The US? foreign policy toward the Middle East and South West Asia region is predicated on three main issues:

(1) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,

(2) dismantling terrorist organizations, and

(3) installing democratic principles and governments.

In the following report, these three critical issues will provide the framework of analysis for predicting Iran?s behavior in 2006. On all three fronts, Iran has and will continue to work actively against US interests. With nuclear weapon aspirations, control over a network of terrorist groups, and a hard line theocracy that limits democracy, Tehran is acutely aware that a successful US foreign policy threatens its power projection capabilities as well as the very existence of its government. Iran has the intentions and capabilities to significantly oppose the US in 2006.

Nuclear Weapons

The US government firmly believes Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Iran maintained a secret nuclear development program for two decades until a domestic opposition group?Mujahadeen-E-Khalq ?uncovered it and brought their discovery to the world?s attention. Tehran has steadfastly maintained their sole interest is in developing nuclear energy for the Iranian people. Iran, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is allowed uranium enrichment capabilities and has asserted that right throughout negotiations with Great Britain , France , Germany (E-3) and recently Russia . However, both sides understand that an unmonitored process can easily produce weapons’ grade uranium.

Tehran had purchased materiel and nuclear weapon blueprints from the AQ Khan (WAR Report) nuclear black market and also failed to provide complete cooperation with the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Washington, DC has supported the diplomatic efforts of the E-3 to reach an agreement with Tehran. However, discussions aimed at ensuring a monitored Iranian program with the sole capability of producing peaceful nuclear energy failed in 2005.

In 2006, Iran is likely to continue its nuclear energy development and continue to explore a nuclear weapons program covertly. The year will likely be marked by the same cycle of promising and derailed negotiations with the E-3 that have failed to delay Iranian nuclear progress. Undermining western efforts is the absence of a legitimate threat to Iran?s nuclear program. An effective military strike is currently unfeasible: the intelligence on the dispersed array of underground nuclear facilities in Iran is weak. Further, a military strike by an external enemy would unite the country’s disparate sectors, solidifying support for the hard-line clerical regime and undermining society?s more moderate elements (WAR Report). Additionally, referring Iran to the UN Security Council and imposing economic sanctions is also an untenable option. Due to their strong economic and energy relationship with Tehran, both China and Russia would block any UN authorized sanctions penalizing Iran over their nuclear program (WAR Report).

Terrorism

For the past 21 years, Iran has actively lived up to their designation by the US government as a state sponsor of terrorism. Through the institutions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Iranian government finances, arms, trains, and provides safe haven to multiple terrorist organizations. Tehran?s creation of a terrorism network that extends throughout the Middle East region has effectively become an arm of Iranian foreign policy, borne from an effort to spread the Islamic Revolution and develop a viable threat against conventionally superior enemies? namely the United States and Israel .

In 2006, Iran will continue to support terrorist organizations with a specific focus on Palestinian groups. In the last several years, Iran has worked through the Lebanese Hezbollah (a creation of Tehran and loyal supporter) to strengthen relationships with Palestinian Islamic Jihad , Hamas , and Fatah?s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade . Hamas leader Khalid Meshal recently visited Tehran, met with high-level leaders of the Iranian government, and vowed to attack Israel should Jerusalem launch a pre-emptive strike at Tehran?s nuclear capabilities. Hezbollah has also established a beach-head in the recently vacated Gaza Strip, creating an easy access point to arm Al-Aqsa operatives with Iranian funds for attacks against Israel. Moreover, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahamdinejad has voiced solidarity with Palestinian terrorist groups and issued multiple threats against Israel, including a call for the country to be ?wiped off the map? (WAR Report).

In the coming year, as the democratic impulse increases in Lebanon , there may also be a strengthened call by its citizens to disarm Hezbollah and give the national government a monopoly of force in the country. Iran will be loathe to lose such a powerful proxy in the Levant and will act to prevent their disarmament. Such a development would bring Tehran closer to Damascus and would also bring relations with the international community ? particularly the US and France– to a head.

Democracy

As a repressive theocracy and the world?s leading state sponsor of terrorism, the Iranian government is actively opposed to America?s foreign policy priority of spreading democracy. The US government believes establishing democracy in the Middle East region and beyond is the long-term solution to winning the War on Terror. The underlying belief is that free and open societies will be inhospitable to terrorism and will elect governments opposed to state-sponsored violence. In 2006, Tehran will continue its clash against the western model of democracy by undermining American efforts in Iraq.

The American-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq (see this WAR Report) has brought significant benefit to Iran. The Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, a bitter enemy, has been removed, and the subsequent democratic process has brought to power Shiite political groups with close connections to Tehran. However, the establishment of a functioning, stable democracy in Iraq would be a monumental success for US foreign policy and would validate their vision for modern Middle East governments. Moreover, it would serve as a rallying example for Iran?s domestic population: a demonstration of an Islamic country with a fairly elected government responsible to its people. The Iranian populace is overwhelmingly young and has endured years of rule by a theocracy that fails to provide economic opportunity, manipulates elections, and cracks down on political expression.

To prevent this outcome, Iran has acted carefully to promote instability in its neighbor, while avoiding an all out incitement for civil war. Tehran is likely to continue to fund Shiite militias based in southern Iran and allow insurgency elements to criss-cross the border, avoiding detection and capture. If they can maintain a sense of chaos in Iraq throughout 2006, Tehran hopes American forces will leave in disgrace and a Shiite-dominated Iraqi population will turn toward the Islamic Republic of Iran for assistance and guidance. Despite the protestations of American, British, and Iraqi officials, there have been no negative consequences that would dissuade Iran from continued interference in Iraq.

Conclusion

Tehran heads into 2006 with a very strong foreign policy built on a successful track record of being able to direct their regional and international relations. Hence, it is unlikely that Tehran’s external patterns of behavior will deviate from previous years. The unlikelihood of a military strike against Iran’s nuclear program, combined with the protection offered by Beijing and Moscow from UN economic sanctions indicates that Iran will continue playing games with European negotiators while moving forward with a nuclear energy and weapons program. Iran will continue to enhance its power projection capabilities by maintaining support and influence over terrorist organizations while avoiding significant repercussions from the international community by claiming ignorance of the groups’ actions. Iranian forces will also act to undermine the installation of a stable, equitable democracy in Iraq as a means of exerting influence over their neighbor and foiling an American success story in the region. Moreover, Tehran has a strong interest in blocking a model of democracy that could inspire a young, restive Iranian population suffering from exorbitant rates of unemployment, inflation, and a lack of political freedoms.