Recent demonstrations in Turkey have awakened a conversation that had fallen out of public interest: should Turkey be admitted into the European Union? Three years have passed since any progress was made in accession discussions. In that time, international tensions have risen and, domestically, Turkey has become embroiled in frequently violent, youth-driven demonstrations. Although Turkey has worked toward achieving some reforms in recent years, civil rights issues and democratic deficiencies still pose a serious blockage to Turkey’s induction as a full EU member. Furthermore, the acute lack of progress in previous accession discussions casts doubt on the benefit of future negotiations.

Hopeful progressivism has been sprouting in Turkey since at least the early 20th century and it has long stood with one foot in traditionalist, religious-ruling schemes and the other in forward-thinking Western practices. Turkey has been involved in European consolidation efforts since the mid-20th century, beginning as far back as the Ankara Trade Association in 1963. Turkish officials have craved the benefits of economic fellowship with strong European powers for decades and took steps toward achieving this end with their 1987 bid for candidacy in the European Economic Community. In spite of their efforts, Turkey has not been fully embraced by European powers, and current events are causing some to question the true compatibility of Turkey with European interests, practices, and legal standards.

Determining Turkey’s admittance into the EU can be considered through a cost-benefit analysis based on the current realities. Strategically, the geo-political benefits of Turkey’s addition to the EU are high. Nestled between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey’s physical positioning alone proffers diplomatic influence and communicative ability in radically different political spheres. Massive critical oil pipelines pulse through heart of Turkey and would help secure positive influence in further petroleum exportation.  Some speculate that the EU’s inclusion of Turkey would also be well-received among Islamic youth throughout the Middle East and translated as a gesture of good will.

While there are many strong opposition points to Turkey’s induction, such as their ability to shoulder the sizable tax burden included with EU membership, perhaps the most significant blockage to Turkey’s admission remains glaring ideological differences with dominant European states. Turkey has worked hard to establish an international reputation as a quasi-Western, secular government that is progressively minded and open to change. For instance, Turkey has made concerted efforts in recent decades to align its domestic policy with baseline European standards. These reforms include the abolition of the death penalty, increased equality for women and Kurdish ethnics, and tougher standards on torture. Additionally, Turkey contributed well to military efforts in Afghanistan and has admirable relations with Israel.

Although these changes are good, EU member states should question the ultimate motivation of Turkey in implementing human and civil rights policies on such “short notice,” and especially ones that seem to require a significant if not established legal history of respect and concern for basic rights. Can cultural norms and and biases be erased with quick legislation?  Is it possible for a country suddenly to become convinced that it needs fundamental changes in its legal and cultural attitude toward civil and human rights? Or are these changes the result of a checklist mentality toward European attitudes on human rights? These questions are only a few that arise when considering Turkey’s beneficial yet sudden domestic policy changes.

One small but significant example highlighting ideological differences between Turkey and some EU members is Turkey’s blatant disrespect of free speech standards. News sources report that to help restrict violence allegedly caused by inflammatory posts on social media pages, Erdogan recently shut-off Internet access during riots in Istanbul. How can Turkish policies like these be reconciled with Western countries who only last year championed Internet as a basic human right? How can countries with such different domestic policies pursue amicable relations?

In addition to these persistent, substantial questions, Turkish diplomats have expressed concern that the door is quickly closing on amicable conversations. It has been three years since the last talks, how long will it be until talks are resumed again? The historical pattern speaks for itself. Of the 13 chapters that have been opened, only one has been completed. At that rate, it would be decades before Turkey would be granted membership. Is it unlikely that EU member states could work through the EU acquis in a manner timely enough to appease Turkish diplomats and still allow for reasonable consideration and debate.

Despite mounting questions and concerns, it would be foolish to ignore the strategic advantages of good diplomatic relations with Turkey. To this end, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has proposed granting Turkey a privileged partnership with the EU, an alternative to granting them full membership. This option seems best given the urgency expressed by Turkish diplomats and the obvious advantages of maintaining strong relations. Only time will tell if the ideological differences between Turkey and strong EU member states will pass beyond possible political reconciliation, justifying the lengthy consideration of their induction.