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The rapid proliferation of low-cost drones has outpaced U.S. counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) capabilities, creating a critical vulnerability across defense and civilian infrastructure. A recent June OODA Network discussion underscored a stark reality: the United States remains dangerously exposed to low-cost drone threats despite having technical solutions, due to regulatory, procurement, and supply chain barriers.
Without streamlined regulations, scaled domestic manufacturing, and rapid procurement reforms, the U.S. will remain behind adversaries in the fast-evolving drone warfare paradigm.
During the recent June OODA Network meeting, members emphasized that while the U.S. possesses kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare tools, and directed energy systems to counter drone attacks, operational deployment of most mitigation measures cannot proceed in a comprehensive way due to many complex issues. Significant changes are required to enable addressing this threat in more than just a patchwork way.
Some examples of complexities that must be addressed include: complex jurisdictional issues and authorities, FCC regulatory issues that impact radars as well as directed energy defenses, a variety of complexities at scaling any defensive system (lasers have limitations due to thermal blooming, guns have limitations due to magazine depth, missiles have limited inventory), firing shells can cause urban collateral risks.
Recent examples that have grabbed attention include:
But the OODA network has long been discussing the strategic revolution the use of drones has had on warfare. We use the analogy of other great revolutions in military affairs. This is clearly one that we must adapt to quickly both in our own offensive capabilities and defense for our military but now clearly for defense of our critical infrastructure and homeland defense.
The vulnerabilities are immense.
Many in our community have been conducting research, analysis and physical assessments of vulnerabilities of key infrastructure to drone attack for years. Exemplary research and reporting has been done by John Sullivan and George Davis. The many articles and reports they have done include research into drone attack vulnerabilities of key ports and the sophisticated use of drones by international criminal groups and cartels.
Rick de la Torre highlighted the PRC use of drone swarms which are producing massive light shows for entertainment over cities while demonstrating how this dual use technology can be turned into a horrendous military capability we must be able to defend against. Rick’s analysis is based on decades of national security experience, but was also informed by research produced by others including the GAO and Modern War Institute. Clearly this threat is being studied by a wide range of actors.
Our research has also covered defensive systems. The Golden Dome initiative calls out the need to defend against drone attacks, and many believe this system, designed to counter nuclear attack, will also inject much needed defenses across the military.
David Bray has published research and analysis on the need for both increased drone capabilities for the U.S. DoD (especially Indo-Pacom) as well as the need to defend against attack.
We have published recaps and examinations of the threat and DoD’s responses to prepare for this new way of war.
The OODA Company Directory, a reference we have built out of the most disruptive technology companies we encounter (in our Defense Tech category), includes a good listing of counter drone capabilities which show the type of solutions being offered by industry.
Strategic reports, including a comprehensive CRS background report, highlight the evolving threat landscape, while recent Congress.gov hearings reviewed small UAS requirements and projected capabilities to inform future procurement and doctrinal decisions.
Recent OODA network member discussions have highlighted the need for more than just awareness across multiple organizations. When issues like this cut across multiple cabinet level departments and jurisdictions, awareness and individual action by various actors is not going to lead to a solution to the issue, at least not on a timeline that can help meet a threat that is here today. At our June member meeting, a discussion led by Mike Groen included a detailed examination of this topic, underscoring the need for cross-agency action across the federal government but also action at state and local levels.