International leaders and foreign policy specialists are calling for the US government to engage Iran and Syria diplomatically in hopes of reaching a regional, cooperative approach that improves the worsening political and security situation in Iraq . Likewise, media speculation suggests the future recommendations from the highly anticipated Iraq Study Group will also advocate such an approach.

However, the violence and political turmoil in Iraq is not a product of Syrian and Iranian machinations. It is the work of local actors and extremist forces that are not beholden to the regional agenda of Damascus or Tehran. While the US has nothing to lose in speaking with Syria and Iran, cooperation from these states will not result in Iraq?s stabilization.

Moreover, it is unlikely that talks would produce a viable agreement on Iraq, as both countries are heavily invested in an anti-US, anti-Israel strategy that seeks to diminish western influence in the region. In exchange for their cooperation on Iraq, Iran and Syria will seek concessions on non-negotiable issues for the US, including the Iranian nuclear weapons program and Syrian power in Lebanon .

Areas of Concern

There are specific areas in which the US and Iraqi national government would seek more cooperation from Syria and Iran. From the former, secure its eastern border to prevent the infiltration of weapons and crisscrossing of Sunni insurgents into north-west Iraq. And close the safe haven provided to Saddam loyalists who reportedly run insurgent activities in Iraq from bases on Syrian territory. From the latter, cease training, arming, and financing Shiite militias in Iraq?specifically their rogue elements, which drive the country?s sectarian warfare.

Cooperation on these issues would aid the security mission of US and Iraqi forces but is unlikely to have a significant stabilizing effect on Iraq. A tightening of Syria?s border with Iraq could disrupt the incoming flow of insurgents, but certainly not end their infiltration of the country nor address the issue of thousands already operating in Iraq. Should Iran end its sponsorship of Iraq?s Shiite militias, it could provide a temporary depreciation of their capabilities. Yet, the splinter groups responsible for the intense escalation of sectarian attacks are capable of, and already do, self-finance through standard criminal enterprises such as kidnapping, extortion, and arms smuggling.

A significant contribution to Iraqi stabilization?ordering the Shiite militias to end their sectarian attacks–appears beyond Tehran?s capability. The diffuse manner in which they have spread their money to Iraqi Shiite militias and to some Sunni armed elements indicates a bid for influence rather than real command and control authority.

Concessions do not Match Deliverables

Were the US to engage in a real politick, quid-pro-quo arrangement with Iran and Syria, the deliverables for Iraq simply do not match the significance of the concessions.

Damascus may require the US to end its support for Lebanon?s March 14 coalition and the international tribunal on the Rafiq Hariri assassination , in effect allowing Syria to once again becoming suzerain of Lebanon. Iran would likely demand a free path to develop an indigenous and autonomous nuclear energy/weapons program.

Barring significant concessions, it is unlikely Syria and Iran will voluntarily help the US mission in Iraq. This does not preclude a strengthening of relations between the Iraqi national government with Damascus and Tehran. The recent restoration of diplomatic relations between Iraq and Syria, as well as Iraqi President Talabani?s high profile visit to Iran is indicative of such a development. However, only after an eventual American withdrawal (or the announcement of a withdrawal timetable) will Iraq?s improved relations with these countries yield meaningful results.