Following Thailand?s bloodless military coup last September, the popular confidence in the interim government?s governing ability continues to erode. Economic missteps by the interim government, a lack of traction in pacifying the Muslim insurgency in the south and investigating the New Year?s Eve bombings in Bangkok, and halting machinations toward a restoration of democratic civilian rule has raised fears of long-term junta power mongering. While the country remains relatively stable at present, the government is under intense pressure to right the economy, establish security in the face of insurgent attacks, and begin transition to civilian rule before its increasingly unpopular rule rallies Thaksin loyalist, anti-junta/civil society, or general populace elements to insurgent protest and possible rebellion.

Though stacked with technocrats who were seen initially as a steady hand for national political and economic affairs, the interim government bungled early economic policy moves, destabilizing the economy. Strategically advantageous peace overtures by the government towards Muslim separatist insurgents in the south have been met with an up tick in guerrilla violence. The investigation into the New Year?s Eve bombings has faltered, with the only suspects thus far arrested being released and the police chief heading the police investigation, seen as a Thaksin loyalist, fired for not making headway on the investigation. Popular frustration has also grown with the slow pace of the redrafting of the constitution, a circumstance perceived as likely to delay elections and the return to democratic civil rule. As a result of these developments, the government?s approval rating has nose-dived to less than 50 percent, while Thaksin?s popularity is on the rise.

In relatively positive developments, the government has lifted martial law in over half the country, including Bangkok, keeping it in place in the rural north, a known Thaksin powerbase and in the insurgency-wracked south. Also, junta leader General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin vowed that the government would hold democratic elections within the year to temper perceptions that the junta has designs of remaining in power indefinitely.

New Year?s Eve Bombing Intrigue Deepens: Muslim Insurgents Revisited

Despite the government?s belief that the New Year?s Eve bombings were the work of Thaksin loyalist elements and not that of Muslim separatist insurgents, the head of Special Investigations looking into the bombings, Sunai Manomai-udom, recently suggested a potential link to the southern insurgency. Sunai has said that an individual identified as Thawansek Paenae, seen on security cameras near one of the bomb-sites, is also wanted for attacks in the south. He is reportedly one of three people, all identified as being from the south, picked-up on security cameras. However, both Sunai and Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont have cautioned that the information does not conclusively link the bombings to southern Muslim insurgents and that investigations will continue.

This potential linkage to Muslim separatist insurgents refocuses scrutiny on their possible role in the bombings, counterbalancing the theory blaming Thaksin insurgents. As the January 3, 2007 WAR Report noted, Muslim separatist involvement is less likely than Thaksin loyalist insurgent involvement, but certainly plausible. The nature and targeting of the bombings, intended to cause indiscriminant carnage against Thais and tourists in Bangkok, suggests a strategic rationale consonant with that of the southern insurgents. However, the attacks are dissonant to the Muslim insurgents? heretofore modus operandi and operational scope, having fought a relatively provincial ethno-nationalist separatist campaign largely focused within the Muslim south. If Muslim separatists were behind the bombings, it would represent an audacious foray outside their traditional area of operations, and a pivotal strategic escalation in the scope of their insurgency to strike against the very center of gravity and power of the government: Bangkok. Such a strategic escalation could conceivably be part of the recent intensification of Muslim insurgent operations in the south.

The suggestion of a linkage to Muslim insurgents comes within the context of an investigation in to the bombings that has yet to produce any definitive public evidence of Thaksin loyalist involvement. While the government has stated that they believe Thaksin loyalists from within the police and military are likely culprits, 19 suspects that had been detained in recent days, including government officials and military officers, were determined not to be involved and were released. Because of the halting and ineffectual nature of the police investigation into the bombings, coupled with suspicions of Thaksin loyalties, the National Police Chief, General Kowit Watana, was dismissed by the junta-installed government. Though a speculative theory at this point, the dismissal may have been compelled by perceptions among the junta that Kowit was seeking to protect potential Thaksin loyalist perpetrators through foot-dragging in the investigation.

At present, these developments in the New Year?s Eve bombing investigation have renewed the plausibility of theories that either Muslim separatist insurgents or Thaksin loyalists may be involved. In either case, the bombings would represent a pivotal escalation in each camp?s insurgent campaign?the southern Muslim insurgents striking outside the south and in the government?s capital city; and Thaksin loyalists launching an opening salvo of violent rebellion?and portends further attacks in the near term. In addition, an environment in which the interim government continues to be perceived by some sectors as incompetent in stabilizing the economy, establishing security, and restoring democratic civil rule, will likely erode further any popular support for the junta, energize Thaksin loyalists and anti-junta insurgency, and rally civil libertarian and general popular protest and rebellion that will challenge the government and national stability.