In Bahrain’s recent elections, the main opposition, a Shiite party, swept lower house elections in the state dominated by a minority bloc of Sunnis. Western media reports hailed the elections as indicative of liberalization and democratic progress in the tiny Gulf state. This optimistic reaction highlights a recurring blind spot in the lens through which the west views the Middle East?maintaining the na?ve assumption that the presence of elections is the main indicator of liberalization and a definitive sign that the country is growing normatively more similar to advanced western liberal democracies.

However, a closer look at the Bahraini elections reveals growing conservatism and the creep of a poisonous illiberal mentality within the Gulf?s most open country. The real losers in this election were not the Sunnis; they were the moderates and secularists who were roundly defeated by Islamist candidates backed by Muslim conservatives?Sunni and Shiite alike. Women and liberal candidates faired poorly.

In 1997, Fareed Zakaria postulated that the next ?wave? of political movements would be the rise of the ?illiberal democracy,? a form of government that shattered western assumptions that democratic governments came hand-in-hand with strong political liberties and durable constitutionality (source). Elections in Bahrain, Egypt , the Palestinian Territories, and Saudi Arabia (municipal elections) have demonstrated ?the rise of the Islamist? within the Arab world. Political theorists and Islamist governance specialists make theoretical arguments that Islamism and political liberalism are not incompatible, but both history and the rhetoric of modern Islamist leaders demonstrate otherwise.

The upside of the ?rise of the Islamist? in Bahrain is that, unlike in Egypt and other places, anti-Americanism is not a part of the platform. While Islamists in the country tend to be more anti-American than the staunch US allies among the Sunni elite, the island?s relationship with the United States that dates back to the 19th century is not on the table for negotiation. Rather than proving a political flashpoint as it might in other countries, the presence of the US Navy?s Fifth Fleet brings a feeling of security to the government in the looming shadow of a potentially imperialist Iran . Shiites in Bahrain who make mention of supporting Iranian ambitions to extend a sphere of influence to Bahrain will be put down quickly by the government.

Increased conservative representation is likely to manifest itself in arguments about sharia courts, theology in government schools, and the role of women in society. Liberal Bahrainis, especially liberal Sunnis, will stem any attempts to turn Bahrain into a theocracy by using the power of the state-appointed upper house to curb the machinations of the lower house and ruling by royal decree. This could lead to growing dissatisfaction on the part of conservatives if expectations of influence brought about by electoral success are not realized. Rather than serving as a vent to release pressure of an underrepresented majority, events like these can act more like a hole in the dike.

Bahrain has, thus far, been an oasis of openness and economic, political, and social liberalism within the conservative Gulf region. But this is the case only because less than five percent of the country made it this way, primarily by royal decree and the influence of wealthy liberal families like the Kanoos and Fakhros. For Bahrain, the era of democratization, occurring simultaneously with the ?era of the Islamist,? could be enough to drain this oasis.