promise enhanced capabilities and operational efficiencies but also bring new challenges in terms of security, ethics, and strategic stability.”

The future scenarios involving the Recoding of War Doctrine and the Disintermediation of the Theater of Operation by the  Swarm Architecture are transformative, heralding a shift in the very fabric of military strategy and operations. While still evolving, these concepts suggest a future where warfare is increasingly dominated by autonomous systems and decentralized decision-making, fundamentally altering traditional battlefield dynamics: 

1. The Recoding of War Doctrine implies a strategic shift toward integrating more digital, autonomous, and cyber-physical systems into military operations. This doctrine is not merely about enhancing existing capabilities but redefining them. For instance, combining AI and machine learning into decision-making processes could lead to faster and more accurate responses to dynamic battlefield conditions. However, this also introduces new vulnerabilities, such as the risk of AI being compromised or acting unpredictably due to flawed data inputs.
2. The Disintermediation of the Theater of Operation by Swarm Architecture refers to the use of swarms of unmanned systems that can operate semi-autonomously to achieve tactical objectives without direct human oversight. This could significantly reduce the risk to human life and allow for operations in environments that are too dangerous for manned missions. The use of drone swarms, for example, could be employed to overwhelm enemy defenses or conduct surveillance over vast areas more efficiently than traditional methods. 
3. These swarms, potentially enabled by advancements in AI and robotics, represent a shift towards more fluid, dynamic, and decentralized forms of engagement. As noted in various studies, the ability of these swarms to self-organize and execute complex tasks could be a game-changer in military operations, offering both strategic flexibility and a significant force multiplier effect. 
4. The shift towards these advanced technologies also necessitates robust countermeasures. As warfare becomes more networked and interconnected, the cybersecurity of these systems becomes paramount. Adversaries with the capability to hack or disrupt these systems could turn a strategic advantage into a liability. This underscores the need for a zero-trust approach in military cyber practices, ensuring that systems are secure and resilient against attacks.
5. The ethical implications of such technologies cannot be overlooked. The increasing autonomy of warfighting systems raises critical questions about the role of human oversight and the decision-making processes in using lethal force. Ensuring these systems adhere to international law and ethical standards is crucial to their acceptance and integration into military operations.

The Recoding of War Doctrine and the Disintermediation of the Theater of Operation by the Swarm Architecture is set to redefine future military strategies and operations. These developments promise enhanced capabilities and operational efficiencies but also bring new challenges in terms of security, ethics, and strategic stability.

NOTE:  This OODA Loop Original Analysis was partially generated with the cognitive augmentation of and in collaboration with ALTzero Project – MattGPT.

Additional OODA Loop Resources

For previous OODA Loop News Briefs and Original Analysis on this topic, see OODA Loop|Drones  OODA Loop | Swarm

In the Wake of the Iranian Drone Swarm and Ballistic Missile Attack on Israel: Future Scenarios:  The war in Ukraine was the beginning, and the Iranian attack on Israel by a swarm of over 200 drones and ballistic missiles is now the tail end of an elongated inflection point – propelling geopolitics into a new era of 21st Century “Algorithmic Warfare” based on asymmetric attrition-based systems and drone-based swarm architectures. A tick-tock of developments and links to live update resources in Israel can be found here – followed by an OODA Loop Scenario analysis.

Swarm Intelligence and Network Swarms: Future Scenarios:  The concept of network swarms, particularly in modern conflict and security, represents a fascinating and somewhat disorientating evolution in warfare and strategic operations. The implications of swarm intelligence also extend beyond these immediate scenarios in technology and defense. They challenge our traditional notions of intelligence, control, and organization, suggesting that decentralized and distributed approaches can outperform centralized and hierarchical ones in certain contexts. Find our analysis here.

The Drone Swarm Architecture Will Transform U.S. Warfighting Capacity:  Lieutenant General (ret.) Clint Hinote, U.S. Air Force and Major General (ret.) Mick Ryan, Australian Army – Special Advisors to the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) – have co-authored a paper on “Uncrewed systems—which are now undergoing a form of Cambrian Explosion in capability, quality, and quantity…these systems are disrupting how combatants are considering risk, cost, and authority on the modern battlefield.” Find their framing and insights here.

The Defense Intelligence Agency on the Iranian-backed Drone Power of Russia and the Houthis:  Two recently declassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports extensively detail the Iranian-backed drone capabilities fueling the reconfiguration of global warfare into a drone swarm architecture – fueling what John Robb has framed as the future: asymmetric, non-nation-state kinetic capabilities organized into drone swarms enhancing the ability for warfighting capabilities “networked tribes” and “global guerrillas” usurping that of traditional military doctrine and the monopoly on the threat of violent conflict traditionally held exclusively by nation-states.

Drones and Port Security:  OODA Network Members John P. Sullivan and George W. Davis, along with co-author Tom Adams, have penned a report based on a geospatial security assessment for the Port of Brownsville, Texas (which “holds the distinction of being the sole deep-water port situated directly on the US-Mexico border”). Details of the report are found here.

The Network Swarm Attack on Israel and the Escalating Global Networked War:  Intelligence Failure? Black Swan? Gray Rhino? Systemic Failure? An entropic, sclerotic Israeli political system? The geopolitical and regional power context for the recent surprise, large-scale scale, and violent Hamas attack on Israel may prove to be “all of the above.” What is clear is the attack was designed as a large-scale, kinetic, and digital “network swarm” – which now opens up a new, “formal” kinetic front in the ongoing, global networked war in the Middle East. Swarm dynamics are a crucial mental model – which we apply here to the Hamas network swarm attack on Israel.

Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine prompts global repercussions on supply chains and cybersecurity. This act highlights potential threats from nations like China and could shift defense postures, especially in countries like Japan. See: Russia Threat Brief

Israel and Gaza: The horrors of war in the region are also giving rise to uncertainty in markets, but for now, it seems the war will not spread throughout the Middle East. Many initiatives between Israel and Arab/Persian nations have been stalled due to the war.

Economic Weakness in China: China’s economy faces dim prospects exacerbated by disasters, COVID-19, and geopolitical tensions. Amid limited financial transparency, some indicators suggest China’s economic growth is severely stunted, impacting global economic stability. See: China Threat Brief

Networked Extremism: The digital era enables extremists worldwide to collaborate, share strategies, and self-radicalize. Meanwhile, advanced technologies empower criminals, making corruption and crime interwoven challenges for global societies. See: Converging Insurgency, Crime and Corruption

Food Security and Inflation: Food security is emerging as a major geopolitical concern, with droughts and geopolitical tensions exacerbating the issue. Inflation, directly linked to food security, spurs political unrest in several countries. See: Food Security

Demographic Time Bomb: Industrialized nations face demographic challenges, with a growing elderly population outnumbering the working-age demographic. Countries like Japan and China are at the forefront, feeling an aging society’s economic and social ramifications. See: Global Risks and Geopolitical Sensemaking

Geopolitical-Cyber Risk Nexus: The interconnectivity brought by the Internet has caused regional issues that affect global cyberspace. Every significant event has cyber implications, so leaders need to recognize and act upon the symbiosis between geopolitical and cyber risks. See The Cyber Threat

Embracing Corporate Intelligence and Scenario Planning in an Uncertain Age: Apart from traditional competitive challenges, businesses also confront unpredictable external threats. This environment amplifies the significance of Scenario Planning. It enables leaders to envision varied futures, thereby identifying potential risks and opportunities. Regardless of their size, all organizations should allocate time to refine their understanding of the current risk landscape and adapt their strategies. See: Scenario Planning

About the Author

Daniel Pereira

Daniel Pereira is research director at OODA. He is a foresight strategist, creative technologist, and an information communication technology (ICT) and digital media researcher with 20+ years of experience directing public/private partnerships and strategic innovation initiatives.