One of the difficulties in researching, studying, and analyzing the phenomenon of “terrorism” is that the word is infused with so much hyperbole, that its use has become pervasive, and, thus, it no longer can be utilized as an effective keyword search or data-collection term. The Washington Post article is a case study of how a US investor is chaffing at Chinese corruption and threatened violence in a business deal that turned sour. Although the American claims to be a victim of “economic terrorism,” few with similar stories in Africa, Latin America, Europe, or even the US would use such a phrase. An academic economist in Shanghai notes: “In China, the legal system and state power are completely intertwined. Government officials control the process, and they tend to abuse the process when their own interests are on the line.” In Texas, at best, they call the same system the “good-old boy network” and at worst ? corruption. Nowhere does the journalist link the thugs who took control of the disputed factory to any known political or separatist group nor does he report any actual violence, although certainly intimidation and the threat of violence loomed.

However, the most interesting development is the Chinese government’s rather public discussion on how to maintain order in an increasingly economically and informationally open society. Chinese authorities officially reported an increase to 74,000 protests, riots, and related disturbances in 2004 over some 58,000 similar events in 2003 ? approximately a 25% increase in violent public unrest admitted by the government. While there is even some public acknowledgement that the military response to break up the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 were much too brutal, there is the opposite fear that local police will sympathize with protesters and not contain current and future unrest. RAND analyst Murray Scot Tanner notes: “The government now finds itself with a dilemma. How to contain these sorts of things without either excessive violence or without sending the signal that people are free to protest is very, very difficult.”

Since 1989, Chinese planners have sought to develop a third security force, often referred to as paramilitary police, for crowd control and dispersal, trained in use of tear gas, riot gear, and other non-lethal equipment. This is becoming increasingly important as both officials and even sociologists have observed that the threshold event triggering flash crowds and violence appears to have been lowering over recent years. Last week, the Los Angeles Times reported an article by military commander Wu Shuangzhan and political commissar Sui Mingtai in Qiushi (Seeking Truth), a twice-monthly publication of the party’s governing Central Committee, focused on the use of paramilitary forces in anticipation and demonstration and response to spontaneous unrest. Western estimates posit that the number of paramilitary forces nationwide has doubled from 600,000 in 1991 to roughly 1.2 million today for just such purposes. No doubt that they will play a significant, if not preeminent, role in maintaining security in preparation for, and the conduct of, the Beijing Olympics in 2008.