In response to Washington?s aggressive campaign to bring Tehran and its nuclear program before the UN Security Council, the Iranian IAEA delegate stated, ?The US has the power to cause harm and pain. But the US is also susceptible to harm and pain. So if that is the path that the US wishes to choose, let the ball roll.? Should Iran act on this vague threat, there are three likely avenues:

(1) disrupting the world?s oil market;

(2) countering US efforts in Iraq , Lebanon , and the Palestinian Territories; and

(3) initiating a terrorist attack against US allies, overseas interests and installations, or the homeland itself.

The success of US-led efforts to derail Iran?s nuclear program, among a broader campaign to destabilize the Iranian government, will determine the course and degree of Tehran?s reaction.

As the world?s fourth largest oil producer and daily exporter of more than two million barrels of crude oil, Tehran can raise the price of oil significantly by cutting or curtailing the amount it provides to the global market. Additionally, Iran controls the Straits of Hormuz?a vital waterway for transporting Persian Gulf oil to its global customers. If Iran cuts oil exports, fires on oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, and/or blocks the waterway, the US as the world?s largest oil consumer will suffer severe economic consequences. However, ?oil as a weapon? is a double-edged sword; the Iranian government relies disproportionately on oil sales in its revenue base, and the loss of such revenue would handicap its ability to govern. Moreover, disrupting the global oil market would harm Tehran?s energy partners in Moscow and Beijing; the policy is plausible only in the unlikely event that both countries vote against Iran in the UN Security Council .

The United States, the United Kingdom , and the Iraqi government have all censured Iran for its interference in internal Iraqi politics and aiding the insurgency . Specifically, Iran has provided advanced improvised explosive device technology to Shiite militias and allowed insurgent elements to crisscross the Iran/Iraq border. Maintaining strong ties with many of the Shiite political and religious leaders in Iraq, as well as armed Shiite militias, Tehran has the capability to disrupt Iraqi civil society significantly and challenge Coalition efforts to build stability. Within Lebanon, and recently detailed by the New York Times? Michael Slackman, Iran has taken steps to increase its influence following Syria?s military departure. Already possessing a close relationship with Hezbollah , Tehran has initiated a friendly outreach program with various Sunni, Druze, and Christian groups operating in Lebanon (see this WAR Report). Iran could use its growing influence in the historically tempestuous Lebanon to counter US efforts at promoting democracy and a friendly government in Beirut. Similarly, Iran has increased its involvement in the Palestinian Territories, funding various Palestinian terrorist groups for operations against Israel . Likewise, Tehran supports Hamas? refusal to recognize Israel and promised to fund the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority should it lose crucial Western aid. Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides an additional forum in which Iran can threaten US interests: the creation of a durable peace settlement.

Through the Ministry of Internal Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Tehran maintains a vast and nebulous terrorist infrastructure. Iran is the world?s leading state sponsor of terrorism, acting as financier and trainer for terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East. With links to Hezbollah, Palestinian terrorist organizations, and al-Qaeda , Tehran has the capability to organize and finance a terrorist attack against a US company or diplomatic installation abroad, US ally, or in an extreme case the US homeland. Indeed, Tehran?s predilection for using terrorism as a foreign policy tool is an acute motivator behind the international community?s efforts to prevent Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon.

Regarding its pursuit of nuclear energy, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei declared, ?if Iran quits, the case will not be over” (source). His statement represents a belief among hard-line Iranian officials that the US government is pursuing the Iraq model to achieve regime change in Tehran: presenting a WMD case in the UN, funding domestic and exiled organizations opposed to the Iranian government, and refusing to take the military option ?off the table.? This is an essential point: the governing forces in Tehran will view threats to its nuclear program within the context of a broader campaign to destroy the Islamic theocracy. Buoyed by increased oil prices, economically aligned with Security Council members Russia and China , and witness to the US military burden in Iraq, Tehran is likely to demonstrate restraint given its comfortable strategic position. However, should the international political dynamics change and the Iranian government feel threatened, the US and its allies should be prepared for all economic, political, and security measures at Tehran?s disposal.