The coordinated New Year?s Eve bombings in Bangkok (Terrorist Incident forthcoming) portend insurgent attacks in the country in the near-term. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the eight bombs that killed three people and wounded more than 30, but the government has blamed supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who was ousted in a military coup d?etat in September. Suspicion also fell on Muslim guerrillas who have been fighting a bloody separatist insurgency in the south, though the government has discounted their culpability.

The attacks utilized small bombs and targeted a parking area near a shopping mall, a small open market, two police posts, and a bus stop at Victory Monument, one of Bangkok?s busiest locales. The use of bombs, some or all reportedly packed with nails, against public venues and security forces on a holiday likely to be thronged with revelers suggests a strategic targeting rationale of:

-attacking Thai security forces,

-causing significant carnage indiscriminately to Thais and foreigners,

-deleteriously impacting Thailand?s political and national stability, its tourist sector, its overall economy, and the government?s stability and legitimacy.

While the signature of the bombings does not definitively point to a particular group, the attacks are likely the work of Thaksin loyalists and supporters, seeking to undermine the government and catalyze Thaksin?s return to power. This camp may include Thaksin loyalist politicians and military elements; poor, rural Thais from the north (Thaksin?s former powerbase); and potentially involve collaboration with anti-junta activists. Recent TRC coverage of Thailand noted that Thaksin loyalist elements and anti-junta activists may represent insurgent elements under a junta-backed government (see September 27, 2006 WAR Report). These attacks may represent an early salvo of an organized militant insurgency against the government.

However, the attacks? indiscriminant targeting of Thais and foreigners and their carnage-causing nature is reason for pause. Such attacks would be seemingly dissonant to loyalists? assumed strategic political goals of causing panic, terror, and instability, and attacking and destabilizing the government, but avoiding indiscriminant and wonton attacks, might alienate a Thai populace that may be needed to usher in Thaksin?s return. In targeting security forces, urban Thais, and foreigners, the Thaksin loyalists may have designed the attacks to avoid the camp?s core constituency. Thus, the attacks likely represent either an operation by Thaksin loyalists to stoke panic and terror or one perpetrated by more extremist elements of the camp bent on a more militant campaign. A key indicator of the perpetrators and the likely nature of the insurgent campaign will be found in the nature of the next similar attack: if it is refined and calibrated to cause panic and attention, but not necessarily widespread carnage, or, one mirroring the Bangkok bombings.

It is less likely that Muslim insurgents from the south perpetrated the attacks, as such an audacious foray into the capital would mark a significant departure from their past modus operandi and a dramatic expansion and escalation of their campaign from what had been a relatively provincial separatist insurgency in the south. The attacks come amid intensified insurgent attacks in the south targeting police, soldiers, government officials, and moderate Muslims perceived as collaborating with the government. This stepped-up campaign has included an invigorated recruitment drive and the expansion and consolidation of control over the Muslim population in the south. The escalation in militancy represents the insurgents? general rejection of peace and reconciliation overtures by the government. Thus, the Bangkok bombings may represent the opening salvo of a national offensive, particularly among the more extremist Muslim insurgent elements, intentionally designed to take the fight to the heart of the government: Bangkok.

With either Thaksin loyalists or Muslim separatist insurgents likely launching a pivotal escalation in their respective insurgencies and with both groups aggrieved with the machinations of the current government, Thailand is likely to experience an upsurge in insurgent attacks in the near-term.

Based on the apparent modus operandi and strategic targeting rationale of the New Year?s Eve attacks and those of the two insurgent camps, both groups would likely target government installations and security forces and possibly population-dense public spaces in a strategy of attacking, de-legitimizing, and destabilizing the government.