The rapid proliferation of low-cost drones has outpaced U.S. counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) capabilities, creating a critical vulnerability across defense and civilian infrastructure. A recent June OODA Network discussion underscored a stark reality: the United States remains dangerously exposed to low-cost drone threats despite having technical solutions, due to regulatory, procurement, and supply chain barriers.

Summary

Without streamlined regulations, scaled domestic manufacturing, and rapid procurement reforms, the U.S. will remain behind adversaries in the fast-evolving drone warfare paradigm.

During the recent June OODA Network meeting, members emphasized that while the U.S. possesses kinetic interceptors, electronic warfare tools, and directed energy systems to counter drone attacks, operational deployment of most mitigation measures cannot proceed in a comprehensive way due to many complex issues. Significant changes are required to enable addressing this threat in more than just a patchwork way.

Some examples of complexities that must be addressed include: complex jurisdictional issues and authorities, FCC regulatory issues that impact radars as well as directed energy defenses, a variety of complexities at scaling any defensive system (lasers have limitations due to thermal blooming, guns have limitations due to magazine depth, missiles have limited inventory), firing shells can cause urban collateral risks.

Recent examples that have grabbed attention include:

• The 1 June 2025 surprise attack by Ukraine against Russian strategic bombers (Operation Spider’s Web)
• The 13 June 2025 Israeli attacks against Iran which included use of drones launched inside Iran.

But the OODA network has long been discussing the strategic revolution the use of drones has had on warfare. We use the analogy of other great revolutions in military affairs. This is clearly one that we must adapt to quickly both in our own offensive capabilities and defense for our military but now clearly for defense of our critical infrastructure and homeland defense.

The vulnerabilities are immense.

• The US Strategic Triad: Our own strategic bombers and the shore infrastructure for SSBNs are vulnerable, as is any SSBM in port.
• Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Power substations, ports, and energy facilities remain unprotected from small drone strikes.
• Supply Chain Dependency: The U.S. relies heavily on Chinese components for sensors and optics, raising strategic risks.
• Innovation Bottlenecks: Startups demonstrate promising systems, such as 3D-printed drone interceptors, but face fragmented procurement pathways and limited integration into defense and homeland security frameworks.

Why This Matters

• Expanding Threat Surface: From strategic weapons to energy facilities and ports to urban targets, drones pose asymmetric risks.
• Technology vs. Regulation: Effective counter-UAS systems exist but are hampered by regulatory constraints, especially FCC rules limiting jammer deployment.
• Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Heavy reliance on Chinese manufacturers for optics, sensors, and core components undermines strategic resilience.
• Innovation Gaps: Startups developing solutions of all types, including 3D-printed interceptors and man-portable solutions face procurement and integration barriers within DoD and DHS.

Background on The Growing Threat

Many in our community have been conducting research, analysis and physical assessments of vulnerabilities of key infrastructure to drone attack for years. Exemplary research and reporting has been done by John Sullivan and George Davis. The many articles and reports they have done include research into drone attack vulnerabilities of key ports and the sophisticated use of drones by international criminal groups and cartels.

Rick de la Torre highlighted the PRC use of drone swarms which are producing massive light shows for entertainment over cities while demonstrating how this dual use technology can be turned into a horrendous military capability we must be able to defend against. Rick’s analysis is based on decades of national security experience, but was also informed by research produced by others including the GAO and Modern War Institute. Clearly this threat is being studied by a wide range of actors.

Our research has also covered defensive systems. The Golden Dome initiative calls out the need to defend against drone attacks, and many believe this system, designed to counter nuclear attack, will also inject much needed defenses across the military.

David Bray has published research and analysis on the need for both increased drone capabilities for the U.S. DoD (especially Indo-Pacom) as well as the need to defend against attack.

We have published recaps and examinations of the threat and DoD’s responses to prepare for this new way of war.

The OODA Company Directory, a reference we have built out of the most disruptive technology companies we encounter (in our Defense Tech category), includes a good listing of counter drone capabilities which show the type of solutions being offered by industry.

Key Points – OODA Loop Follow-on Research on Counter-Drone Defense

Strategic reports, including a comprehensive CRS background report, highlight the evolving threat landscape, while recent Congress.gov hearings reviewed small UAS requirements and projected capabilities to inform future procurement and doctrinal decisions.

• In response to escalating drone threats, the U.S. Marine Corps announced plans to deploy counter-drone systems across its units by 2025, prioritizing force protection and operational readiness.
• Meanwhile, Congress has called for comprehensive Department of Defense (DoD) assessments to guide counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) investments and close critical gaps.
• These concerns echo longstanding warnings, such as those raised in USNI Proceedings, that the U.S. counter-UAS capability gap remains urgent and persistent.
• The U.S. Army is also embedding counter-drone defense into its broader transformation strategy, recognizing drone threats as central to modern warfare (CUASHub).
• Recent congressional hearings led by Representative Rob Wittman further underscored the urgency of addressing these capability gaps across the services.
• Joint force efforts are underway to create integrated counter-small UAS solutions, as detailed by the Association of the United States Army, with the First Army advancing specialized counter-UAS training programs to ensure operational competence.

Recent OODA network member discussions have highlighted the need for more than just awareness across multiple organizations. When issues like this cut across multiple cabinet level departments and jurisdictions, awareness and individual action by various actors is not going to lead to a solution to the issue, at least not on a timeline that can help meet a threat that is here today. At our June member meeting, a discussion led by Mike Groen included a detailed examination of this topic, underscoring the need for cross-agency action across the federal government but also action at state and local levels.

Concluding Thoughts

• Awareness of the threat is high, but that is not sufficient: It is a positive that multiple organizations in DoD, DHS, the law enforcement community are aware of the threat and some are taking action. But as mentioned above there are cross jurisdictional issues that must be addressed meaning leadership will be required to ensure collective action.
• Regulatory Reform: There are multiple examples of places where regulatory reform will be needed. One clear one is in streamlining FCC and interagency approval pathways to deploy electronic countermeasures domestically.
• Domestic Manufacturing: Many defensive systems are dependent on PRC produced components. Expansion of the ability to produce U.S.-based critical components (e.g., sensors, optics) is easier said than done and also requires leadership.
• Procurement Acceleration: The US Government procurement system has a hard time moving fast, but has shown it can adopt to a crisis. This should be treated like a crisis to ensure operational counter-UAS architectures can be designed and fielded.
• Doctrine Update: Doctrine moves slow, probably far too slow to have an impact on this fast moving threat, but still, doctrine should move. There needs to be more policy work on integrating counter-drone strategies into broader homeland security and critical infrastructure defense planning.
• Joint Integration: Driving multi-service and interagency collaboration to unify standards, procurement, and deployment and doing so at speed is critical.